Recovering, Restoring, and Renewing the Foundations of American Public Administration: The Contributions of Herbert J. Storing

As the conversation moved from one topic to another, I was caught off guard by Stillman’s earnest query as to how and why the late Herbert J. Storing, my mentor at the University of Chicago, seemingly had such remarkable influence on his former students, even though he did not have much impact on the field of public administration as a whole. Stillman told me that he had quickly scanned back issues of *PAR*, looking almost in vain for contributions to the literature by my erstwhile mentor. His diligent search yielded only one major article. He conceded that because his search was conducted with considerable haste, he might have missed one or two articles or reviews by Storing. Nevertheless, one or two or three contributions to *PAR* over a lengthy career represents rather “slim pickings” for a leader in the field.

For well over a week, Stillman’s question haunted me. My mood changed from puzzlement to anger—from “How did Storing manage to hide his light under a bushel so well that his contributions to public administration are practically unknown to the accomplished scholar who now heads the field?” to “Why doesn’t Stillman know more about Storing?” My anger soon yielded to remorse. I had to ask myself, “Why haven’t I done more to enable scholars like Stillman to know what I know about Herbert Storing’s influence on our field?” I decided to round up the usual suspects, former students of Storing who had studied at Chicago around the same time as I and then went on to make solid contributions to public administration on their own. The following colleagues came immediately to mind: Kent Kirwan, Douglas Morgan, David Rosenbloom, and David Schaefer. We agreed to write a joint article under the leadership of Douglas Morgan, which we would submit, with only a sly hint of mischief, to *Public Administration Review*. The article would restore our dear friend and mentor to his rightful place in the field of public administration.

Here follows, dear reader, the fruit of our labor.

—John A. Rohr
All interesting administrative questions are political questions . . . Age-old political and constitutional problems now present themselves as problems of (or in) public administration. —Storing (1964b, 147; 1965, 48)

It is not “common sense” versus “science.” Virtually no one claims that common sense proverbial wisdom is sufficient either as a guide to action or as a means of understanding human behavior. The question is whether the admittedly necessary transcendence of common sense is to be achieved by science as understood by Simon, or by an exploration of human ends, to which common sense points but which it alone is not competent to undertake.

—Storing (1962, 126)

Public administration continues to face an “identity crisis” that has been at the center of the discipline since its inception. The crisis turns on the following question: Are the animating principles of public administration to be discovered in the political foundations of a given regime, or are they to be found in more universal and transcendent principles of scientific management? The debate over the proper connection between politics and administration manifests itself today in numerous ways: whether the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration can and should accredit programs in other countries; how we should design culturally appropriate programs for international students who are interested in the study of public administration in the United States; what the role of American scholars should be in assisting China, Vietnam, and other countries that have made a national commitment to “scientific development.”

According to Dwight Waldo (1968, 5), it was Herbert Simon who created the discipline’s “identity crisis” in public administration by destroying confidence in the validity of early administrative science. But Simon (1947) resolved that crisis by offering the prospect of a pure science of administration. Herbert J. Storing, by contrast, rejected the prospect of finding the identity of public administration in some kind of science. Instead, he outlined a resolution of the identity crisis by traveling back in time, beyond the field, to the American founding. In doing so, he reframed the identity crisis and transformed the study and practice of public administration into statecraft.

Storing argued that the politics-administration dichotomy stems from the efforts of the American founders to create the conditions necessary for securing the long-term vitality of America’s system of ordered liberty. Their efforts resulted in tensions between the administrative and political activities that are necessary to protect American democracy from the inherent dangers to which it is liable. In the process of illuminating the politics-administration dichotomy, Storing made four significant contributions to public administration theory:

1. He reframed the politics-administration debate; (2) in doing so, he resolved the “identity crisis” in American public administration by stressing the central governing role of career administrators; (3) he introduced the “judicial approach” to administrative decision making and, in the process, restored prudential judgment as the centerpiece of administrative practice; and (4) through the height, depth, and breadth of his perspective, he revealed the vital importance of the bureaucracy, and not just its limitations. Correspondingly, he opened our minds to the nobility of the life of the civil servant by clarifying its potential for statesmanship. By sharing his vision, he enabled us all, teachers and practitioners of public administration alike, to better see what we are doing.

In this article, we will revisit Storing’s contributions to the study and practice of public administration. We do so for two reasons. First, as former students, we believe Storing has received inadequate credit for and attention to the significant contributions he has made, largely because his teaching and writings were presented in collections of essays and compilations of writings rather than in a monograph format.

