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Foundations of Public Administration
Public Service, Ethics, and Democracy
Louis C. Gawthrop

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Given the substantive nature of democracy, as opposed to its purely procedural aspects, the essence of public sector ethics in America, and the principal emphasis of this compendium of articles, will focus on a systemic body of ethical/moral values, virtues and visions, which converges on the democratic ideal of the common good. According to the laws of physics, maximum strength is to be found in the process of triangulation. Considered in terms of democratic governance, the triangular linkages of democratic values, virtues, and visions create the essential bond of unity that steers the democratic process toward the common good. The readings presented in this collection have been selected on the basis of how they relate to one or more of these primary focal points.

In addition, the articles included in this compendium reveal the major fluctuations over time that mark the development of public administration in America. The unique aspect of this evolutionary process, so to speak, is that each successive cycle does not erase its predecessor cycle. That is to say, depending on how specific one wants to be, the theory and practice of public administration in America have evolved through at least four or five (or more?) iterations, yielding increasingly more complex administrative

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processes and patterns of design. Does each cycle or era shape its own particular normative approach to public sector ethics? The articles contained in this compendium are designed to evaluate this query in depth.

Given these introductory comments, it seems appropriate to begin by noting that it was the triangular confluence of values, virtues, and visions that caused the Founding Fathers to fashion a system of democratic governance, nurtured by a secularized body of ethical/moral precepts that were geared to achieve the common good.

As viewed by the distinguished historian of American religion, Sydney Ahlstrom, July 4, 1776 had a long period of gestation beginning with the turn of the Seventeenth Century. According to Ahlstrom, the long-term revolutionary nascency that evolved...was the revolution in men’s hearts, to which, in John Adams’s view, the Declaration of 1776 gave only belated expression. And the source of its strength lay in the religious substratum, which was always Nonconformist, Dissenting, and Puritan in its basic disposition....A new conception of freedom and equality took shape, involving conceptions of God, man, human rights, the state, and history, which became inseparable from the Enlightenment’s outlook on reality. On July 4, 1776, these conceptions became a cornerstone of the American political tradition....In the words of the nation’s Patriot heroes and Founding Fathers these ideas were woven into the very texture of American thinking. The American nation was born in the full illumination of the Enlightenment, and this fact would permanently distinguish it from every other major power in the world (Ahlstrom, 439-440).

Ahlstrom continued to describe a comparable revolutionary ground swell that took place at the time of the founding of the nation:

In one very important respect ... Americans were participating in a fairly revolutionary departure from the traditional precepts of natural law. Reflecting a typical Puritan emphasis on inward experience, they shifted the emphasis from the order of nature and government to the reality of natural rights. In other words, they “interiorized” the significance of natural law and rendered it more man-centered, stressing human rights rather than cosmic order, the individual rather than the state, liberty rather than obedience (440-441).

From this early background, a normative system of ethical/moral values, virtues, and visions infused the procedural aspects of democratic governance and, long before the beginnings of the Republic, this system assumed a core position in the forefront of America’s body of beliefs. Throughout the course of American history, this belief system has encountered so many bumps in the road that it is probably more accurate to acknowledge that the bumps are the road. Nevertheless, as the subsequent pages will demonstrate, although the journey has not always been smooth, the development of a sense of public service has been an integral factor in giving meaning to the systemic body of normative precepts that form the keystone of democratic governance. As we grapple with the many challenges facing democracy in these early years of the Twenty-first Century, with all of its many dimensions of hi-tech sophistication, we cannot
improve on the wise insight of the Royal Governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, John Winthrop, as he prayed with his Pilgrim followers before they disembarked from their ships to begin their new adventure:

*We must strengthen, defend, preserve, and comfort each other.*
*We must love one another, we must bear one another’s burdens.*
*We must look not only on our things, but also on the things of our brethren.*
*We must rejoice together, mourn together, labor and suffer together* (Miller, 82).

Winthrop’s prayerful hope for the Pilgrims is as sound and as relevant today as when first offered; indeed, it could clearly serve as a clarion call for a future of public service in the name of democracy. To bring this sentiment into current perspective, one needs to turn to the sage of modern public service, Dwight Waldo.

“Administration was present ‘at the creation’,” Dwight Waldo pronounced in one of his valedictory lectures presented during his final semester at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School in 1979. By this he meant there was a closely interrelated network linking civilization and administration. Administration “was an integral part of civilization whenever and wherever civilization developed; and without the foundation and framework it supplied, civilization would not have developed,” Waldo concluded (17, 24-25). What Waldo more specifically implied is that from the very beginnings of civilization there were individuals who were willing to serve some “higher authority,” how-

ever that term was defined (Gawthrop, 1998, 80). Indeed, at the earliest times of ancient history it is apparent that there were followers who were given authority by their leaders to implement the leaders’ decisions. Their function was to serve exclusively at the pleasure of their leaders. The basic demands imposed on history’s administrators were (and still are) fairly universal. They were expected to demonstrate the virtues of obedience, loyalty, trust, courage and, of course, a willing subordination to their respective higher authorities.¹

In contrast to the millennia-old notion of service to some higher authority, the notion of a service committed to, and derived from the body politic — the people — is, by no means, as old as civilization; in fact, the notion of public service in the name of democracy is not very old at all if a few hundred years can be considered recent, given the historical sweep of time. Of course, as with all good generalizations,

¹ Some sources include competence as one of the essential characteristics of the administrative class. In my view, competence is a given, recognizing, of course, that incompetence not only runs, but frequently gallops through the annals of administrative history. I take my stand with H. L. Mencken, as quoted in The Sun, Baltimore, Maryland. June 3, 2007, p. B7:

*One time, years ago, Mencken was checking copy coming in from the night editor and sighing at the rising number of errors he was noticing, errors of fact but also of syntax, and even some idioms that didn’t sound quite right. He shook his head and said, as much to himself as to the editor at his side: ‘The older I get the more I admire and crave competence, just simple competence, in any field from adultery to zoology.’*
this assertion needs to be qualified. For example, one
could cite the Athenian Oath that bound all of the
residents of that Greek city-state to a common link of
service to one another and to the polis – *i.e.*, the
common good. Or one could point to the extensive,
sophisticated, and comprehensive humanitarian
health and social welfare systems devised by the civil
authorities of the city of Florence in response to the
Black Death scourge of the Fourteenth Century (the
bubonic plague) that swept across Europe.

In response to this crisis, the notion of a *public service*
was embraced by the city’s governing officials and its
administrators by assuming responsibility for the care
of the indigent, infirmed, aged, orphaned, starving,
dying, and dead (Gawthrop, 1998. 85). As a conse-
quence, this welfare initiative resulted in 1) an in-
creased democratization of the Florentine govern-
ment stemming from the broader public participation
in the policymaking process, 2) a significant increase
in the ethical/moral consciousness among the body
politic, and 3) a deeply-felt sense of civic obligation to
the common good.

Similarly, the humanitarian commitment of the
Catholic religious Order of St. Francis (the Francis-
cans), to provide social welfare for the indigent, wi-
dows, and orphans, was carried throughout Europe
more than a century before the example of Florence.
Along these lines, the role of the guilds — the diverse
organizations of craftsmen — in providing health and
welfare support for their members could also be men-
tioned, even though this would be putting a strain on
the term public service. Other examples could also be
cited, but the notion of a service made public in the
governance of a community did not become wedded
to the formal systems of government until the Eigh-
teenth Century with the beginnings of democracy in
England and America.

Just as administration was “present at the creation,”
so, also, was *public service* present at the genesis of
modern-day democracy. The notion of service to the
public, or in the public interest, is fundamentally a
democratic idea; moreover, it is intrinsically linked to
the concept of democracy as an ideal-seeking system.
The clarion call of a government “of the people, by
the people, and for the people” is a universal declara-
tion of the ideal state of a democratic system of go-
vernance. And this ideal carries with it an integral sys-
tem of ethical/moral virtues, values, and visions that
reflect the essence of democracy.

An interesting conundrum emerges, however, when
the ideal-seeking system of democracy becomes in-
tertwined with the vines of the bureaucratic version
of public service/public administration. Given the
German sociologist Max Weber’s description of the
ideal *bureaucratic system* it can be extrapolated that bu-
reaucracy was, in effect, also “present at the creation.”
Certainly the ancient Chinese and Egyptian empires
reflected virtually all of the trappings of the classical
bureaucratic system. And it is this system that inevita-
ably, and persistently, has generated a centrifugal force
designed to suppress the idea of a service made public
from its natural linkage to democracy as an ideal-
seeking system. Given the forces and counterforces
generated by these two divergent models of “service” — namely, the democratic mode versus “bureaucracy” in the classical mode — the evolution of democracy in America over the past 200+ years suggests an interesting analogy, which is to say, democracy is the parable of history.

Parables create tensions, contradictions, paradoxes. They also can present unexpected situations that come as surprises verging on disbelief. They generate what would seem to be a set of obvious circumstances, but then turn our conventional thinking on its head with a conclusion that often strains our belief system. Parables challenge us to follow new directions and to think in terms of new parabolic dimensions. The dialectical pathway of democracy has been reflected in its evolution since the days of Athens, and on this basis it seems reasonable to suggest that democracy is a parable of history. To draw from the totally unrelated writings of the Dutch theologian, Edward Schillebeeckz, who posits that only parables can explain a parable (116), if democracy can be viewed as a parable of history, then it seems reasonable to suggest that public service is a parable of democracy. As I have stated elsewhere, the development of public service in America...contains and reflects all the mysteries, contradictions, challenges, and surprises that are associated with parables. And in attempting to comprehend the substantive essence of “ad-ministering” to the commonweal, one is drawn ever closer to the perennial mysteries of democracy. The two are integrally related through a common set of values, virtues, and visions. In fact, the only hope there is in drawing closer to the values, virtues, and visions of democracy is through the engagement of public service (Gawthrop, 2002, 90).

The ethical/moral impulses of democracy are embedded deeply in the psyche of our national character. By manipulating the dynamics of our administrative systems, however, these democratic impulses can be elevated, reduced, honored, or subverted, made proactive or reactive, or viewed as authentic or inauthentic. The two-century tandem trip of the public service and the bureaucratic modes has been a roller-coaster ride in which the attention and emphasis given to one has been inversely related to that of the other. For instance, the federal administrative system was staffed by Federalist appointees for the first forty years of the Republic in a manner that could be classified as reflective of the bureaucratic mode. By contrast, the next thirty-two years, described best by historian Leonard White as the Jacksonian period, could be seen as an example of the public-service mode. But here is where the parabolic dynamics come into play. Our praise for the values of stability, continuity, competence, integrity, and loyalty infused into the national government by the Federalist administrators overshadows the bureaucratic elitism and arrogance frequently attributed to them. Similarly, the Age of Jackson can also be seen from one perspective as the democratization of the national administrative system; or, to put it in the vernacular, the elite Federalist snobs were swept out and the doors of the federal government were flung open to an administrative cadre composed of the common folk. From the end of the Jacksonian period in 1861 to the 1880s – excluding the Civil War years and their aftermath – the best in-
tentions of the Jackson era became degenerative impulses that twisted the notion of public service into a parabolic caricature of service for the self. Any ethical/moral sense of service revealed during the Federalist period was lost during these subsequent years. Jackson’s vision of a democratic commonweal gradually became a pernicious and perfidious system of political patronage — i.e., spoils — that truly put the viability of the nation’s democratic value system in grave danger.

In the latter decades of the Nineteenth Century a dynamic counterforce to this seemingly uncontrollable spread of the spoils system emerged in an eclectic form, generally referred to as the Progressive Movement. From the efforts of this reform movement, a number of measures were designed to infuse the contaminated machinery of government with the democratic ethical/moral values, virtues, and visions that were evidenced in the opening years of the Republic. Specifically, these reforms were aimed at eradicating corruption and restoring confidence and trust at all levels of government, but especially in the systems of public administration. Moreover, these reforms were designed to purify the machinery of democracy by introducing a predominate and persuasive attitude of impartial, objective, detached professionalism into the public service.

For example, from the 1883 Pendleton Act that gave rise to the Civil Service Classification System, to the initiative-referendum-recall, and to the city-manager plan — not to mention the trust-busting campaigns of President Theodore Roosevelt — the single most significant thrust of the Progressives was the restoring of a sense of fairness, justice and integrity that would serve the public in the mode of the democratic ideal. But, given the manner in which parables have a way of creating tensions and contradictions, the emphasis placed by the progressives on professionalism, shortly became the cornerstone of the Management Science Movement.

The jump from the progressive era to the management science period was significant and quite substantial. The professionalism sought by the progressive reformers resulted in the creation of a cadre of career-minded public servants who were committed to the ethical/moral values of the democratic ideal. By contrast, however, the Management Science Movement, building on the philosophy of logical positivism, introduced the elements of a totally value-free administrative system that were redirected toward embracing a mechanistic process, converging solely on the notion of efficiency. As championed by two of public administration’s founding scholars, Luther Gulick and Lionel Urwick (who, as some wag noted, were the two guys that put the “ick” in public administration), the principles of the Management Science Movement were seen as the only rational way to approach the issues of good government, civil service, civic honor and integrity.

This scientific perspective was preceded by Woodrow Wilson’s 1887 article, “The Study of Administration,” in which he argued that administration was a science and “the field of administration is a field of business” (201). This proposition was further extended by
Charles Dawes, the U.S. Treasury Department’s first director of the newly-created Bureau of the Budget, who, at the formal inauguration of the bureau in 1923, characterized the President of the United States and his cabinet members as the president and vice presidents of an ordinary business organization (172-173). The apparatus of the government’s administrative system became the workings of a “Firm” that was, indeed, secularly fixed in the classical bureaucratic mode with a vision of an impersonal, objective, value-free pursuit of efficiency. In a most serious and stern vein, Dawes best captured the temper of the times in a passage from his inaugural speech that deserves to be quoted at length.

I want to say here again that the Budget bureau keeps humble, and if it ever becomes obsessed with the idea that it has any work except to save money and improve efficiency in routine business it will cease to be useful in the hands of the President. Again I say, we have nothing to do with policy. As much as we love the President, if Congress in its omnipotence over appropriations and in accordance with its authority over policy, passed a law that garbage should be put on the White House steps, it would be our regrettable duty, as a bureau, in an impartial, nonpolitical, and nonpartisan way to advise the Executive and Congress as to how the largest amount of garbage could be spread in the most expeditious and economical manner (178).