Second, we believe the unresolved debate over the proper role of administration in governing can benefit from Storing’s insights.

Reframing the Politics-Administration Dichotomy: The Problem of American Democratic Governance

Storing regarded the politics-administration dichotomy as the unfortunate result of collective memory loss among both practitioners and students of American politics. The dichotomy did not originate with the writings of Woodrow Wilson and Frank Goodnow. Instead, it originated from the “problematic nature” of the American regime. “The preoccupation of Herbert Storing’s professional life was the genesis and meaning of the American regime” (Cropsey 1981, xv), which was to be found in the Federalist-Anti-Federalist debate. Both parties to the debate agreed that the purpose of government was to protect individual rights. They also agreed that liberty could not be assumed to result simply from the election of government officials by popular vote. For the Federalists, popular elections entailed the need for protections against majority tyranny and foolishness and the capacity for competent administration. For the Anti-Federalists, popular elections entailed the need to build in protections to ensure that elected officials would not become a ruling elite that used its power to advance its interests at the expense of protecting individual rights and preserving the local conditions necessary for these rights to thrive. For both the Federalists and Anti-Federalists, the purpose of democratic government was the protection of individual rights, but there was disagreement over how these rights could best be secured. In Storing’s introduction to his seven-volume collection of Anti-Federalist papers, he observes that “the nation was born in consensus but it lives in controversy, and the main lines of that controversy are well-worn paths leading back to the founding debate” (1981, 1:6).
In his study of the founding, Storing identified four well-worn sources of danger to the health and survival of democratic governance: majority tyranny and foolishness, the loss of republican virtue, the abuse of power by government officials, and ineffective and inefficient administration. For Storing, each of these problems was foundational to understanding the nature of American politics and institutions and the role of administrators in the governance process.

Majority Tyranny: The Shays’s Rebellion Problem

Storing was struck by the agreement between Federalists and Anti-Federalists that “[g]overnment by the people or, in practice, majority rule was not . . . the very definition of free government, because it can lead to unjust deprivations of individual liberty” by a tyrannical majority (1981, 1:40). So what is the best guarantor against majority tyranny? For the Federalists, it was a complex system of government that included reliance on a multiplicity of the numbers and kinds of factions generated by a large commercial republic, a system of representation, and a set of governing structures and processes that checked and balanced the exercise of governing powers. For the Anti-Federalists, liberty could be secured only by cultivating a set of republican virtues (further elaborated in the next section), which they believed would be eroded by the commercialism of a large republic. Storing observed that in the view of the Anti-Federalists,

[The] Federalist solution not only failed to provide the moral qualities that are necessary to the maintenance of republican government; it tended to undermine them. Will not the constitutional regime, the Anti-Federalists asked, with its emphasis on private, self-seeking, commercial activities, release and foster a certain type of human being who will be likely to destroy that very regime? . . . It is a simplification, but not a misleading simplification, to say that the crisis faced by Abraham Lincoln seventy years later required a synthesis of the Federalist and Anti-Federalist reservations. And if the major element in the reservation was still the Federal one, yet it is due the Anti-Federalists to say that it was they, more than the defenders of the Constitution, who anticipated the need. The Anti-Federalists saw, although sometimes only dimly, the insufficiency of a community of mere interest. They saw that the American polity had to be a moral community if it was to be anything, and they saw that the seat of that community must be the hearts of the people. (1981, 1:73, 76)

In seeking to solve the majority tyranny problem, the Federalists promoted the virtues of a large commercial republic, which seemingly weakened the conditions needed for republican virtue and a politically vigilant and engaged citizenry.

Republican Virtue: The Engaged Citizen Problem

Storing’s longest and perhaps most important labor of love during his relatively short life was the compilation of an authoritative seven-volume collection of Anti-Federalist writings. “The aim of the collection,” he explained, “is to make available for the first time all of the substantial Anti-Federal writings in their complete original form and in an accurate text, together with appropriate annotation” accompanied by an introduction, providing “for the first time, in my judgment, a full and adequate account of the main lines, the principles and the grounds of the Anti-Federal position” (1981, 1:
xix). He undertook this work because he believed that the Anti-Federalists had not received the credit they deserved for shaping the American Constitution. More importantly, he argued, the Constitution “did not settle everything; it did not finish the task of making the American polity. The political life of the community continues to be a dialogue, in which the Anti-Federalist concerns and principles still play an important part” (1981, 1:3 [emphasis in original]). In short, Storing believed that “the Anti-Federalists may have something to teach” us (1981, 1:4).

One of the most important teachings of the Anti-Federalists was the need to ground democratic governance in what Storing called “republican virtue” (1981, 1:24, 73). Republican virtue consists of a set of political habits and dispositions that reflect a constant love of liberty. This love is cultivated by small, face-to-face government and the life exemplified by the yeoman farmer, which fosters the essential republican virtues of moderation, vigilance, industry, and thrift.Republican virtue contrasts with the virtue of the procedural republic, which emphasizes the importance of structures, processes, and formal rights to protect liberty (Kemmis 1990, chap. 2).

Storing’s belief about the centrality of the Anti-Federalists to the American polity has obvious relevance to the increasing interest over the last three decades in America’s communitarian roots (Etzioni 1993; Kemmis 1990; Putnam 2000). Whether it is concern about the forces of globalization, reaction to the expanding powers of the national government, dismay at what appears to be excessive greed in the marketplace, or concern for the development of social capital, the nature and kind of citizen virtue needed to sustain democratic government is very much a part of our current political dialogue. In his introductory essay to the seven-volume compilation, Storing sympathetically summarized the Anti-Federalist “small republic” vision of self-government that could not be satisfied by simply protecting citizens from the abuses of rulers such as King George or becoming more efficient at performing government functions. Small democratic communities were important not simply because they provided better opportunities to maintain eternal vigilance over suspicious rulers; they also mattered because they produced policies and practices that were informed by local knowledge, and they provided processes that enabled citizens to acquire the knowledge and skills to be civically engaged in meaningful ways. To be so engaged enhances one’s liberties and heightens the sense of self-interest rightly understood. The Anti-Federalists believed that a constitution that provides for a strong, professionalized central government and encourages the private pursuit of material gain tends to discourage civic engagement. Ultimately, this distracts the public from a proper vigilance over their liberties as well as from civic-mindedness more generally.

Abuse of Executive Power: The King George Problem

A recurring problem that Storing wrestled with in his teaching and scholarship was how power could be centralized without endangering the liberty of its citizens. His favorite text on the American presidency was Charles Thach’s book The Creation of the American Presidency (1969), to which he wrote a preface for the reprinted edition. Storing was especially interested in Thach’s account of how the antityrannical forces of the American Revolution resulted in the adoption of new state constitutions that concentrated governmental power in the popularly elected legislative branch (with New York
as a notable exception), providing for a very weak executive branch (Thach 1969, chap. 2). This weak-executive model was embodied in the Articles of Confederation, which resulted in a central government that was too weak to collect taxes and provision an army during the American Revolution, sowing the seeds for the model's own corrective in the Constitutional Convention of 1787.

Storing's concern for how executive power could be safely constructed was also at the center of his critique of Herbert Simon's administrative science. Storing argued that Simon's model of rationality and efficiency "takes its bearings from the goals of top management" (1962, 103), thus "radicalizing the claim for unity in administration." There are three reasons why Simon's model promotes centralization: (1) "the crucial and governing activity is development of the science itself, which can only occur (except derivatively) at the top"; (2) "gaps in the science make it necessary to resort to central authority to support the science"; and (3) "there remains a continuing need to enforce the rational design of the science" (Storing 1980, 110). Storing's study of the American founding gave him pause about these centralizing tendencies. The reasons for centralizing have to be informed by the political ends that centralization is intended to serve, and once these ends are fully revealed, it is not so clear that centralization is the best means for achieving them. Centralization must be judged by whether it promotes the primary purpose of the American constitutional system: the preservation of individual liberty.


Storing recognized in his study of the founding debates that even the Anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitution favored a new kind of Union "to provide defense against foreign enemies, to promote and protect American commerce and to maintain order among the states" (1981, 1:24). Storing observed that once the Anti-Federalists conceded the need for more power at the center, they "simply could not meet" the Federalist argument that sufficient powers needed to be given to the new government in order to ensure the achievement of its ends (1981, 1:29). But Storing pointed out that the Anti-Federalists were right in warning that the desire for efficient government could easily fall prey to false concerns for the status and riches of the nation-state within the larger global order.