Dawes set forth the practical tenets for those who gathered in the tabernacle of efficiency; Gulick and Urwick provided the theoretical framework needed to turn efficiency into dogma. The good intentions of the management-science adherents, bound together as they were by the mystical and magically sounding acronym, POSDCORB, were viewed as the vehicle to move the administrative systems ever closer to the ideal of a public service in the mode of democracy. Below the surface level of this projected vision, however, another set of dynamics was taking shape and, in this regard, one is reminded of the parabolic message delivered by the British poet, Matthew Arnold:

Below the surface stream, shallow and light
Of what we say we feel — below the stream
A light, of what we think we feel — there flows
With noiseless current strong, obscure and deep,
The central stream of what we feel indeed (56).

Below the surface current of the Management Science Movement, with its compass clearly pointed to a value-free search for the efficient state, there flowed a “noiseless current, strong, obscure, and deep” that was, in fact silently turning the notion of government, in general, and public administration, specifically, into a mechanistic, closed, impersonal, and purely reactionary system.

During the 1920s, the long-established bromide extolling the notion that the government that governs least, governs best became impressed on the nation’s psyche and this inevitably created a new vision of the bureaucratic mode. On the surface of the “Roarin’ Twenties”, one of the few “activist” preoccupations of the federal government and several of its subsystems across the nation seemed to be the enforcement charade associated with the Eighteenth (prohibition) Amendment. Otherwise, the closed, impersonal, mechanistic bureaucratic systems were, for all intents, effectively reduced to the maintenance of housekeeping chores. As a consequence, without any widespread
sense of ethical/moral awareness, the nation slowly but surely drifted into a state of paralyzing anxiety and subsequent despair. Although the nation rose from the dark and dank depths of the spoils system, the depression of the 1930s created an even greater demand for a revival of the democratic mode of a service made public and ethical. The *laissez-faire* tenets of the management-science period became increasingly disconnected from the reality of the times. This disconnect was most severely felt from the “crash of ’29” until March of 1933 when Franklin D. Roosevelt became president, thus marking not only the beginning of the New Deal but also the beginning of a dramatically new episode in the ascendancy of a public service clearly defined by the ethical tenets of the democratic mode.

The 1930s marked the mobilization by the federal government of the citizenry to energize a wide range of domestic policies and programs. The 1940s extended this mobilization effort in response to the dynamics of World War II. In both instances, the democratic mode of public service was in sharp contrast to the negative government of the 1920s, and it demonstrated dramatically just how much more effective — as opposed to efficient — it was than the bureaucratic vision of service. In the context of the New Deal, the democratic value components of public service were made operational in terms of organic, dynamic, imaginative, and anticipatory dimensions, with a heavy emphasis placed on the infusion into the body politic of the ethical/moral values of democracy.

In both periods – the 1930s and the 1940s – efficiency was made essentially secondary to the notions of equity and effectiveness. Economic rationalism gave way to a humanistic pragmatism, and the Management Science Movement was redefined in terms of an ethical/moral framework focused on the common good. Thus, the parable of service in the name of democracy was given a new paradigm that put the citizen closer to the processes of government than ever before and gave the citizen a sound ethical/moral basis for the acceptance of a positive, or *thinking* government, the likes of which had never before existed. The parable of the New Deal was perhaps best described by a distinguished British political scientist, Harold Laski:

*As soon as the American democracy moved into the epoch of the positive state, it could not afford the luxury of dull government. For it is the inherent implication of dull government that the dynamic of the national life is not profoundly effected by its operations; and it is to the inherent dynamic of the positive state that the operations of government are profoundly important. From this it follows that the government of a positive state, if it is to be successful, must necessarily be a *thinking government* (270-271. Emphasis added).*

Spanning the 1930s and 1940s, the citizens of the Civilian Conservation Corps, the workers of the Works Progress Administration, the draftees in the military, and the women in the wartime factories — all were mobilized to become, figuratively speaking, “public servants” committed to the values of the positive state. This period was undoubtedly one of the high points in
our nation’s history that revealed the epitome of public service in the name of democracy.

With the passing of the New Deal and the end of the Second World War, it could be assumed that, like the period following World War I, there would be a “return to normalcy,” but such was not the case. For example, when the “bravest generation” returned home from the Second World War, there followed dramatic increases in marriages, births, demands for affordable housing, college enrollments, geographic mobility, and social diversity. Even more dramatic, however, was the emergence of the United States as a peace-time world power — a role that had major consequences as far as democracy and public service were concerned.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, damage to the industrial and residential sectors throughout Europe was extensive; colonial empires were fragmented into sovereign nation-states; and a new global institution, the United Nations, was created to bring the nation-states of the world together in an international forum. In response to these situations, the U. S. was committed to assuming an extremely activist role on the global level. The stimulus for this commitment was in part humanitarian but in larger part political due to the perceived threat of the spread of communism by the Soviet Union. The net result was the beginning of a “cold war” that pitted the values and virtues of democracy against the dogmas of communism in a political struggle for the loyalty of the underdeveloped, developing, and even the fully developed nations of the world. For the U. S., this resulted in a major expansion, not only in the role, but also in the size of the federal government. International policy decisions became more expansive and complex; the specific programs devised to carry out policy became more numerous and much more challenging; and the personnel requirements needed to convert these programs into action expanded significantly.

Essentially, a new cadre of comparative and area administrative specialists was needed to administer the aid programs. Given the explosive growth of these programs, however, the supply of experienced comparatists could not keep up with the demand. Similarly, although the foreign aid organizations² were initially established as independent agencies, essentially separated from the State Department, the latter was still extensively involved in every country that was a recipient of U. S. foreign aid. In addition, the aid agencies had to operate in conjunction with a number of other federal departments and agencies — e.g., Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, not to mention the Central Intelligence Agency. As a result, directives frequently became snarled, actions were frequently negated by counteractions, and malfeasance, overfeasance, and nonfeasance in the context of decision-making discretion were not unusual occurrences. In addition, just plain ignorance on the part of many foreign aid administrators about the unique cultural differences they

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confronted caused the programs to encounter set-
backs that, in many instances, were irreparable in the
damage caused. To be sure, successes were achieved
over the years, but on balance, successful efforts to
implant the ethical/moral value systems of democracy
and a democratic public service were limited. Once
again, the attempt to move in a parabolic direction of
the common good was, in fact, reduced to the expe-
dient devices of a bureaucratic mode.

The other major development that was manifested in
the post-World War II period was basically organiza-
tional and resulted in the adoption of a decision-
making schema referred to simply as the pluralist-
bargaining-incremental system. This PBI system was
the result of a more-or-less intuitive and pragmatic
practice that had been applied for a number of years
and was finally formalized by Nobel Laureate Herbert
Simon’s *Administrative Behavior*. It was also Simon
who introduced the profession to “administrative
man”, as well as the term, “satisfice.” In the decision-
making scheme of life, it was “economic man” who
always sought to maximize his returns rationally by
selecting the most logical and obvious alternative to
pursue – *i.e.* that alternative which would yield maxi-
mum benefits at minimum costs. By contrast, admin-
istrative man sought to *satisfice*, or to select that alter-
native which was good enough to meet the specific
need at a particular point in time. As introduced by
Simon and developed in more detail by such fellow
incrementalists as Charles Lindblom and Robert
Dahl, the PBI system, and its preoccupation with the
concept of satisficing was, unfortunately, anything but
a “people-friendly” decision-making system.

In the first place, the notion of change in the PBI
perspective was severely limited by scope and time;
that is to say, all program changes were to be pre-
sented in small increments and limited to a one-year
authorization and appropriation lease. Consequently,
all large-scale decisions for change and/or requests
for multiyear appropriations were to be avoided. Se-
condly, within the PBI framework the future was un-
known and unknowable. Hence, the future (*e.g.*, to-
morrow) was shaped by the present (*e.g.*, today) which
was simply an incremental extension of the past (*e.g.*,
yesterday). Needless to say this can make for a myo-
pic and conservative approach to change. And, finally,
the emphasis placed on reaching bargained agree-
ments among the professional political actors fre-
quently was reduced to watered-down, common de-
nominator decisions that satisficed – *i.e.*, were “good
enough.” The notion of public service advanced by
the incremental perspective fitted neatly into the pat-
tern of the classical bureaucratic mode. In order to
interact effectively with their relevant elected and po-
itical officials, as well as interest group representa-
tives, career administrators had to become proficient
in the PBI process, even to the extent that, as
Lindblom advised, “...it is not irrational for an admin-
istrator to defend a policy as good without being able
to specify what it is good for” (84).

The PBI system was clearly a bureaucratic construct
that was designed to 1) achieve stability and predicta-
bility among the body politic; 2) minimize dissension
and maximize satisfaction (*i.e.*, to satifice) as far as the
bargained decisions were concerned; and 3) exclude
the general public from intruding in the decision-making process except through the actions of bona fide interest group representatives. To be sure, the PBI system was a process that worked quite effectively as long as — and this is a big caveat — the pool of political and economic resources was constantly expanding, and any expressed dissatisfaction with the resulting resource allocations was restricted in scope and intensity. The sense of effectiveness reflected in the PBI system, however, was essentially squelched when confronted with a shrinking resource base and/or an increased dissension among an expanding segment of the body politic. To deal with these contingencies (decreased resources and/or increased dissatisfaction), which became pressing realities during the Vietnam years, a page was taken out of the previous management science handbook — albeit updated and made much more sophisticated — and designated the planning-programming-budgeting system.

Introduced into the Defense Department in 1961, PPBS soon became the most contentious household phrase in administrative circles since the term “spoils system” was introduced. Compared to the incremental system, in virtually every respect PPBS was a diametrically opposite approach to organizational decision making. The only exception that can be cited with a fairly high degree of certainty is that it was as much, if not more, “people unfriendly” than was the PBI system. In the most simplistic terms, PPBS was seen as a rational-comprehensive-analytical approach to the decision-making process. Where Lindblom referred to incrementalism as the “branch method,” the rational-comprehensive approach was an example of the “root” method. In contrast to PBI, the R-C approach allowed for a more rational allocation of resources through the comprehensive analysis of all pertinent and relevant data, systematically collected. The primary focus of PPBS and its various offshoots, as mentioned below, was the maximization of efficiency, obtained through the rational-analytical assessment of program objectives, outputs, and alternatives. The operational goal of R-C analysis was to present top-level decision makers with a set of program alternatives listed in rank order of their respective cost/benefit ratios. From this position, it was assumed that policymakers would be positioned to make a rational selection of that alternative which yielded the most favorable cost/benefit ratio.

The analytical bias of the rationalists was so overriding that terms such as the common good, the public interest, or even the ethical/moral values of democracy were seldom discussed. That is to say, only if these concepts could be objectively identified as ends, and the means required to achieve the stipulated end goals/objectives could be quantitatively measured, were they taken into consideration. According to economist and former assistant budget director with the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, William Capron, one of PPBS’s principal adherents, argued that R-C analysis...

...has forced people to rethink their own roles...[as well as their] agency’s roles; it is raising questions and providing a context in the bargaining framework in which questions can be raised which have largely been ignored
in the past....it provides new ways of looking at problems (Capron, 14).

Capron, without realizing the full import of his comments, ironically captured the essence of the parable of public service.

As noted above, PPBS was introduced to the Department of Defense in 1961. In 1965 it was extended to include all departments and agencies in the federal government. The executive order that established government-wide PPBS was rescinded by President Nixon and replaced with a similar but far less rigorous, less contentious, and less comprehensive system referred to as management-by-objective, or MBO. When Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency, the pendulum swung back to a more rational-comprehensive system identified as zero-based budgeting, or ZBB. This sequence of programming and budgeting systems was extended to include a variety of other concepts such as cost-benefit analysis, public-choice theory, reinventing government (with its focus on the “customer” or “consumer”), and performance measurement/managing for results (MFR).

What has been lost in the process, however, is the presence – indeed, the absolute essentialness – of a qualitative measure of the ethical/moral virtues, values, and visions associated with a public service in the name of democracy. One promising development currently in force is a serious effort to move the qualitative aspects of public service to an active position on the parabolic spectrum. Within the bounds of the New Public Administration or the New Public Management, significant efforts are being made to develop a body of applied ethical discourse under the banner of a “new” New Public Service, whereby a focus on the democratic mode of public service offers the vision of a future in which responsiveness to the public is paramount.

To summarize, the classical bureaucratic public service model is geared to focus on responsibility while the democratic model places its emphasis on responsiveness. In a similar fashion, the same split can be
attached to the efficiency/effectiveness dichotomy. Operating in the bureaucratic mode, the central focus is on efficiency, while the democratic mode is much more skewed toward effectiveness. This is not to say that the two sets are mutually exclusive. The real challenge, however, is to develop a hybrid, so to speak, that combines the requisite elements of both, but which places principal importance and emphasis on qualitative responsiveness in achieving maximum effectiveness, as well as developing and maintaining a service delivery system to the public that embraces the ethical/moral values of democracy.

The notions of the citizen, the community, and the common good form the core of any discussion of democracy. In the final analysis, democracy is about creating wholes in regard to individual citizens, neighbors, and communities. In addition it is about developing a wholesome manner of living and way of life. Wholeness and wholesomeness are fundamental to democracy. Acting together they form the essence of an associational life; that is to say, a life lived with harmonious reciprocal relationships dedicated to the well-being of others and to the common good. The articles that are attached to this commentary were selected to emphasize this very point. If, as proposed at the outset, only a parable can explain a parable, then it would seem reasonable to suggest that the history of public administration in the U.S., if viewed in terms of its ingrained ethical/moral values, is a constantly recurring parable that tells the story, not only of service to the public, but the story of democracy, as well.


Commentaries on Public Service, Ethics, and Democracy
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I. Overview


As an introduction to the topics of public service, ethics, and democracy, the articles in this unit are brought together to demonstrate not only how wide in scope the topics can be extended, but also the depths to which they can be explored. The themes presented in each of these articles, regardless of the direction from which they are approached, prove to be timeless in their relevance for today’s Twenty-First Century public-sector administrative systems. In this sense, they serve an important function in providing a passageway to the most persistent and pervasive — and, at times, the most dynamic and dramatic — aspects of public service, generally, and public administration specifically. The linkage between ethics and democracy is, to a significant extent, forged by the caliber and character of how the public service is advanced in the name of democracy. This linkage is emphasized most distinctly by the historian, Barry Karl, in his article, “Public Administration and American History.”