Storing pointed out that the Anti-Federalists were right in warning that the desire for efficient government could easily fall prey to false concerns for the status and riches of the nation-state within the larger global order. Andrew Jackson saw the meaning of responsibility as obedience to the president, the Whigs as obedience to the law. This difference had important implications for Storing's view of the role of career administrators in the governance process. He observed that the Whig model emphasized "the exercise of experienced, informed, responsible discretion . . . not [mere] obedience to higher command" as the essence of good administration (1980, 110). It is this model that Storing held up as the standard for assessing the role of professional career administrators in the American system of governance. It is a standard that encourages independence within a loosely coupled hierarchy and the exercise of informed judgment similar to that exercised by judges. Both of these qualities will be discussed more fully later in this essay.

Storing's study of the American founding brought to light significant tensions among the prophylactics necessary to prevent democracy from succumbing to the inherent pitfalls of popular sovereignty. By giving all power to the people to prevent abuses by the King Georges of the world, democracy could succumb to a lack of power at the center to administer the powers of government with competence and efficiency (the Articles of Confederation problem). Or it could succumb to majority tyranny (the Shays's Rebellion problem), or to economic excess and lethargy (the engaged-citizen problem). From the perspective of the founding generation, the public interest was problematic because of the difficulty of addressing any one of the four major sources of danger to liberty without making the others worse. For example, creating a more consolidated government at the center with greater executive power to protect against external threats and the tyranny of the majority potentially endangers the liberty of citizens as a result of internal abuses of power by governing officials and limited civic engagement. Thus, an irreconcilable tension exists among the goals of competent government, responsiveness, preservation of minority rights, and civic engagement. For the Federalists, the danger of insufficient governmental power at the center and of majority tyranny outweighed the Anti-Federalists' concerns about excessive power at the center and the need to protect and cultivate the virtues of a small civic republic.

While Storing recognized that the need for administrative competence was one of the major reasons for creating a new Union, this competence was one among several different kinds of political expertise necessary to secure individual rights. From the founders' perspective, the administrative part of governance was a political activity, which Storing argued gives administrators "a reasonable and legitimate claim to share in rule" (1964b, 147). The political role played by administrators, however, was different from the political role played by elected members of the legislative body. "It is a distinction between broader and narrower political operations or between two levels of politics that emphasizes their connection and rejects a distinction between political and administrative questions" (Kirwan 1981, 211 [emphasis in original]). By redefining the problem of democracy, Storing addressed the identity crisis in public administration and in the process carved out a central role for the bureaucracy and administrators in democratic governance.
Resolving the Public Administration Identity Crisis: The Role of Administrators in Democratic Governance

Herbert Storing propounded a pathbreaking reinterpretation of the role of the public administrator, at least at higher levels, as one of statesmanship. Prior to Storing’s work, scholars had long recognized the insufficiency of the politics–administration dichotomy (as propounded by Woodrow Wilson and Frank Goodnow) as an empirical account of how government operates: civil servants inevitably exercise considerable discretion in their daily work, above and beyond the merely “technical” question of finding the most efficient means of carrying out the commands of their elected superiors. In fact, questions of means are never entirely separable from choices among ends. But scholars remained perplexed about how to legitimize this political role within a democracy, so as to offer meaningful guidance about how civil servants should go about their work, and hence to design an education that would best equip them to fulfill their duty.

The root cause of the failure of contemporary political science and public administration theory to provide an adequate account of the work of civil servants, as Storing observed in the last essay he wrote, “American Statesmanship: Old and New,” was the tendency to reduce it “into two simple elements: populism, or radical democracy, and scientific management” (1980, 403). Because of their reluctance to distinguish, as the authors of The Federalist did, between the people’s immediate wishes and their true interests, contemporary scholars saw no grounds to justify civil servants’ partial autonomy from electoral direction except the claims of technical expertise (see Friedrich 1940). Only on the grounds of expertise or “scientific management” could the claim to administrative autonomy be upheld without offending the scholars’ hyperdemocratic sensibilities. In this respect, public administration scholarship thus remained in thrall to the Wilsonian dichotomy. Because contemporary scholars had lost the founders’ appreciation of democracy as a problem—a regime that, like all others, rests on a partisan principle that could destroy it if it is not institutionally moderated—they failed to appreciate the positive (and not merely technical) contribution that civil servants (not despite but because of their nonelected status) might make toward improving our system of government.

Storing’s most fundamental criticism of contemporary academic approaches to public administration was articulated in his 1962 essay on Herbert Simon’s purported “Science of Administration.” In this essay Storying demonstrated the impossibility of substituting an evaluatively neutral science comprising universally valid rules of behavior for the administrator’s practical judgment, in which questions of ends and means are inevitably intermixed. Subsequently, Storing set forth his account of the proper political role of the bureaucracy in three essays published in the mid-1960s: “The Problem of Big Government” (1963), “Political Parties and the Bureaucracy,” (1964b), and “Leonard D. White and the Study of Public Administration” (1965).