Apropos of Waldo’s assertion that administration was present at the creation, Karl observes “...the development of modern democracy would be impossible without professionalism.” But here, at the very outset of our journey through the annals of PAR, we are confronted with an age-old conundrum. Down through the ages many circles of distinguished practitioners and scholars have argued that a focus on professionalism and scholars have argued that a focus on professionalism is strongly suggestive of elitism. Professionalism, it is argued, yields “expert-ism,” which, by definition, yields specialization – a perfectly normal and benign process. But the real danger to democracy emerges when the specialists start generalizing. As Karl notes, an aura of elitism is the inevitable net result. To be sure, Karl recounts, over the years the notions of elitism have been consistently soft-pedaled while the notions of professionalism and specialization have been deftly and pragmatically modulated, with the net result being a distinctive blend of “democratic elitism.”
The notion of democratic elitism was mainly reflected in a body of individuals who Karl refers to as the “American Victorians,” i.e., those individuals who reflected an intense commitment to the common good in a manner that was totally devoid of partisan politics. Actually, if one turns back to the formal beginnings of the Republic in 1798, the term American Victorians could also serve as an appropriate label for the Federalist cadre of public servants, of whom the eminent American historians, Samuel Morison and Henry Steele Commanger have observed, “...seldom has a class acted more wisely for the good of the whole than the Federalists.” 1 Nevertheless, despite the efforts over the decades to maintain a focus on the common good, the problems of linking effective management to popular democracy have persisted to the point where they are still divisive issues that need to be confronted today.

Democracy is an ideal-seeking system that is committed to the common good, the good life, or that state of being where that which is, is good. This is the ultimate aspiration of democracy. Nonetheless, time and again it has been stated that, short of unremitting anarchy, democracy is the messiest form of government. That is to say, as Richard Stillman so artfully portrays in his article, “The Peculiar ‘Stateless’ Origins of American Public Administration...,” there is nothing tidy, neat, orderly, or confidently predictable about the system of government we so ardently embrace. Government of the people, by the people, and for the people sounds nice but once the system is turned over to “the people” or their duly elected representatives, things can get messy. To embrace democracy requires delicacy and serious deliberation and, as Stillman points out, this is the result of the unique stateless character of American government, in general, and public administration, specifically. Thus, the final product of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention that was ratified by the individual states created a “state without a state,” so to speak. But what can being a stateless state possibly mean? How can there be a stateless state? As Stillman describes this phenomenon, the ingenuity of the Founding Fathers becomes increasingly apparent as they came up with a creative “stateless” compromise called federalism.

It is to these normative concepts that the other articles in this section are focused in excellent harmony. In this regard, it is Terry Cooper who posits in his article, “Big Questions in Administrative Ethics...” that the common good, or public interest as he prefers to call it, provides public servants with a moral compass. Combined with the notions of virtue, social equity, citizenship, and regime values, these normative perspectives are capable of guiding public administrators through the conflicts, contradictions, tensions and ambiguities that so clearly characterize the ebb and flow of a stateless state.

Is it reasonable to ask if it is possible to be an ethical public servant day-in-day-out over the course of a career? There is no doubt in the former Maxwell

School Dean Steve Bailey’s mind that the answer is yes. As presented in his article, “Ethics and the Public Service,” the search for the common good is always at the forefront of his message, and the challenge for public servants is to develop “the capacity to harness private and personal interests to public interest causes.” According to Bailey, this is especially true insofar as charity is concerned. The clearly transparent expression of charity is so very essential if the humanity and ethical/moral goodness of democracy is to prevail. It needs to be emphasized, however, that from the beginnings of the administrative state, with its manifestation of the phenomenon we call bureaucracy, it has been taken as a foregone conclusion in many circles that public servants must 1) operate at all times without any consideration being given to ethical/moral factors, and 2) operate at all times without assuming any responsibility for the implementation of any official and/or discretionary acts.

Viewed in this context, an ethic of neutrality, as Dennis Thompson defines it in his excellent article, “The Possibility of Administrative Ethics,” is deeply embedded in the history of public bureaucracy. The notion of a policy/administration dichotomy is the logical outcome of this ethic, as is the argument for a fact/value dichotomy. The neutered public servant is to focus on facts, not values, and on executive and legislative directives, not on policy issues. Loyalty in carrying out explicit administrative mandates is a given, and in a representative democracy the voice of the people is vetted through the legislative process. Obey or resign is the simple message that circumscribes this ethic of neutrality.

The second argument advanced by Thompson concerns the proposition that public administrators cannot be held responsible for the policy decisions or administrative actions in which they might be involved. This position is defined by Thompson as an ethic of structure that provides an age-old cover for administrative acts with the pleas: I’m not responsible; I was only following orders. This rationalization was put to rest with the Nuremberg Trials dealing with the World War II atrocities. It was extended to the Vietnam conflict and the Lt. Calley incident, and subsequently carried over to the Iraq war involving a number of incidents, not the least of which was the Abu Ghraib affair.

The ethic of structure and the ethic of neutrality are constructs designed to absolve public administrators from the heavy load of ethical responsibility that must be assumed if democracy is to be made viable. Responsibility is the fundamental “silent partner” in democracy’s inherent value set: freedom, equality, justice, and responsibility. If there is no willingness to assume a sense of responsibility to make democracy work, there is no democracy. This is one of the key points that America tries to convey to the emerging nations of the world, and it is this point that Stuart Gilman and Carol Lewis examine in their article on the cross-national or global extension of public-service ethics.

To what extent is public-sector ethics a cross-national concern? Whose ethics is at work on the global level? “Democracy and a market economy depend upon the
public's...confidence in the integrity of government institutions and public servants,” write Gilman and Lewis in their article, “Public Service Ethics: A Global Dialogue.” To be sure, there is enough evidence available to confirm that emerging nations do not find it difficult to adapt to the basic values of a market economy. Such value measures as performance measurements, profit generation, hard-nosed pragmatism, and, of course, efficiency are relatively easy to transport globally, but not so the core values of democracy. Aside from the basic values of freedom, equality, justice, and responsibility, can trust, openness, and honesty also be implanted with comparable ease? How about kindness, unselfishness, and beneficence?

The points raised by Gilman and Lewis are as valid today as they were when their article first appeared in 1996. The only additional dilemma we face today is the fact that the global system has become more densely populated and more dynamically interactive. Where do we stand today in regard to the global span of the ethical/moral values, virtues, and visions of democracy? An in-depth examination of the historical antecedents that underpin our administrative superstructures can provide a solid base for addressing such contemporary questions. Indeed, the historical antecedents cannot be ignored; they define the character of democratic public service.
II. Historical Antecedents


The previous commentary made reference to the Federalist administrative officials who served with distinction in the early years of the Republic. In the article that opens this section, “The American Bureaucrat: A History of a Sheep in Wolves Clothing,” Barry Karl examines in depth the development of the phenomenon referred to as the dichotomy between politics/policy and administration that, as seen by Karl, initially emerged in America during the Jacksonian era. It is during this period that the spoils system infiltrated the administrative confines of the Federalists and, in the process, slowly contaminated the cadres of the “professional” public servants.

The Jacksonian period created a major schism in the federal government’s administrative system as a result of the massive infusion of partisan political dynamics into that system. As a consequence, the ranks of the professional public servants — i.e., those who viewed their positions as full-time vocations, requiring varying levels of administrative competence — were perceived by Jackson and his followers as a disdainful group of elitist snobs who needed to be winnowed out in unceremonial and categorical fashion.

As a counterforce to the Jacksonians, the Progressive Reform Movement of the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries emerged with a wide-ranging agenda, including a central focus on creating a professional civil service. One major figure in this effort to create a nonpartisan, impartial, objectively neutral, and professional civil service was Woodrow Wilson whose seminal essay, “The Study of Administration” (which is the lead article in the section that follows) is generally cited as the starting point of modern public administration in the United States.

For Wilson, administration was a business in much the same way as Charles Dawes subsequently defined the role of the Bureau of the Budget. The dividing
line between politics and administration, and politicians and administrators was, as seen by Wilson, clear and certain in a manner that caused Karl to observe: “Wilson and his generation of administrative reformers were articulating a problem that was to plague...the Progressive movement and the history of reform ever since....” Just how current this Wilsonian reform thesis is evidenced was also noted in Dennis Thompson’s article in the previous section wherein he discussed in detail the contemporary presence of the ethic of neutrality.

That the policy/administration (and fact/value) dichotomies have maintained a persistency up to the present day should not be surprising. Certainly even in the context of democracy an administrative structure is needed to insure that “the laws are faithfully executed.” Conflicts and tensions arise, however, when the inherent values of the classical bureaucratic model are confronted with the intrinsic values of democracy. Sometimes the synchronization is smooth; most of the time, however, the gears just do not mesh. The classical bureaucratic method is not designed to accommodate the dynamic complexities of democracy. This closed, mechanistic, objectively neutral, nonpartisan system works best in a tightly controlled, highly centralized structure of governance. To introduce it into a democratic context is to create a major challenge that other forms of government do not have to endure. Karl’s proposition that the growth of the bureaucracy in America can be viewed as the single most unintended consequence of the Constitution’s Framers may be debatable. There is no debate, however, over the fact that an ingrained hostility toward bureaucracy was “present at the creation” of the Republic and remains alive and well today as the ever-favored object to be politically and persistently villainized. This is a reality with which we have learned to live, albeit uncomfortably. Karl observes, as he ends his essay with a final insight that is worth emphasizing: “The battle between bureaucracy and democracy is written into our history. So is the fact that democracy must win. All we have left to debate is the cost.”

For the Founding Fathers there was no debate. All of the signers of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were “democrats.” There were no Royalists among them (although Hamilton was considered to be a crypto-Royalist by many of his contemporaries and future historians). The term democracy, however, was an open-ended concept. What kind of system of governance was democracy destined to reflect? The two most fundamental models that evolved during the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention were personified by Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton, and two more diametrically opposite visions of democratic governance could not have been advanced. Lynton Caldwell’s article, “Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Heritage of American Public Administration,” provides an astute and insightful summary of the respective administrative systems of these two giants of democracy, from which one can extrapolate the ethical/moral values, virtues, and visions that define their preferred frameworks of democracy.

As Caldwell maintains, the combined talents and geniuses of Jefferson and Hamilton have provided a
solid foundation for the development of a heritage that became our national treasure. Jefferson’s decentralized sense of democracy and Hamilton’s stress on nationalism have served as the amalgam that holds our system of governance together. Despite the tug and pull of these two dynamic forces, the tension that has resulted from the clash of their respective “magnetic fields” creates that which we call democracy. This reality creates frequent consternation here at home, and it is virtually impossible to export abroad to the developing nations of the world.

The contrasting views of Jefferson and Hamilton as to how the new Republic was to be governed inevitably gave rise to a similar congressional debate in 1789 concerning the proper role of the administrative personnel who would be employed to manage the governmental system. As described by Brian Cook in his article, “Subordination or Independence for Administrators: The Decision of 1789 Reexamined,” the debate addressed two distinct and contrary views: namely, an instrumental view that was countered by a constitutive perspective.

As Cook points out, Madison was the principal proponent of the instrumental view that would place the administrative structure of the new government solely in the hands of the Congress and the President, although the instrumentalists, themselves, were split over which branch should be the sole holder of the “instrument.” The constitutive position was advanced by those who assigned a literal meaning to the constitutional wording, “heads of departments.” Such individuals, it was argued, should enjoy the same constitutional rights and independence as intended by the separation of powers doctrine. The net result of this most important debate was a dual perspective that defined the administrative system as an instrumental body with constitutive qualities. The tension created by these two challenging characteristics is still evidenced today. To be sure, the question of who controls the “instrument” was settled by Franklin Roosevelt in 1933. But the question of how much discretion, or “independence,” should be permitted public servants is still the subject of intense debate.

In the article by William Richardson and Lloyd Nigro, “Administrative Ethics and Founding Thought…,” their primary focus is centered on discussing what the instruments of democracy, and especially the administrative system, were intended to achieve in an ethical context. To this question, the Founding Fathers gave considerable attention, and as Richardson and Nigro note, the net result of these discussions was a primary focus on the elevation of an ethical excellence that was needed to sustain an abiding sense of public virtue.

Except for the procedural protections provided by the Bill of Rights, one cannot turn to the Constitution for insight in this regard. But the Founders’ concern has generated intense discussions over the meanings and appropriateness of such terms as civic virtue, the public interest, and public-spiritness. Richardson and Nigro expound at length and most insightfully on the conflicts between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists over the issue of ethical excellence. For the Anti-Federalists, such excellence was found in the
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small, homogenous communities that served as the incubators of publicness – public interest, public virtue, public welfare, and public service. The Federalists’ notion of public excellence or virtue was shaped by the commercial nationalism that blended the heterogeneous clusters of individual self-interests into the ethical excellences that formed the public interest.

For both Federalists and Anti-Federalists, public virtue and honor were integral components in the development of national esteem. To serve in the name of democracy was an honor to uphold. Similarly, the linkage between public virtue and knowledge became a critically essential element in the pursuit of honor and virtuousness. Richardson and Nigro argue that the need for a virtue-centered citizenry is greater now than ever before, and it rests on the shoulders of our current administrative cadres to assume the nurturing of ethical excellence.

The constitutional references to the administrative system of the federal government could hardly be vaguer or more ambiguous. Can public administration draw any legitimacy from the constitutional establishment of the new Republic? Was it (and is it) to be viewed solely as an instrumental contrivance or does it enjoy some degree of sanctity that melds it into the constitutional dynamic of our systems of governance? David Hart, in his book review, “The Poetry of the Constitution,” provides an invaluable and superbly written essay on John Rohr’s book, *To Run a Constitution: The Legitimacy of the Administrative State.*

Drawing from Rohr, Hart explains that public servants are endowed with a moral obligation to defend the Founding values on behalf of the body politic. In a word, they must become the guardians and the guarantors of these fundamental values, given the moral obligation they willingly acknowledge. For Rohr, the Founding Fathers earnestly believed they were engaged in the transmission of moral truths and, thus, they were obligated, ethically and morally, to explain their actions and decisions as gracefully and as clearly as possible, which is also what Hart means when he refers to the poetry of the Constitution and the poetry of the oratory that surrounded its formation.

It is in this context that Rohr, as noted by Hart, “directs us to the poetry of the Constitution, both in argument and document, to find not only the justification for an administrative state, but also for the reasons why we should believe in it ourselves.” Thus, the legitimacy of the administrative state, *i.e.*, the public service, is deeply embedded in the ethical/moral values, virtues, and visions that became, almost poetically, the oratorical essence of the new democratic Republic.

For Luther Gulick, the constitutional legitimacy of the administrative state was never in question. However, its political efficacy was, and still is, frequently questioned. In his article, “Reflections on Public Administration, Past and Present,” Gulick notes that since the beginning of the new Republic, public administration has passed through a series of developmental stages. Starting with a dream, only to be followed by the steady degenerative descent into a pit of spoils.
and corruption, the administrative cadres were resurrected as a profession worthy of honorable recognition. Gradually, however, the image of public administration shifted from that of a negative, objectively neutral caretaker to a positive and dynamic institution — *i.e.* a “fourth branch of government.”

The net result, as seen by Gulick, was the advent of a drastic imbalance in the balance of powers. The executive branch, Gulick argues, has become far too dominant in the overall scheme of our democratic system. To move into the future, Gulick notes, fundamental reforms are needed, and public administration must be prepared to assume a broader and more proactive role than it has in the past. Not only must it be prepared to assume increased responsibilities for the wide-scale implementation of policy directives, but it must also be prepared to assume proactive responsibilities within the citizenry. Public administration must become, Gulick notes in 1990, “more involved in solving problems in the field and in conciliation and education,” the relevance of which for the present can hardly be dismissed. Like most of the other selections that comprise this section, the historical antecedents of public administration have a peculiar tendency to capture the essence of our present state of governmental affairs.
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III. Ethical Codes


The values, virtues, and visions that undergird the systems of public service, ethics, and democracy cannot begin to be summarily captured in an ethical code. By the same token, however, one cannot address the domain of public-sector ethics without discussing the reality of such codes. Throughout the halls of government at all levels, ethical codes are thoroughly pervasive — but are they persuasive? That is to say, codes do no harm but do they do any good? Where do they fit in the training of young professionals, and old professionals for that matter? The articles in this section address these and other trenchant points that have been raised by the supporters and critics of ethical codes. Their presence in this discourse on public-service ethics and democracy cannot be ignored.

Phillip Monypenny’s 1953 perspective on ethical standards – “A Code of Ethics as a Means of Controlling Administrative Conduct” – presents a basic assessment that can be advanced in stating that ethical standards are extremely limited in what they can do. They can, however, serve a useful purpose for every public organization in allowing a stable, self-perpetuating, “strategic group” of senior personnel to establish such standards that are to prevail in the overall unit. This approach can be seen as ethics by imitation, where every individual in the unit sees the future as being dependent on the judgment of more senior colleagues, and particularly those senior people who constitute “the strategic group.” The ethical standards created by the strategic group become the standards for all. Viewed in this context, ethics becomes the guide to the “worthiness” of each individual member of the organization as determined by the close mentoring and proctoring by the strategic
group. From this perspective, the ethical standards become highly personalized and internalized in a manner that is strikingly similar to Robert Presthus’ “upward mobile” organization man who recognizes the old, battered aphorism, “you have to go along to get along.”

Not much can be added to the second selection in this unit, “A Code of Public Ethics,” which was adopted in 1953 by Arlington County, Virginia. In contrast to Monypenny’s situational and subjective ethical worthiness approach, Arlington’s code falls clearly into the mold of standard operating procedures by choosing to embrace an explicitly stated set of objectively defined provisions. This selection is an example of a code prepared by an external body, The Citizens’ Commission on Ethics in Government, and was composed of such leading public administration figures as Fritz Morstein Marx, John Corson, Frank Ball, Chad Gurney, and Paul Hunter. It is a good example of the basic “thy-shall-not” elements that are generally reflected in virtually all legalistic codes.

The major provisions of this type of code include prohibitions aimed at conflicts of interest, the use of public resources for private gain, the granting of special favors, avoiding the appearance of impropriety, failure to make all assumptions explicit, and the failure to seek advice from one’s colleagues (peers and/or superiors) when confronted with a difficult ethical dilemma.

The one good feature of this approach to ethics is that it pronounces very clearly that there are situations in every public organization that can yield unethical behavior on the part of individual administrators. The major weakness of this approach, however, is that it states the obvious. Any newcomer to public service who has passed his or her probationary period should have been already made fully aware of these pitfalls that border the paths of public service.

To focus the notion of conflict of interest on the federal level, the article by J. Jackson Walter, the former director of the Federal Office of Government Ethics, “The Ethics in Government Act…,” provides an excellent appraisal of how federal conflict of interest laws directly impact the recruitment and confirmation of top-level executive branch nominees.

For example, to what extent does the public disclosure of a political nominee’s personal and detailed financial interests contribute to the enhancement of the democratic process? To be sure, the sunshine laws required by the recruiting and nomination processes are admirably designed to ferret out disqualifying conflicts of interests; but do not these transparency mandates also create impediments that discourage many well-qualified individuals from pursuing a position in the public service?

Much the same can be said in regard to the issue of blind trusts. By assigning their financial holdings (i.e., stockholdings and other investments) to the management of an independent trustee (with heavy emphasis on the word “independent”), prospective nominees understand that during the course of their tenure in the federal government they will be complete-
ly blinded to the activity of their financial investments. The blind trust proviso is designed to insure that prospective nominees cannot take any actions while serving in the federal government that would enhance their personal financial interests. To what extent does this provision act to discourage well-qualified individuals from accepting positions with the federal government?

The third potentially inhibiting factor is referred to as the “revolving door” law that places a wide range of restrictions and exemptions on the post-government employment options applicable to former political executives. If one is prohibited, however, from taking any post-government, private-sector position that entails direct involvement in the same areas of responsibility as those carried out while in the federal government does that serve as a major barrier in the recruitment of top-level government officials?

These central provisos that are designed to maximize public disclosure represent, as Walter puts it, the rite of initiation into “government in the sunshine.” But even more significantly, the Ethics in Government Act brings presidential nominees face-to-face with the reality of just what it means to serve in the cause of democracy.

The subsequent article by Ralph Chandler, “The Problem of Moral Reasoning in American Public Administration,” was written at a time (1983) when the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) was seriously debating the question of adopting a statement of ethical standards as its professional code.

Given the fact that ASPA was, at that time, one of the few professional associations without a code of ethics, the discussion within the Society was anything but casual. The Society’s National Council, after extensive debate, and on the recommendation of its Professional Standards and Ethics Committee, adopted a statement of principles rather than committing the Society to a code of ethics at that time. Chandler’s contribution provides a piece of invaluable history that delves extensively into the pros and cons of ethical codes. His essay is insightful and profound, and it is as timely today as when it was written. Given the tone and temper of this opening decade of the Twenty-First Century, Ralph Chandler’s essay needs to be revisited and “redated.” To be sure, in 1984 ASPA adopted an explicit and appropriate code of ethics. The question, however, still remains: Have the profession, collectively, and its members, individually, become more “ennobled” and more “heroic” as a result of ASPA’s ethical code?

An essential companion piece to Chandler’s article is Montgomery Van Wart’s essay, “The Sources of Ethical Decision Making…,” that provides an excellent summary of how ASPA’s code of ethics evolved, and how public administrators had to draw on a wide variety of value sources to guide them through their complex and heterogeneous decision-making processes. In this context, the term “value sources” can be defined as normative (ethical/moral) decision guides or “triggers” (activators of action), and as Van Wart notes, “Depending on the narrowness of the [public administrators’] roles and the degree to which
[the roles]... are allowed to overlap, many researchers have catalogued numerous [value sources]....”

After intensive discussion and an extensive search for inputs from its membership, ASPA established a set of five basic value sources that serve today as the heart of the society’s ethical stance. The code’s five central benchmarks are: 1) to serve the public interest, 2) to respect the U.S Constitution and the law, 3) to demonstrate personal integrity, 4) to promote ethical organizations, and 5) to strive for professional excellence. Van Wart’s major contribution to the Society’s code of ethics is to be seen in the specific details and the rationale he provides for each of these five major ethical value markers.

Ideally, one seeks to follow the yellow brick road that leads to a state of ethical goodness, but inevitably the bumps in the road create ethical dilemmas. To be sure, the bright yellow road seldom turns to asphalt black; rather it shades into various hues of gray. Van Wart’s analysis of ASPA’s code of ethics provides a guide through the valleys of gray with all of the vague ambiguities that inevitably are associated with administrative decision making in the public service. There are, indeed, bumps in the road, but at a certain point public administrators have to recognize that the bumps are the road, as a close reading of Van Wart’s article makes perfectly clear.

What effects do ethical codes have? What differences do they make in the day-to-day operations of a bureau, agency, or department? Is anybody listening? In their article, “Ethics in Government....,” James Bowman and Russell Williams attempted to find answers to these questions by surveying 750 randomly selected public managers to determine their perceptions of ethics in the work place. The overall results of their survey were primarily quite positive and encouraging. A recognition of ethics as a pressing issue that needed to be addressed seriously was strongly endorsed by nearly 80% of the respondents. (There was a 59% response rate.) Unfortunately 85% also agreed that most public organizations either took a reactive, legalistic, blame-punishment approach in dealing with ethical issues, or they had no consistent approach, which suggests that ad hoc solutions to ethical dilemmas were situationally determined.

Not surprisingly, there was also wide agreement amongst the respondents that any meaningful progress in establishing a firm ethical base in any unit of government must begin “at the top.” The importance of management by example cannot be minimized if an ethical culture is to be seriously imprinted on public-sector organizations. In this regard, ASPA’s ethical code was viewed positively by most respondents in serving as a guide, a point of reference, a generalized coda in a manner that suggested it provided a sense of moral authority.

One very valuable contribution that Bowman and Williams draw from their survey is the distinction that exists between a code of conduct and a code of ethics. The former advances rule-based statutes or executive orders with the consequent effect of converting the “realm of ethics into the realm of law.” Bowman and Williams argue that this coercive, quick-fix ap-
approach usually reduces ethics to legalism with the attendant imposition of penalties for deviation. The only amendment that might be made to this assertion is to suggest that a code of conduct approach is specifically designed to reduce ethics to the level of legalism. We are far too often inclined to legalize that which is moral and then to moralize that which is legal.

Bowman and Williams conclude their study on the high note that ethical codes do have a clear purpose in that they serve as valuable guides and reference points to the enhancement of an ethical organization environment. Moreover, it is also widely recognized that the context of ethics is clearly distinct from the context of law, which is simply to say that not everything that is legal is ethical. Perhaps the most penetrating conclusion to be drawn from this study is that an ethical attitude has to be tailored to the particular culture that reflects the “DNA” of every organization, and that these ethical “chromosomes” have to be reticulated from the top-down. The odds that this progression can simmer from the bottom-up are slim to none.

Updated results of the Ethics in Government Project are presented by Bowman and Claire Connolly Knox in their most recent article, “Ethics in Government: No Matter How Long and Dark the Night.” Bowman and his various colleagues are building a very impressive empirical data base that allows them, and others, to postulate a set of ethical propositions with a fairly high degree of confidence, not the least of which is the indication that, over time, a steadily increasing and widespread sense of ethical consciousness is being evidenced throughout government. Moving from “A Winter of Despair to a Spring of Hope,” as the subtitle of the 1997 article suggests, Bowman and Knox sound a more encouraging note in their 2008 piece when they conclude, “As a new century unfolds there is reason to believe that ‘no matter how dark the night, the day is sure to come.’” Taken together, the two articles provide a wealth of provocative empirical data focusing specifically on ethics in government.
In studying administration as it spans across the historical continuum of time, one can, for instance, scan the Bible and uncover numerous examples of administration in action. Extremely sophisticated bureaucratic systems were evidenced in the ancient Chinese and Egyptian empires. Wherever civilization invaded, administration was right behind. Seminal ideas concerning early administrative systems of government in whatever form, steadily emerged, spreading over the millennia and around the globe. In the United States basic, rudimentary administrative systems were established as the colonies settled in the new world. Higher levels of organizational complexity emerged as the country evolved from colonies to states to nation. Leonard White, public administration’s preeminent historian, has documented in superb detail the development of public service in America from the founding to the beginnings of the Twentieth Century.

In his article, “The Study of Administration,” published in 1887, it was Woodrow Wilson, however, who is credited with assigning professional stature to public administration by defining its role in our democratic system of governance as a science of practical application, clearly distinct from the partisan currents of politics. At a later date, the politics/administration dichotomy was combined with the fact/value dichotomy as derived from the logical positivists. It was another of public administration’s most eminent scholars, Luther Gulick, who, like Wilson, placed public administration on an exalted professional and scientific pedestal, albeit with much more rigor and sophistication than Wilson provided.

Wilson, Gulick, and other distinguished academicians and practitioners have had significant impacts on public-sector administration at all levels of government. In addition to Woodrow Wilson, this unit focuses on six other major scholars who, individually and collec-
tively, have left an indelible imprint on the theory and practice of public administration. More to the point, however, the impact of their seminal contributions in shaping the ethical/moral content of public administration — muted and nuanced in some instances, explicit and blatant in others — has been substantial. In no small part, the public-sector administrative systems that surround us today are guided, and in most instances, imperceptibly guided by the profound ethical/moral insights derived from the collective body of work provided by such scholars as Wilson, Max Weber, Carl J. Friedrich, Herman Finer, Herbert Simon, Charles Lindblom, and Dwight Waldo.

Max Weber, for instance, in his essay, “Bureaucracy,” formalized in theory what was evidenced in practice from the very beginnings of civilization, namely, a formal hierarchical model of a classical bureaucratic system. The notions of hierarchy, such as graded ranks of authority, superior-subordinate relationships, objective impersonality, and other central characteristics were fused together by Weber to form a composite system that was designed to yield maximum administrative efficiency. Indeed, as seen by Weber, the model he advanced was touted to be the most efficient system that could be devised to deal with complex administrative operations. Within the Weberian system, the politics/administration dichotomy was clearly evidenced.

The selections by Carl J. Friedrich, “Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility,” and Herman Finer, “Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government,” have to be considered as a paired parley. Both focus on administrative responsibility but from diametrically opposite perspectives. For Finer, the legislative body in a democracy is the preeminent branch of government, and the sole functional responsibility of administrators is to implement all legislation signed into law in the most literal manner conceivable (recall the Charles Dawes anecdote referring to garbage and the White House Steps as quoted previously). Viewed in this context, administrators are directly accountable to the legislative branch whose members are the duly elected representatives of the people. Any ambiguity that might confront administrators in the discharge of their responsibilities is to be referred back to the legislative body for clarification and further direction. Like Weber, Finer’s administrator is a cog in a wheel whose only ethical obligation is to function in accordance with the literal letter of the law. As a consequence, to the extent that public administrators function in accord with Finer’s principles, maximum efficiency will be achieved and the democratic ideal will be obtained.

For Carl Friedrich, administrative responsibility must take into account the expertise of administrators and the role they play in the shaping of public policy. As seen by Friedrich such responsibility reflects an intrinsic sense of ethical/moral professionalism that reverberates in the conscience of every administrator.