In his essay on White, Storing showed how the work of a preeminent scholar of public administration gradually moved away from a belief in the uniformity of public and private administration, which could be perfected through a neutral science, toward an appreciation of the unique political character of public administration. At the same time, White’s work exhibits a gradual renunciation of the Wilsonian assumption that it is possible to discover a set of rules for public administration that are valid for all governments alike—that is, without regard to differences among regimes. As Storing put it elsewhere, the impossibility of strictly separating politics from administration reflects the fact that “all interesting administrative questions are political questions” (1964b, 147). Precisely because “administration is the heart of modern government,” as White stressed, requiring civil servants to exercise quasi-legislative and judicial functions (making and applying rules) as well as narrowly “executive” ones, the “age-old political and constitutional problems now present themselves as problems of (or in) public administration” (Storing 1965, 48)—contrary to Wilson’s claim that the fundamental constitutional problems had been “settled” and hence could be set aside. White’s scholarly turn in his last years of research from pursuing administrative “science” to producing four volumes of history tracing the development of American public administration over the first century of the country’s existence demonstrated a growing awareness that administrative systems both reflect and shape the political regimes that they serve.

To deny the possibility of severing politics from administration does not mean, however, that the civil servant is to be understood merely as a politician in the same sense as elected officials. The failure to conceive a political role other than that of the party or partisan politician was, in Storing’s view, the crucial failing of the civil service reform movement, which aimed to cure the corruption of the spoils system by insulating the civil service from politics as such, not merely from partisanship. Storing stressed that the chief goal of the original reformers was not administrative efficiency but the elevation of the moral tone of the country as a whole. Reformers believed that treating public offices as spoils would encourage cynicism about government and spread an attitude of selfishness among the public at large. Without denying the reformers’ achievement, Storing held that they “grossly oversimplified the problem of popular government.” First of all, the idealism typified by George Curtis’s forecast that turning elections into “a contest of principle” rather than “a fight for plunder” would make “the honest will of the people the actual government of the country” represented a forgetting of the founders’ lesson that politics will always be guided in part by the pursuit of selfish interests, and that interest-based politics offers certain advantages in terms of moderation and stability over one based on unmitigated ideological conflict (Storing 1964b, 142; cf. the account of the advantages of “small” over “great” parties in Tocqueville 2000, 1:i.ii. 2:166–70). Second, the reformers’ unqualified populism embodied a neglect of another key principle of the founding: the fact that popular majorities as well as “elites” may be prone to acts of injustice or folly—pointing toward the need to moderate pure majoritarianism no less than elitism (Storing 1980, 103).

Despite the deficiencies of their approach, Storing observed, the reformers left a lasting impression on the understanding of American government through their influence on the “second generation of reformer-political scientists” typified by Wilson and Goodnow, who “sought to state systematically the theory of government implicit in the reform movement and to elaborate . . . its practical consequences.” The model that emerged presented a quite different view of the problem of democratic governance from the view held by the founders. For the second generation of reformers, the ideal democracy consists, as it were, of two pyramids joined at the top. The will of the people flows up through the
pyramid of politics where it is collected by parties and formed into programs of legislation. The programs of the majority party then flow down through the administrative pyramid where they are implemented in the most efficient manner.

According to this theory the prime requisites of a civil service are political neutrality and technical competence. (Storing 1964b, 143)

The legacy of this model can be seen in the demand for more "responsible" (i.e., ideologically coherent) parties as well as the scientific management movement (Storing 1964b, 143–44).

By contrast with the approach of the civil service reformers, Storing, using the British civil service as both model and example, articulated the conception of an administrative apparatus that remains “political” in the sense of aiming to promote the fundamental ends of the regime it serves, without being tied to the program of a given political party (which would incapacitate it for serving other parties). Storing argued in “Political Parties and the Bureaucracy” that the very qualities that distinguish the civil servant from the elected politician, including his relatively long tenure in office, professional expertise, and partial insulation from direct accountability to the electorate, enable him to serve a unique kind of political role, which can complement the skills and practices of the latter. Borrowing a term from Sir Henry Taylor’s classic The Statesman, which prefigured much of his discussion of this theme, Storing termed the civil servant so understood a “closet statesman” (1964b, 152–54; Taylor [1836] 1998, 125). For Storing, a statesman was someone who “is carried beyond immediate practical issues by a need to understand the deeper ground on which they rest” (1970, 9). This quality not only was important for individual political leaders, but also needed to be institutionalized in the formal structures and processes of democratic governance. In “The Problem of Big Government,” Storing argued that the distinctive attributes of the national bureaucracy equipped it to serve the moderating function that the founders intended the Senate to perform—but which developments culminating in the Seventeenth Amendment now prevented that body from accomplishing (Storing 1980, 82).