Finer’s article is a direct and spirited rebuke of Friedrich whose article is viewed by Finer as nothing short of, figuratively speaking, blasphemy. The Friedrich/Finer debates, as they are often referred to,
emphasize one of the central dichotomies that invades the patterns of public administration. Where does administrative responsibility preside in the operations of the administrative state? Friedrich and Finer provide answers to this question that challenge us still today.

At first reading, Herbert Simon’s book, *Administrative Behavior*, is a ground-breaking treatise on the socio-psychological aspects of administrative organization and decision making. Viewed more incisively, however, an ethical theme that subtly draws one into the vortex of a powerfully psychological organizational system can be discerned. The notion of “administrative man” is introduced as a counter to the pure rationalism of economic man or analytical man. Delving into this multivarient psychological system, Simon argues that administrative man’s capacity for rational decision making, unlike his economic counterpart, is seriously limited, or bounded in several important respects, most significant of which is time. Simon’s notion of bounded rationality is introduced in the article included here, “The Proverbs of Administration,” and published by *PAR* in 1946. His *Administrative Behavior* book, which was published in 1947, develops the notion of bounded rationality in much more detail.

The first half of Simon’s “proverbs” article is aimed as a repudiation of the compendium of *Papers on the Science of Administration*, edited by Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick, who, together, came to represent the seminal voice of the Scientific Management Movement. As interpreted by Simon, however, these “scientific” principles were reduced to the status of proverbs. In the second half of his article, a brief preview is presented of several other concepts that are uniquely associated with Simon. For example, the notion of “satisficing,” derived from the manufactured verb, “to satisfice,” is one of Simon’s basic building blocks of incrementalism — a concept that serves as an excellent introduction to the seminal work of Charles Lindblom. Just as Max Weber turns the perennial practice of hierarchy into a theory of bureaucracy, so, also, does Charles Lindblom turn the age-old practice of incrementalism into a decision-making theory that he mischievously dubs, “The Science of Muddling Through.”

Lindblom’s “science” is centrally focused on an administrative decision-making method that follows directly from Simon’s notions of administrative man and satisficing. Lindblom introduces the reader to the root and branch methods of decision making, which are merely simplistic terms to distinguish between what he defines as the rational-comprehensive approach (root) and the successive limited-comparison approach (branch). The branch method, as laid out by Lindblom, is the preferred decision-making process that unfolds in a sequence of incremental steps, *i.e.*, small changes in limited variables. How are these “small changes” to be determined? And at this point, the influence of Simon is made manifest. A small in-

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3 New York Institute of Public Administration (1937).
crement of change is that which satisfices; that which is good enough to meet the need for the time being. If this first step is successful, it can be followed by another small increment of change that satisfices, etc.

But, this raises another fundamental question: Good enough for what? How does one determine if the incremental change is “good enough”? What, asks Lindblom, is the test of a “good” policy decision? And his response is simple and straightforward: a good policy decision is any decision for which at least majority agreement can be obtained. Agreement, then, is the key factor in the process of incrementalism and, to the extent that a good decision becomes a function of agreement, then “it is not irrational,” proclaims Lindblom, “for an administrator to defend a policy as being good without being able to specify what it is good for.”

To understand the logic that embraces Lindblom’s extraordinarily original notion of incrementalism and the value assumptions that it encompasses, his 1959 article has to be examined carefully and incisively. It is an introduction to what became, in public administration at any rate, a major school of thought.

As a special treat, a second article by Lindblom is included in this collection. The 1979 publication of “Still Muddling, Not Yet Through,” marked the Twentieth anniversary of the publication of the original article, and the follow-up essay is a gem in itself. In it, Lindblom reflects on the astonishing impact of his original article, and then proceeds to respond to some of the praise and criticism that the article en-

gendered. The two articles need to be read as one; they reflect, in capsule form, the seminal ideas of a leading scholar whose influence on public administration has been extraordinary.

Simon brought us face-to-face with the psychological realities of administrative behavior as it affected his administrative man. Lindblom led us into the pragmatic system of incrementalism. But it was Dwight Waldo who defined the centrality of public administration as the centerpiece of our democratic system of governance. His major work, The Administrative State, served as one of the definitive works in the literature of public administration.

Like Lindblom’s sequel, “Still Muddling, Not Yet Through,” Waldo revisits his original volume seventeen years later in 1965 (“The Administrative State Revisited”). One central theme that Waldo pursues throughout all of his writings is the pursuit of a sense of unity, cohesiveness and self-conscious identity for Public Administration (always capitalized as opposed to the ordinary, generic use of the term, public administration, always in lower case). In addition, Waldo explicitly dismisses the persistent assumption of the dichotomy between politics and administration, first advanced by Woodrow Wilson and subsequently presented as dogma by Gulick and Urwick in their scientific management approach. Moreover, it is the scientific management approach, and the methods of science, in general when applied to public administration, which shape much of Waldo’s critical perspec-

tive. As he notes, “the established techniques of science are inapplicable to thinking and valuing human beings,” which leave him unimpressed and skeptical of the scientific rationalists’ ability to withstand critical examination. For Waldo, the proper study of Public Administration must be grounded in a normative base, all of which, of course, puts Waldo on a direct collision course with Herbert Simon.

A close reading of his article and, indeed, a close reading of his book, provide a valuable insight to the unique expository style that characterizes all of Waldo’s work. He challenges, he confounds, he synthesizes – in short, he provokes his students to think. And for that, alone, we are deeply in his debt.

What an interesting and exciting period the decade starting in 1939 must have been. Gulick and Urwick came out with their management-science “textbook”, Notes on the Theory of Organization, in 1939. Simon’s powerful retort, Administrative Behavior, was published in 1947. One year later, 1948, Waldo’s counter to Simon, The Administrative State, was published. Three major volumes in nine years, along with the 1940 launch of what has become the profession’s premier journal, Public Administration Review – it must have been an exhilarating period.
V. Should Administration Have a Soul?


In his book, *The Enterprise of Public Administration*, Dwight Waldo poses the ultimate challenge of the day: “Why should an instrument [i.e., bureaucracy] designed to be impersonal and calculating, be expected to be effective in delivering sympathy and compassion?” One answer to Waldo’s penetrating query could be because administration has a soul. Of course, if this is true, an even more perplexing question could be asked: *Should* administration have a soul? It is at the end of David Levitan’s article, “Political Ends and Administrative Means,” that he shares a comment from a colleague, “administration must have a soul” (emphasis added). And it is Levitan who expands on that assertion by stating “...administration should contribute to the fuller development of the soul of the state.”

Levitan focuses on an administrative system that, as he sees it, was steeped in social and political philosophy, as well as democratic theory. The real challenge, as Levitan proposes, was to develop a body of “procedural law” designed to insure the fusion of broad philosophical principles with precise administrative support. “The due process of law concept,” Levitan states, “in its true historical sense, is at the very foundation of democratic government.” From his perspective, the administrative systems of government are as important, if not more important than the philosophical principles of government. “It is of supreme importance that the administrative machinery [of government] be permeated with a democratic spirit and ideal with respect for the dignity of man.” From this, one could conclude that not only must administration have a soul, but that soul must be imbued with the fundamental values, virtues, and visions of democracy.

The Levitan article is but a prelude to what follows. It is Luther Gulick, the grand designer of public administration in America, who, in his article, “Democracy
and Administration Face the Future,” reveals no reluctance or reticence in demanding our complete attention. His demands are neither dated nor purely academic, and his 1977 comments are clearly relevant for the public servants of this opening decade of the Twenty-First Century. Moreover, they are as pertinent as they are precise. If one reads nothing else in this compilation of articles, it is essential to read Gullick’s comments under the section heading, “Nature of the Failure” (p.707). To the question posed previously —should administration have a soul — Gullick’s article implicitly endorses this concept with insightful clarity and urgency.

The notion of the soul of administration is not lost on George Frederickson and David Hart, as reflected in their article, “The Public Service and the Patriotism of Benevolence.” Normally patriotism is associated with the pride, honor, fidelity, and/or love of one’s homeland. In America, it is especially reflected in the intense defense of the American brand of democracy. For Frederickson and Hart, however, democratic patriotism is not enough as far as the dynamics of a public service is concerned. The basic demand that must be evidenced by democratic patriotism is “…the intentional inculcation, and practice of benevolence—which is the extensive and non-instrumental love of others. We have termed this the ‘patriotism of benevolence’ and argue that it must be the primary motivation of public servants in the United States.”

In the article that follows, “Hierarchy, Virtue, and the Practice of Public Administration,” Terry Cooper concentrates his attention on developing a moral identity for public administration collectively, and the public administrator individually. The necessity to develop a moral framework in which an ethics of virtue can be structured becomes, for Cooper, the essential normative force needed to shape the practice of public administration. In this context, public servants have a moral obligation 1) to pursue the public interest, 2) to acknowledge and honor the sanctity of the law as reflected and applied to the myriad administrative processes and procedures, rules and regulations, and 3) to insure that standards of excellence associated with the practice of public service be maintained and advanced. It is within this framework that Cooper advances his perspective for the development of a normative ethics for the practice of public administration.

Viewed from one perspective, it could be argued convincingly that the practice of public administration is most clearly reflected in the profession’s exercise of discretionary authority, and this is precisely the main thrust of Patrick Dobel’s article on “Integrity in the Public Service.” Operating in the context of this real-
ity, the question that looms most centrally is how does one maintain a sense of ethical/moral integrity when faced with the constant challenge of discretionary decision making? As has already been discussed, one can always “satisfice”, that is, use pragmatic discretion in selecting a decision alternative that satisfies, or is “good enough.” Dobel, however, is no pragmatist. Rather, his focus on integrity as the central normative value emerges from the vortex of three dynamic and convergent forces in which the basic ethical/moral elements of discretion are fused into a holistic entity. Blending these three components—regime accountability, personal responsibility, and prudence—yields, for Dobel, a decision-making ability that is well-grounded in the dynamic of integrity. To a very real extent, Dobel’s article is a positive response to the central query of this section—should administration have a soul?

David Hart opens the final article of this section, “The Virtuous Citizen, the Honorable Bureaucrat, and ‘Public’ Administration,” with an extended quote from John Hallowell’s, The Moral Foundation of Democracy. Drawing from this source, Hart equates the role of the public administrator with that of the statesman whose primary responsibility is to inspire right action by creating, as Hallowell contends, “a social environment congenial to the realization of...those principles of conduct which will promote the forces of good already in men and of restraining that which is bad.” This, as seen by Hart, is the unique character of the “public” in public administration and it is directly relevant for our present-day systems of governance.

A recovery of the true sense of “publicness” is essential if democracy is to provide meaning for the body politic. Moreover, to paraphrase Hallowell, public administration “is not a kind of technology,” easily transposed into the dogmas and doctrines of private-sector business administration. Rather, public administration is “a form of moral endeavor” (emphasis added). For Hart, public administration is unique in its attachment to “the natural law values upon which this nation was founded....” This leads to the conclusion that Hart’s article is a lodestone of ethical/moral insights concerning the character, integrity, and virtue of the individual citizen, the common good, and, most importantly, the moral stature of the publicness of public administration. This proposition ties-in directly with the Fredrickson and Hart article in this section where it is argued that “public servants must be both moral philosophers and moral activists....” To shape “the honorable bureaucrat” in this mold is the making of an honorable bureaucracy, that unique institution that indeed has a soul.
VI. Diverse Perspectives


Is bureaucracy beautiful? Can a public administrator be described as an artisan? Are bureaucracy and democracy enveloped in shrouds of hypocrisy? These and other questions that approach public-sector ethics from a diversity of unconventional perspectives are pursued in this section.

Charles Goodsell, for instance, in his piece, “The Public Administrator as Artisan,” argues that the notion of viewing public administration as an art form has never been considered very seriously by either scholars or practitioners. By focusing on the micro-levels of public administration, Goodsell draws from the theoretical disciplines of aesthetics and art, and develops a normative framework that could provide a more relevant way of viewing public-sector ethics.

What Goodsell is suggesting is that public administrators who can attain a sense of value, virtue, or vision from the microactivities of their daily routines do, in fact, achieve an aesthetic sense of accomplishment. To achieve a sense of purposeful accomplishment in a thoughtful, competent, and considerate manner is to turn the mundane into the meaningful, the ritual into the creative, and the programmed into the enlightened. To achieve that which is fitting, which meets a need, which serves a purpose in a manner that enhances the potentialities of others is the height of aesthetic purity. Viewed from the microlevels of administration, such actions by public servants become the basis of an artful – indeed, truly artistic– public administration that offers an inspiration that is...beautiful?

For George Frederickson, great beauty is to be found in the noble purposes contained in the ideas (and ideals) that are reflected in the body of public administration. In his article, “Can Bureaucracy Be Beautiful,” he contends that the beauty of bureaucracy can be revealed in the effective management of democracy, as well as in the aesthetic quality it generates. Depending on the functional focus of the system, organizational designs, for instance, can vary considerably, and, as Frederickson suggests, the resulting forms can
clearly assume artful or artistic patterns. Similarly, he contends that “the beauty of order is beguiling; it is understood, familiar, comfortable. The beauty of change is less well-understood…” (Emphasis added).

Change can be dynamic, creative, freeing, exhilarating, and in this regard, it is the aesthetics of beauty that best describes the experience and not the strictures and dogmas of management science. To be sure, one can argue that there is beauty to be found in the routine, the habitual, the predictable; but is it really beauty that can be perceived in that which is programmed to become habitual? Soothing, perhaps; attractive for some, yes; but beautiful?

Certainly the beauty of change was in the forefront of the minds of the Founding Fathers as they approached the task of designing a system of democratic governance infused with normative aesthetics. In their verbal debates, the ideas they pursued revealed their persistence in elevating the aesthetic beauty of a people united through their diversity. The portrait of democracy they painted was an oratorical and artistic masterpiece. Unfortunately, the beauty of that portrait has become somewhat drab over the years. It needs a good cleaning. Perhaps, public administration’s primary mission for the Twenty-First Century is to restore our civic beauty. We need to make democracy beautiful again.

Viewed from another perspective, John Rohr argues in his article, “The Study of Ethics in the P.A. Curriculum,” that the beauty of public service is to be found in what he refers to as regime values. By regime values, Rohr is referring to the ethical/moral values, virtues, and visions that characterize the essence of our Republic. In this regard, Rohr’s article stands in contrast to the body of literature that bases its ethical inquiry in political philosophy or humanistic psychology. For Rohr, the proper basis for discerning the regime values that guide public administration is found in the law as pronounced by the U. S. Supreme Court. To use Rohr’s language, the ethical principles needed to guide administrators are uncovered by focusing attention on what might be referred to as the Court’s “regime decisions”, i.e., those decisions that are aimed at the core of the very being of our constitutional Republic. Thus, to the extent that public administrators recognize their obligation to embrace the democratic values, virtues, and visions as discerned from the Supreme Court’s regime decisions, the ethical/moral consciousness of the profession will be focused on the attainment of the common good.

To turn to a more somber theme as presented by Louis Gawthrop in his article, “Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Hypocrisy…” it is obvious that the notion of hypocrisy does not fit well in the context of aesthetic beauty. There is something resoundingly ugly about the introduction of hypocrisy into the democratic system of governance. And yet, it was the profession’s Grand Master, Dwight Waldo, who noted in 1977 that one consequence of the fusion of democracy and bureaucracy is the manifestation of hypocrisy. After more than two centuries of experience, can we not conclude that the core body of our democratic systems has become infested with guile and pretext, which are the basic forces that drive hypocrisy? Cur-
Currently, given the widespread designs to impose the canons of management on the intrinsic values of democratic governance, the presence of hypocrisy cannot be more apparent. The “art of pretense,” the methods of acting or playing a role or, indeed, of wearing a mask, have been infused steadily into the mainstreams of public administration. The net result has been the persistent dilution of the fundamental ethical/moral values of democracy by the frequently perfidious machinations of bureaucracy. Waldo viewed the tensions between the two forces with real concern, and as was noted previously, he left us with a tantalizing query: “Why would an instrument [bureaucracy] designed to be impersonal and calculating be expected to be effective in delivering sympathy and compassion?” Providing an answer to this challenging question is one of the main purposes of this compendium.

The article by F. Neil Brady, “‘Publics’ Administration and the Ethics of Particularity,” offers another interesting perspective that focuses on the pluralistic character of America’s democratic polity. As seen by Brady, terms such as the public interest, the public welfare, and the common good are almost inevitably invoked as universal ideals. The adjectives “public” and/or “common” are used with such frequency in nano and meta terms so as to become virtually synonymous with the term “universal.” In actual fact, however, public administrators develop their sense of ethical consciousness through the experience they gain from specific micro “particulars”, i.e., through their interactive relationships with particular individuals, particular situations, particular contexts.

Thus, on the basis of these interactive relationships, Brady contends that the public in public interest is, in fact, a set of particularistic, individualistic publics. Viewed in this context, the ethics of particularity consists of the linkage of administrative relationships to diverse, distinct, and detached entities involving individual citizens; small ad hoc groups; and formal, well-organized interests, all of which relate directly to Robert Dahl’s notion of a majority of minorities. “One function of the publics administration,” Brady concludes, “is to allow for the personal and cultural definition of value, [as well as] for a plurality of answers to the question, what is the good life?” In other words, there is no single correct way to approach the issue of ethical values in one’s professional life. Nor, as Brady observes, is there a fixed recipe for the development and maintenance of viable relationships. “Those who want to learn the art will just have to learn from someone who knows” (emphasis added).

An interesting complement to the provocative perspective provided by Brady is advanced by Carol Lewis’ excellent article, “In Pursuit of the Public Interest.” Lewis systematizes various perspectives of the public-interest concept in an effort to present a multifaceted formulation of the duties and obligations of public administrators to the values, virtues, and visions of democracy.

Lewis poses four fundamental aspects of the public interest; namely, democracy, mutuality, sustainability, and legacy. Utilizing these four concepts, Lewis advances a set of delightfully provocative, serious discussions. Democracy and mutuality are related to the
administrators’ obligations and duties in the micro and macro spheres of their daily interactions. Sustainability and legacy relate to public managers’ obligations and responsibilities for the shape of the future as perceived in the metasphere of tomorrow. For Lewis, any serious pursuit of the public interest must address each of these concepts, in sequence and collectively.

Bringing these four concepts together is no easy task but, for Lewis, it is an absolutely essential task. Hence, the pursuit of the public interest becomes an ongoing, exploratory process that is in constant iteration, evolving from the present to the future and back again.
VII. Shaping an Ethical Citizenry


One of the fundamental assumptions of an ideal state of democracy is that every civil servant is a citizen and every citizen is expected to serve in some capacity or another. For democracy to achieve its basic inten-

...tions, it must be recognized and acknowledged that every member of a democratic polity has a fundamental responsibility to serve the other. What other? Any other person, place, or thing that is in need, without — and this is an important proviso — any expectation of reward.

Marshall Dimock, one of ASPA’s most distinguished charter scholars, noted in his article, “The Restorative Qualities of Citizenship,” written shortly before his death, that the notion of citizenship is a term that incorporates an all-embracing way-of-life. While it may be a universal designation of national affiliation, the role it assumes in a democracy makes it most distinctive *vis-a-vis* other systems of government. Even in a democracy, however, the currents of citizenship ebb and flow according to the temper of the times. Moreover, evidence of responsible citizenship can be noted by its presence or absence not only on the national level but also on the regional, state, local, neighborhood and/or community levels. If a healthy citizenship is to prevail, the role of public service and its public servants needs to be restored and redirected, as Dimock observes, to assume a leading role in igniting and fanning the embers of democratic citizenship among the body politic.

Citizenship, in the democratic state, is a relational term that implies the direct involvement of the citizen in the affairs of democratic governance. Grassroots democracy is the specific term that defines citizen ac-
tivity in influencing the public policies that directly affect their daily lives. The term is normally cited to trumpet the clarion call of democracy. Is there, however, a dark side of grassroots activity? Is such activity always directed to capture the true nature of an ethical citizenry, responsibly involved in the affairs of government? Is grassroots democracy a myth or a reality?

That is the fundamental question that serves as the title of a superb book review essay by two outstanding scholars of the New Deal period, one of whom — Rexford Guy Tugwell — was the ethical/moral conscience and visionary of Franklin Roosevelt’s “brains trust”, and the other of whom — Edward Banfield — became an major scholar in his own right. The book that is being reviewed, TVA and the Grass Roots is, in itself, a classic, written by another outstanding scholar, Philip Selznick. The reviewers soundly affirm the excellence of Selznick’s effort, but in so doing they turn a book review into a valuable and insightful mini-case study of one of the crown jewels of the New Deal, the Tennessee Valley Authority project.

The term stakeholders is currently used to define one who holds a stake or share in the pot of resources (broadly defined) to be distributed by government to designated target groups of citizens of particular regions and/or for particular purposes. On the one hand, the basic thrust of the Tugwell and Banfield essay focuses on how the TVA, “operating with a national charter and with its sole excuse for being that there existed a national interest,” was to transform the Tennessee Valley region drastically. On the other hand, however, Tugwell and Banfield demonstrate with equal thoroughness and insightfulness just how a regional project that could clearly serve to enhance the common good of the nation, could also be crippled and neutered by the petty, myopic visions of grassroots stakeholders.

The authors end their essay with a qualified hopefulness. “The alternative to the grass-roots approach is not less participation by citizens; it is, on the contrary, more meaningful participation.” The real value of the essay, however, rests in its timeliness. While we now praise the richness of our demographic diversity, and hail the grassroots activity of the ever-proliferating sets of stakeholders, the nation becomes increasingly paralyzed by legislative stalemates, executive intrusions, and judicial interferences in grassroots politics. The hopefulness of Tugwell and Banfield can be admired and embraced in theory; in practice, however, their time of hopefulness has not yet arrived. The dark side of the TVA machinations still casts its shadows on the notions of grassroots democracy.

The previous articles provide an incisive introduction to the essay presented by George Frederickson, “The Recovery of Civism in Public Administration.” Indeed, the first nine paragraphs of Frederickson’s excellent essay, written in 1982, could be pulled out of context and, with minimal editing, be passed off as a capsule summary of the state of grassroots democracy.

7At the time of the writing of this book review, Edward Banfield was a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Chicago who served as Tugwell’s graduate instructor. He subsequently rose to a level of outstanding scholarly distinction.
in America during the first decade of the Twenty-First Century.
The “new civism” focuses on a public administration of the future that should be intimately tied to citizenship, the citizen generally, and to the effectiveness of public managers who work directly with the citizenry. To recover from the debilitating virus that has effected a steady decline of civism in public-administration’s traditions, Frederickson urges a reconstitution of a sense of community, a rediscovery of the means of achieving consensus, and a recovery of grassroots citizen activism. It is the new civism that incorporates the basic ethical/moral values to regenerate a viable grassroots democracy in America.

Frederickson’s notion of civism dovetails nicely with the thesis advanced by Louis Gawthrop in his article, “Civis, Civitas, Civilitas: A New Focus for the Year 2000,” which focuses on the necessity to reemphasize and revitalize these age-old concepts. The central thrust of this article rests on the ability and willingness of public administrators to enhance the essence of the art of government and redirect the currently faddish obsessions with the craft of management.

The notion of citizenship and the ethics of civility involves such values as honor, courage, and forthrightness. The gradual erosion throughout the Twentieth Century of these most hallowed democratic traits has resulted in an emergent judicial ethics of positive law as well as the development of a procedural ethics. In a very real sense, public administration has become, as the French philosopher, Paul Ricouer, has observed, expert in ritualizing the moral and then moralizing the ritual. To realign the ethical systems that are attached to the notions of citizen, citizenship, and the art of government, public administration must be prepared to revitalize the democratic essence of the citizenry. That is to say, a prime responsibility rests with public servants at all levels of government to make government interesting for the body politic, which, in the final analysis, is the engine that drives the dynamic of democracy.

To be sure, this proposition, if carried out sincerely and thoroughly, could possibly create a challenging paradox. Namely, to the extent that citizens become more knowledgeable, more involved, and more self-confident in their abilities to develop a critical consciousness as well as to assert a constructive criticism, they might become increasingly competent in the intricacies of the craft of management without giving much thought to the art of governance. By making government “more interesting” citizens could quite possibly end up replacing one set of “experts” with another.

Serving as a complement to, and an extension of the proposition that every public servant is a citizen, Ralph Chandler, in his article, “The New Public Administrator as Representative Citizen…,” introduces the notion of administrators as representatives who are committed to pursuing the dynamics of radical egalitarianism. Acting in this role, public administration...
tors assume the character of trustees of the public good; they become the dynamic change agents intent on instilling a sense of critical consciousness in all citizens with whom they come in contact. As representative citizens, public administrators become fiduciaries of democratic values, virtues, and visions, and in the process, elevate the term grassroots action to a position of wholeness and wholesomeness.

If one can view democracy as a secular religion, then Chandler's excellent portrayal of administrators as representative citizens, completely imbued with the ethical/moral values of grassroots democracy, needs to be given serious consideration. In line with Frederickson's notion of civism, Chandler's administrator/representative citizens are committed to the restoration of civic friendship and the renewal of bountiful community values. Indeed, in the final analysis, Chandler's article is a clarion call to all of those representative citizens to become custodians of the fundamental ethical/moral values of democracy. These values, as perceived by Chandler, must be invested in the body politic at all levels of government, and the burden of this responsibility rests substantially on public administrators. Viewing public administrators as representative citizens is a vision that would indeed forge a new role in our system of democratic governance.

A different perspective of the ethical values associated with the terms citizen and citizenship is advanced by John Rohr in his article, "Civil Servants and Second-Class Citizens." Approaching the subject from the viewpoint of public law, Rohr begins by stating that the meaning of citizenship in our legal system is a "surprisingly impoverished concept." That is to say, there is no legal obligation of citizenship found in the body of U.S. law. It is the "person" who is protected by our legal system, not the "citizen."

Rohr provides an excellent historical summation of the evolution of the term citizen as a spin-off from the monarchical term, "subject." As he notes, the classical Greek and Roman traditions of citizenship were unabashedly elitist. Even as the term citizen evolved into the monarchical term "subject," only to revert back into a republican version of citizen, public servants assumed a decidedly elitist position by virtue of their exclusive functions in republican democracies.

Rohr argues that career civil servants in America need to shed their inferior sense of second-class citizens. They need to accept, both intellectually and functionally, the fact that they are an integral part of a governing elite that serves an exclusive role in the system of democratic governance. They stand as an elite body of representative citizens, to borrow Chandler's term, committed to broadening the base of citizen action, participation, and direct involvement in the systems of governance. To change the citizen from a passive consumer of government services to an active and dynamic participant in the governing process requires a fundamentally different role for public servants. As I have discussed elsewhere, it requires a shift from

the traditional posture of boundary-guarding agent to one of boundary-spanning agent. Rohr’s move in this direction creates a body of elitists, to be sure, but an elite body of change agents who have the principal responsibility of creating a holistic sense of citizenship. This elite body of civil servants has the opportunity, Rohr concludes, “to fulfill the highest aspiration of citizenship in their own lives, and ...they can offer the same opportunity to others. Theirs is a noble calling.”

The essay by David Hart, on decentralization and citizen participation (“Theories of Government Related to Decentralization and Citizen Participation”), takes a radical turn that centers on what he refers to as a revolutionary proposition. Hart draws the outline of a citizen who is a full and absolute participant in a radically reconstituted, ideal democratic environment. Hart defends this position as an essential offset to the steadily increasing centralization of power in both the public and private sectors. By contrast, the total decentralization of power in the public sector to the grassroots citizenry, Hart argues, is the only feasible way to reverse the negative, dehumanizing trend toward ever increasing centralization. Hart, however, inserts one caveat: namely, an absolute commitment to the ethical/moral values of democratic governance must precede the commitment to decentralization. That is to say the latter is to be instrumental in promoting and, one might add, protecting, the former.

Hart deals with the intricacies of participatory democracy in a comprehensive and scholarly fashion, but by his own admission, one final question remains: Why should the citizen participate? What is needed to answer this fundamental query, says Hart, is a new theory of democracy that will engender and support the vision of an ideal participatory system. This, in turn, requires the emergence of a metasystem in support of a grand participatory schema that maximizes citizen participation at all levels of government and in all capacities. The difficulty presented, Hart observes, is severe; but the rewards for success are dramatically invaluable.

The final article in this section by Terry Cooper, Thomas Bryer, and Jack Meek, “Citizen-Centered Collaborative Public Management,” seeks to define a viable role for the citizen in a democratic society through direct engagement in the process of administrative collaboration. The authors provide an interesting summary of the historical shifts that have characterized civic interaction, beginning with the early Puritan settlements. An insightful, valuable, and intriguing conceptual model of various approaches to citizen-centered civic engagement is explained in detail. The model flows from an outer ring of adversarial approaches to civic involvement, to the core center where dynamically interactive, citizen-centered collaboration is realized. The centripetal forces that move the process through five levels of engagement are examined in detail. The authors conclude their essay by addressing a series of, essentially, ontological questions that reflect deeply embedded ethical/moral values. Who initiates civic engagement? Who is involved in the process? Why should citizens be involved? Where does civic engagement take place?
In probing for the answers to these queries, one becomes enveloped in the fundamental ethical/moral values that buttress a citizen-centered collaborative public management designed to bring democracy and governance into a dynamically evolving, interacting system.
Commentaries on Public Service, Ethics, and Democracy

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VIII. Meta Ethics


To introduce this unit that focuses on some of the meta-ethical discourses that imbue the public administration literature, Kalu Kalu’s article, “Of Citizenship, Virtue, and the Administrative Imperative: Deconstructing Aristotelian Civic Republicanism,” sets the normative context reflected in each of the accompanying articles. For Kalu, citizenship is viewed either as an instrumental duty to the state (as in the case of Aristotle’s civic republicanism) or as a normative right. In the former instance, one has to do something in order to be someone. Citizenship, in this instance, is therefore a function of having and doing. In the latter case, however, citizenship is taken as an ingrained characteristic of one’s normative being.

Viewed in this later context, each citizen’s obligation to the state is a matter of individual choice (which, of course, runs counter to the proposition that every citizen has an equally ingrained responsibility to serve, in one manner or another, in the name of democracy). To be sure, every individual has the option not to serve in any normative sense. The instrumental model of citizenship, as reduced to Aristotle’s civic republicanism, will suffice. But, as Kalu argues, the virtuous citizen is the product of a normative state that links the individual to the state in an intractable bond of democratic being. Thus, citizenship becomes a function of civic virtue that, in turn, sets forth a reciprocal relationship that Kalu perceptively defines as *eudaimonia*—“the state of being well and doing well at being well.” Or, another way of presenting this eschatological concept is as a state of being where that which *is*, is good.

Kalu warns against the contemporary loss of the liberal egalitarian tradition through the increased imposition of instrumental mandates by the state. The real
challenge, therefore, for public administration is to achieve a civic convergence of a normative sense of being good in an eschatological context and an instrumental sense of doing right in the practical observance of the law and the state. To bring the two together is the challenge of our liberal tradition that is best met by those who serve in the name of democracy, which should be just about all of us.

Moving from an eschatological focus on ethics, Michael Harmon advances an epistemological perspective of organizational theory that is principally grounded in the deceptively simple term, “action theory” in his article, “Decision’ and ‘Action’ as Contrasting Perspectives….” Harmon’s action theory is presented as a counter to Herbert Simon’s morally neutral decision theory, which, as Harmon observes, has been accepted quite uncritically by most organizational theorists. Contra Simon, Harmon shapes his action theory on the basis of the writings of the widely recognized scholar of phenomenology, Harold Garfinkel, in a manner that allows Harmon to shape his action theory in a definitive moral context.

Unlike the decision context in which most organizational theory research is conducted, Harmon’s action theory addresses the socio-ethical-moral context in which decisions are made. Moreover, action theory provides a more plausible epistemology of social life. Finally, it puts at its core an openness to the direct involvement of the moral goodness of organizational action. For Garfinkel, as well as Harmon, the moral good is found in the ever-evolving human situations where ethical/moral values, virtues, and visions can serve as guidelines, signposts, or ideals. In the final analysis, it is the action-producing “good” that constitutes the principal source of moral worth for public-sector organizations in their efforts to attain the value-oriented and action-generating precepts of democratic governance.

Robert Denhardt is also concerned about the loss of a sound, normative grounding in the body of public administration’s historical and philosophical perspectives. In his article, “Toward a Critical Theory of Public Organization,” Denhardt turns to the philosophical writings on critical theory with particular emphasis on the writings of the distinguished German philosopher, Jurgen Habermas.

Denhardt provides an excellent summation of the rise of critical theory with its base in the Frankfurt School of social philosophy. Rejecting the tenets of the rational, scientific method as a social-control mechanism, the thrust of the critical theorists is to emancipate the individual from the vice-like strictures of logical positivism.

Drawing on Habermas, Denhardt applies the thrust of critical thinking to the public sphere, in general, and public administration, in particular. An examination of conventional public organizations from the perspective of critical theory would reveal 1) the extent to which they are a major source of bureaucratic domination in our lives, and 2) the extent to which modes of critical thinking can reveal to public administrators and the citizenry at large the reality of such
domination and the manner in which it can be eliminated.

Critical thinking provides a method of developing alternatives to the bureaucratic-domination model that is so pervasive in our society. In contradistinction to the rational-scientific approach, critical thinking offers the opportunity to devise new dimensions of effective public actions that yield a well-informed citizenry, in possession of a viable and active state of critical consciousness. In this context, “critical democracy” becomes a much more vital and meaningful undertaking that restores the ethical/moral components of democratic governance.

Just as Denhardt is influenced by Jurgen Habermas, Michael Smith turns to the existentialism of the French scholar, Gabriel Marcel. Smith’s article, “Self-Fulfillment in a Bureaucratic Society…,” starts with the premise that our bureaucratic organizations are the prime inhibitors of attaining any degree of individual self-fulfillment on the part of public administrators. As seen by Smith, self-fulfillment is the state of being where one individual relates to another with total openness, trust, and loyalty. Honor, dignity, and fidelity become the watchwords of the "whole" organization man.

Marcel is vague, if not outright pessimistic about the prospect of self-fulfillment being realized in large, bureaucratic organizations. These are not exactly the breeding grounds for Marcel’s perceptions of love, hope, and fidelity. Smith, however, is more adventurous. The best that Marcel can advance is the development of an inner self-mastery, i.e., a disciplined sense of self that permits his honorable man to disengage from the bondage of large-scale bureaucratic systems and to operate in the context of a seemingly hermetically sealed environment. This elaboration of the self allows each individual bureaucrat to relate to the other, every other, as the I becomes related to the thou or, as Smith says, “Find your true self through fidelity to the other thous.”

Smith finds hope in the development of the existential dynamics that become aligned to the patterns of participatory democracy in the bureaucratic context. In this regard, small becomes beautiful for Smith who emphasizes that successful participatory management efforts depend on reducing the decision-making nexus to the lowest point practical in the overall bureaucratic context. Self-fulfillment is found in the intimacy of collegiality and fraternity, and in this regard, the honorable bureaucrat, for Smith, is closely akin to the “parenthetical man.”

The parenthetical man is drawn from Alberto Guerreiro Ramos’ article, “Models of Man and Administrative Theory.” The article, later expanded to book length,10 reflects the imaginative insight of an outstanding scholar whose rich and varied life ended much too early, thus depriving the profession of the full import of his intellectual vision.
In his article, Ramos traces the evolution of administrative theory that began in the late 1880s, with the appearance of what he designates “operational man.” This model is characterized by Ramos as a passive being, programmed to fit the control mechanisms of an all-knowing organization. Operating in a neutral, value-free environment in which no consideration need be given to ethical factors, the key motivating impetus for the operational man is determined by a calculative balancing of social and economic rewards.

With the emergence of the Human Relations School, triggered by the Hawthorne Studies, a new model of organizational man is identified by Ramos as “reactive man.” As seen by Ramos, the concept of reactive man derives from the work of social psychologists who argued that the internal work environment was the important psychological variable conducive to achieving maximum performance outputs. In contrast to these two models of “organization man” (operational and reactive), Ramos sets forth his vision of an organization composed of parenthetical administrators. In this context, he envisions a state of being that is suspended, i.e., bracketed off, from the currents of the traditional operational/reactive models. As a result, the parenthetical man, acting in a suspended state of being, is able to exert a highly developed sense of critical consciousness of the hidden value premises that undergird the traditional models of administrative man.

Ramos’ parenthetical model extends to include life styles and organizational designs that are increasingly evidenced as counters to traditional systems. This tendency is reflected in the growing attempts to establish nonhierarchical and client-oriented organizations. The traditional organization is now faced with a critical encounter, Ramos argues. “We need no less than a radical critique of organizational reason.” Given the time of its publication in PAR (1972), the radicalness of this piece cannot be overstated. It came at a time when “up the organization” was the clarion cry for dynamic and systemic change. The vision of a radical parenthetical man as advanced by Ramos may be dated, but its implicit substantive theme and focus is as recent as tomorrow.

To move one’s intellectual focus from the microlevel of inquiry to the macrolevel is an everyday occurrence for most students of administration. To move beyond the macrosphere and to venture into the metalevel, however, is to move into the seemingly “mystical” systems of philosophy and theology, i.e., of metaphysics. Unfortunately, this is a realm that few are prepared to venture.

Curtis Ventriss, however, is not hesitant to draw us into the depths of this metasphere with his excellent book review essay (“Modern Thought and Bureaucracy”) of Ralph Hummel’s, *The Bureaucratic Experience: A Critique of Life in Modern Organizations*. With patience and persistence, Ventriss walks us through Hummel’s work, and in so doing, introduces the neophyte to the major philosophers from whom Hummel draws his critique of modern organizations, as well as other major philosophers who are cited by Ventriss in his in-depth exegesis of Hummel’s book. In this regard, it seems also appropriate to observe that the book’s
seemingly innocuous title is the velvet glove that fits tightly over an iron fist.

Moving into the body of the book, as reviewed by Ventriss, is to be swept up by a dynamic undercurrent, strong and deep, and into a whirlpool critique of the destructiveness of modern bureaucracy. As Ventriss notes, Hummel’s analysis is centered on the negative impact of human potential imposed on the individual by the powerful forces of the traditional hierarchical bureaucratic systems. Specifically, Hummel draws heavily from the works of the German existentialist philosopher, Martin Heidegger, with special emphasis placed on his concept of an authentic Being as one who reflects a critical consciousness of what it means to be. To be what? To be an authentic person who is free of the bonds of an imprisoning bureaucratic society.

As noted by Ventriss, given the state of the present global system, which, for the most part, functions as a smothering bureaucratic force, the net result is an inauthentic world that is essentially devoid of any ethical/moral value. Can we work our way out of this bureaucratic vice, Hummel asks? His answer is disheartening, and yet, the prospect of a hopeful future is kept alive through the always potential “meta Beingness” of an authentic life. For students of public administration, Hummel’s book, as well as Ventriss’ excellent critique, need to be given serious consideration.

Another book review essay (“Postmodernism and Public Administration’s Identity Crisis,”) that recommends itself for inclusion in this collection is the review by O. C. McSwite (a.k.a., Cynthia J. McSwain and Orion F. White) of two books on public administration and postmodernism. The two books offer diverse approaches to the same problem that plagues public administration in America, namely the split between the practical and academic perspectives of administration, and the dichotomy that separates the positivist academic theorists from their normative colleagues. Moreover, there is the divide that is seldom breached, namely the split that pits the field of public administration against the older, more traditional academic disciplines. As McSwite notes, “We desperately need perspectives that can help heal these splits” (emphasis added).

These divisions that splinter public administration, according to McSwite, can be reduced to one, chronic debilitating factor, namely, the chasm that exists between the social forces of light and the forces of darkness. Described as the “I know” attitude, this approach to interrelational contact in traditional public organizational systems reduces itself, in its most extreme design, to the degenerative form of “I know and you don’t.” In the final analysis, this prevailing attitude is reflected in the division between those who seek the comfort of certainty and those who are constantly confronted with doubt. The split between the positivist and the normativist besets the field of pub-

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Public administration in a most revealing manner as expressed in the two books under review.

As indicated by McSwite, both books seek to establish a new dialogue that is intended to deactivate the incendiary “I know” attitude with one that brings unity out of diversity, comity out of enmity, and productive dialogue out of babble. As seen by McSwite, both books provide excellent assessments of public administration and the postmodern period. The ethical/moral baselines that support these books reveal a metalanguage of openness, trust, accommodation, loyalty, and integrity. Whether these two books could represent the cornerstones of the body of literature on a postmodern public administration and, hence, provide the identity that this review assumes is lacking, is problematic. Two books and McSwite’s excellent essay are intrinsically targeted at enhancing the qualitative essence of our administrative systems.
Viewed from the most obvious perspective, Donald Menzel’s article, “www.ethics.gov: Issues and Challenges Facing Public Managers,” is woefully outdated. Over the course of the last decade, the e-world of government has become so expansive and sophisticated that today one can easily circle the globe through the links of the cyber networks. The dynamic uses of computers are increasing at a seemingly exponential rate; but what about the abuses? As the texture of the e-world becomes increasingly complex and more tightly meshed, are there ethical challenges emerging of which public managers need to be aware?

It is in confronting this brave new world of e-ethics that Menzel’s article is centrally relevant for the opening years of the Twenty-First Century.

At the most basic level, the misuses of the computer by individual public managers can be stipulated in a rather straightforward manner, not dissimilar from the abuses discussed previously in the commentary on ethical codes. As Menzel notes, the general rule is to restrict use of the e-domain to one’s professional responsibilities and specific job-related activities. Any use of the Web or e-mail beyond the permissible range of use authorized by one’s work unit can be subject to disciplinary action.
Government agencies themselves can generate a wide range of ethical problems concerning the use made of personal data collected from individual citizens. Hardly a department or agency exists, certainly at the federal level and to a more limited extent at the state level, which does not maintain extensive data bases on segments of the body politic relevant to their prescribed missions. In a very real sense, as Menzel implies, we have become a data-based society in which the computer knows me better than I know myself. Despite firm assurances that personal information will be solemnly protected by the gathering governmental unit, the frequency with which data bases are shared among agencies, are lost and/or stolen is alarming. The ethical questions raised under these circumstances were of serious concern to Menzel when he wrote the article; the concern at the present time has simply compounded steadily.

On the positive side, public access to various categories of government data, if managed carefully, certainly is in keeping with the call for increased openness of the systems of government. This, however, raises some interesting questions. Should the ultimate goal of democratic governance be complete transparency at the federal level? At the state level? At the local level? How open should the data bases of government be? What ethical standards apply to the degree of openness? Closed-ness? The difficulty with this cybervision of the future is that the steady progression of data aggregation can potentially yield a “Brave New Fahrenheit 451” world.

As noted above, the advent of the World Wide Web of cyberspace has created a network of open access that is unparalleled in the history of civilization. Its global reach has the potential effect of creating an egalitarian set of worldwide “neighborhoods” that forms a dynamic, interactive community. Is it possible to look upon this emerging new phenomenon as a Twenty-First Century metaversion of the Greek City State? Or, given the fairly high levels of competency that maneuvering through the Web and its accompanying e-world require, is it more likely that the virtual model will be a Twenty-First Century version of Plato’s republic?

In their article, “The Effects of E-Government on Trust and Confidence in Government,” Caroline Tolbert and Karen Mossberger address the impact of the e-world on government and its potential for increasing citizen trust and confidence in the values of our democratic system. Through the use of Pew survey data, the authors explore the relationships between citizens and their governments at the federal and local levels. Moreover, they provide evidence that trust and confidence on the part of the body politic result from responsiveness and openness on the part of the government. Two different subsets of citizen-government interaction are posited by the authors. First, there is an entrepreneurial approach wherein the
government serves the citizenry by providing information in response to policy and program queries. The second subset is designated the participation approach whereby the citizenry is provided direct electronic “voicing” in response to questions posed by the government, such as ballot initiatives, referenda, policy choices, et.al.

Following their in-depth analysis of the Pew survey data, the authors conclude that the degrees of citizen trust and confidence in government are revealed more positively at the local level than at either the state or federal levels. On the other hand, the federal government showed the highest positive response in regard to the process-oriented procedures employed by the entrepreneurial model. Tolbert and Mossberger conclude that on the basis of admittedly limited evidence, there is a strong inclination to argue that increased access to government at all levels via the e-channels and the Web, yields an increase in citizen trust and confidence in the activities of their governments. Openness, of course, is the key variable in this connection, and in this regard, other probing and critically important questions need to be examined. For example, to what extent do public administrators, at all levels of government, have trust and confidence in the citizenry, as well as trust and confidence in their own internal organizational relationships? How far are government agencies prepared to open the doors of their “data dens” to public scrutiny? Will we move in the direction of a cyberspaced system of democratic governance or in the opposite direction of a philosopher king and his loyal cadre of guardians?

Starting in the 1990s and carrying through to the present, the role of the “fourth branch” of government has been radically redefine in theory and in practice. Generally speaking this transformation emerged with the publication of the David Osborne and Ted Gaebler book, Reinventing Government. The message in this book initiated a groundswell of interest that seemingly coalesced under the rubric, “The New Public Management,” (NPM). Not to be confused with the New Public Administration that emerged from the first Minnowbrook Conference in 1968, the New Public Management envisions, as the Denhardt's note in their article, “The New Public Service: Serving Rather Than Steering,” managers as the entrepreneurs of a new, leaner, and privatized government, emulating not only the instrumental processes but also the value biases of the private sector.

Of course, if one recalls the Woodrow Wilson treatise on “The Study of Public Administration,” the notion of public administration as a clone of the business world is hardly a novel idea. In fact, it was not all that original with Wilson. Nevertheless, the emergence of the NPM has snowballed over the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations to the point that the

federal bureaucracy has become essentially a “holding company” headed by an executive branch system in charge of parceling-out (a.k.a., “outsourcing”) functional, structural, as well as programmatic bits and pieces of the executive branch to the private sector.

The Denhardts attack this movement frontally and forcefully in their excellent article, which has been extended into an equally outstanding book, *The New Public Service: Serving Rather than Steering*. As a counter to the NPM, they advance the notion of a new public service (NPS), with a heavy emphasis on the concept of service. As presented by the authors, the NPS reverberates with the notions of democratic citizenship, a sense of community, and a society structured around a wellspring of civility. “Accordingly,” the authors state, “public administrators should focus their responsibility to serve and empower citizens as they manage public organizations and implement public policies.” Integrity and responsiveness become the watchwords of the NPS. Moreover, a series of normative standards or models that the Denhardts use to define the dimensions of the NPS are discussed in a relevant and insightful manner.

The primary concern of the NPS is focused on the elevation of democratic values, virtues, and visions insofar as the implementation of policies is concerned. With the fusion of administrative responsive-

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clearly superseding the dictates of the capitalist, free enterprise, market-based design of the “new” public management.

In the collaborative model, the burden of responsibility rests heavily on the shoulders of public administrators. It is the career civil servants who operate at the interface between their agencies and their assigned target clienteles. They become boundary-spanning agents (rather than boundary-guarding agents) who must, argue Box et al., assume the responsibility to take, “steps toward improving the quality of democracy by actively helping people to govern themselves” (emphasis added).

The authors offer a well-developed portrait of the dynamics needed to trigger a positive resurgence of public administrators committing themselves to a service truly fitting basic democratic values, virtues, and visions. Their proposal is particularly relevant as more and more public policy programs and functions are being outsourced. Can this debilitating process be reversed? Box and his associates raise the question and provide their collaborative response. The question remains, however, is anyone listening?

And the beat goes on. From the New Public Management to the New Public Service the pathway leads to the New Governance as examined by Lisa Bingham, Tina Nabatchi, and Rosemary O’Leary in their article, “The New Governance....” In defining their vision of a New Governance (NG), the authors provide an excellent and comprehensive survey of the literature that relates to their notion of governance and how it has become an integral element in the policy and implementation processes. The article directs attention to the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial roles that public administration practitioners have assumed over time. Moreover, the article’s principal focus on governance is extended to the state and local levels in a manner that is informative as well as insightful. Included, also, is a pertinent and relevant discussion of the manner in which administrative law and the Administrative Procedures Act are directly involved in the processing of the New Governance.

The New Governance processes discussed in this article link practitioners to citizen stakeholders in order to assume the work of government. In this context, the role of the citizen becomes a critically important component in the NG design. Moreover, as the authors observe, a heavy responsibility also falls on public administration practitioners to energize the NG linkages with the citizenry in order to confront and embrace the imperatives of democratic governance. The opportunities are myriad; but so, also, are the obstacles.

Making a major shift beyond the positions taken in the previous articles, Mark Bevir provides one of the most provocative and challenging articles included in this compendium. Bevir builds his essay, “New Public
Management and Substantive Democracy,” around what he sees as a debilitating system perspective that has a direct negative impact on the prevailing notions of democratic governance. Such a pattern of system governance is a top-down process focused on networks and partnerships, as opposed to the conventional focus on hierarchies and markets. Viewed in this context, system governance is seen as an “elite project based on expert assertions that it is an efficient and effective mode of governing.” As seen by Bevir, system governance, in effect, includes the essential elements of the NPM, NPS, and NG. Nevertheless, the emphasis that system governance places on citizen participation, consensus building, service delivery, and performance management (all in the name of reinventing government) is illusory. In fact, he argues, the voices heard from the body politic are predetermined or stacked in favor of the power elite in control of the formulation and implementation of policy programs. Moreover, the extent of citizen “participation” from amongst this skewed set of voices is limited to consultation rather than meaningful and genuine dialogue in which the citizen assumes an equal place at the table of governance. And by equal, Bevir means radically equal.

This system perspective must give way, as Bevir sees it, to radical democracy wherein citizens become active agents in all phases of democratic governance. In effect, they must become their own change agents in designing the contours of their freedom. Hence, radical democracy must be embraced as a way of life in which citizens, individually and collectively, determine how to rule themselves. Operating in this mode, open and meaningful deliberation can take the place of the pseudo-dialogues that characterize system democracy. Deliberation focuses on continuous persuasion and debate.

From Bevir’s notion of radical governance, an ethic emerges that avoids the strictures of an immutable set of prescriptive moral rules. Rather, an ethic must be devised as a body of flexible guidelines that are also always subject to continuous persuasion and debate. Given his radical ethical design, it would seem that the principal tenet to apply in this context would be an all-pervasive doctrine of situation ethics.

Moreover, his argument is replete with pronouncements that are certain to generate debate: e.g., “democracy does not stand as a universally rational order,” or “an historically contingent account of democracy implies that rights are social, not natural,” or “civic associations could be self-governed, they need not be bound tightly by rules laid down by the state.” Of course, debate is exactly what Bevir wants to generate, and this article is an excellent launching pad for just such discussions.

Carried to its logical extreme, Bevir’s radical democratic governance would seem to envision equally radical changes in virtually all governing institutions.
Nothing would be exempt from the people’s voice, and in this context, the role of public administration would certainly be radically transformed in a manner that would make a stimulating beginning of a very radical dialogue.

John Kane and Haig Patapan offer one perspective that revolves around the notion of prudence, which, although not very radical, is certainly quite relevant for the future of public service. To be sure, the virtue of prudence has been espoused for a very long time. Admittedly, for the Greeks, and especially Plato, wisdom rather than prudence was a principal virtue along with temperance, fortitude, and justice. But, to this set of virtues, the early Christian theologians replaced wisdom with prudence and linked the four together as the cardinal virtues, which, in turn, became the action energizers that supplemented the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love.

In their article, “In Search of Prudence: The Hidden Problem of Managerial Reform,” Kane and Patapan begin by providing an excellent philosophical review of prudence through the eyes of philosophers from Aristotle to the present time. The authors argue that in transforming the “old bureaucracies” into the more cost-efficient NPM system, the dimensions of the NPM were imposed across the board, with particular responsibility being placed on senior-ranking administrators in all federal agencies and departments. The net result was that the cumulative body of wisdom acquired by this aggregate group of senior managers was essentially wiped clean by the injunctions of the NPM.

As Kane and Patapan note, the NPM seeks to increase discretionary freedom (entrepreneurship) among senior personnel, and, at the same time, to increase performance accountability through quantitative measurement control mechanisms. This effectively replaces the conventional notion of wisdom, which relies on individual practical insights gained through experience, with new forms of control that could facetiously be labeled the “new prudence.” In addition, as the hammer of the NPM is dropped, more and more public servants (and especially those with the most seniority and with the greatest accumulation of practical wisdom) become excessively and abnormally “prudent” in a most dysfunctional sense.

To reduce the essence of prudence to the mundane levels of individual self-survival through ritualized rule obesiance is to neuter a public service that, if imaginatively empowered could be the primary source of a truly humanistic, citizen-centered process of democratic governance. Genuine prudence requires the reconstruction of an ethic that is supportive of an organizational environment, as well as one that rests on the cardinal virtues. Prudence cannot stand alone; it needs to function in a holistic context, interacting always with temperance, fortitude, and justice. Unfortunately, as this excellent essay by Kane and Patapan
reveals, the basic deficiency of the NPM reform measures is that prudence is made hidden.

To complete this collection of articles focusing on the ethical/moral dimensions of public administration, Charles Goodsell, uses the metaphor of human vision in his article, “A New Vision for Public Administration,” to develop a positive, normative framework for public administration. To add to Goodsell’s notion of vision, one should keep in mind that the ability of the eye to see depends on its inability to see itself. This observation certainly applies to the human eye, but does it apply to that introspective vision that constitutes the imperative of the mind’s eye to measure the normative essence of one’s authenticity? The existentialists would certainly respond “yes.”

This is an important point for Goodsell. As he suggests, public administration “sees” as well as it “is seen” from a wide range of perspectives and social constructs, and in this respect it must develop a more mature vision of its authentic self than it has at the present time. Goodsell’s new visual direction for public administration, which suggests, in turn, a new virtual reality, can be conceptualized as the hub of a multispoked wheel representative of the multiplicity of stakeholder groups. Public administration assumes a central position in Goodsell’s schema and, hence, it becomes the definitive dynamic in moving the wheel of governance on an ever-forward mission trajectory. This new vision that Goodsell develops with in-depth and thoroughgoing logic has to be read carefully to be fully appreciated. It is much too intricately woven together to be described sufficiently in this brief summation. It is essential to note, however, that a major component of Goodsell’s design is the attainment of a holistic body of public trust.

By trust, Goodsell means that element of interactive behavior that is committed to creating a vision and a reality of a government that makes progress toward the democratic ideal possible. In this context, public administration is at the hub of the wheel and, hence, is the critically positioned component in the generation of a trust that infuses the whole dynamic interaction of democratic governance. Moreover, although Goodsell does not venture beyond his focus on trust, it might be appropriate to add that the notion of loyalty can also be drawn into his new visual direction in the capacity of a directly related reciprocal of trust. To carry this thought one step farther, in the early biblical era, trust and loyalty were frequently used cognates of the Aramaic word for faith. Taken together, trust and loyalty expand the faith, the civic faith, which is embedded in the essence of democracy. Viewed in this context, the notion of civic faith is a perfectly fitting endnote to this compendium on public service, ethics, and democracy.
To borrow from the body of critical moments in American history when the dynamics of public service, ethics, and democracy came together to generate a civic faith of major proportions, one could cite the founding of the Republic when the values, virtues, and visions of the Founding Fathers engendered a civic faith embedded in the phrase, “Toward a more perfect union.” Also, the sense of a civic faith was made manifest by those individuals whose values, virtues, and visions blended together to form the Progressive Movement during the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. One could also cite the 1930s’ era when the nation steadily sunk deeper into the mire of the Great Depression. It was the forcefulness of a dynamic civic faith, drawn from the more perfect union of public service, ethics, and democracy that reversed the nation’s descent into hopelessness.

A new America began to take shape in the aftermath of the Second World War. Using 1950 as a baseline, the second half of the Twentieth Century could only be characterized as a period shaped by rapid and turbulent growth and steadily compounding complexity. From 1950 to 2000, the three basic elements of civic faith — public service, ethics, and democracy — receded into the background in favor of a new superpower vision, global in scope. As a consequence, the early years of the Twenty-First Century have been characterized by a series of searching and searing challenges that cannot be ignored or dismissed. Can the civic faith that energized the Founding Fathers, the visionary Progressives, and the “New Dealers” be revived, revised, and regenerated, or are we faced with the prospect of a democratic faith made vacuous?

Texans have an expression — big hat, no cattle. In baseball circles, the phrase would be, good field, no hit. Viewed from a global perspective, the charge against democracy today is, increasingly, all form and no substance.

As the articles in this compendium attempt to illustrate, given the development of public administration in America, there is a direct relationship between democracy and public service, with ethics serving as the critically essential intervening variable. To the extent that these three factors can be forged into a dynamic and holistic system, there is promise and hope for the future of a more perfect, global union. On the other hand, however, to view these three components as completely independent and discreet variables is to turn civic faith into an empty drum. Democracy devoid of a comprehensive ethical value system is nothing more than a body of objectively detached laws, rules, and regulations. Much the same can be said of a public service structured completely in the context of a totally dispassionate impersonality—sine ira et studio.

At the outset of this compendium it was noted that the triangular linkages of democratic values, virtues, and visions create the essential bond of unity that steers the democratic process toward the common good. Now, at the conclusion of this journey through
the pages of *Public Administration Review*, it is also apparent that the triangular linkages of public service, ethics, and democracy are essential in shaping a civic faith that leads to the common good of a more perfect union. Can public administration synthesize these twin sets of triangular forces? In this regard, the answer may very well be found in the conscience of our profession, which is to say a conscience that radiates the idealistic hopes of our Founding Fathers. Given the disquieting, initial years of the Twenty-First Century, the challenge that faces public administration seems obvious: to fuse the two forces together will require a commitment of unwavering proportions.