Storing’s reform program for American public administration was informed by his understanding of the problematic nature of American democracy and the important role that the bureaucracy plays in fulfilling the purposes of democratic governance. In urging that higher civil servants and the bureaucracy as a whole be understood as practicing statesmanship, Storing was not inventing a role that they did not already perform, but trying to clarify the nature of their work so as to encourage them to perform it better. As he put it, Nonpopulist, nonscientific concerns seem even in American democracy to be at the heart of statesmanship; yet the American statesman is likely to believe that they are not really his proper business, even when he spends most of his time with them. The result is that these nonpopulist, nonscientific sides of American statesmanship tend to be done poorly and, even when done well, tend to be done under cover. (1980, 89)

Storing was not blind to the defects of bureaucracy—its potential for inefficiency, indecision, and petty tyranny. But he maintained that “random carping or wholesale condemnation of the bureaucracy” served only to divert attention “from the need to nurture and strengthen its capacity for administrative statesmanship.”

Storing’s teaching about the political role of public administrators as statesmen has special importance for the more than 87,500 local government jurisdictions in the United States. Nearly 75 percent of American cities today are governed by a council-manager form, with a part-time legislative body and a full-time professional manager (Adrian 1999, 58). When originally created in the early 1900s, the council–manager system was intended to separate policy or politics from administration. Recent studies have documented that this “bright-line” distinction does not exist at the local government level, in large part because the city manager plays a “statesmanlike” role in facilitating both policy development and implementation (Nalbandian 2000; Svara 2001, 2006, 2008). In undertaking this role, managers must balance the competing needs for efficiency, responsiveness, community engagement, and the protection of individual rights (Morgan and Kass 1993; Morgan et al. 2008, chap. 3). These needs are pushed down even to the middle management layers of local government organizations (Morgan et al. 1996). Administrators are successful when they are able to play the role of the British civil servant in taking the initiative for problem solving without displacing the leadership role of elected officeholders. This requires “leading from behind,” taking initiatory leadership without engaging in partisan political advocacy and, of course, looking “beyond immediate practical issues … to understand the deeper ground on which they rest” (Storing 1970, 9). Storing argued that playing this role requires the skills and temperament of a judge rather than those of a policy wonk or technical analyst.

**Constitutional Law and the Judicial Model of Administrative Practice: Restoring Prudent Judgment to Administrative Work**

Storing argued that the judicial model is the appropriate guide for understanding the nature of administrative rationality and judgment. This model was informed by two considerations. First, after undertaking an extensive examination of Herbert Simon’s scientific model, Storing was convinced that the fact–value distinction on which it rested did not correspond to the reality of administrative practice, nor could it. Worse, the distinction was dangerously misleading, resulting in a failure to examine the ends of one’s administrative actions. Second, the judicial model was informed by Storing’s extensive understanding of American jurisprudence and the constitutional role that civil servants play in the modern administrative state through their responsibilities for implementation, rulemaking, and adjudication. Each of these influences will be elaborated more fully in the paragraphs that follow.
The Defects of the Positivist Science Model

Storing undertook an extensive analysis of both the internal logic and the consequences of Simon's ambitious effort to ground public administration in the principles of a “science of administration.” This is “true science,” Simon argued, required the development of an entirely new vocabulary. Common wisdom, far from providing the basis of social science, is a different language altogether. Simon observed that he had not detected “much progress in the ‘wisdom literature’ in administrative theory during the past fifty years. Aristotle and the Hoover Commission sound much alike, except [that] the former was a good deal more sophisticated than the latter about the relation of politics to administration…. You can find the same kinds of impassioned pleas for ‘wisdom’ in medicine a century ago as we find in administration today. Meanwhile the sale of Lydia Pinkham’s vegetable compound has fallen off; the sale of thyroid extract has increased” (1957, 62). Simon believed that the principles of modern science could improve public administration in much in the same way that they had improved medicine.

At the heart of the divide between common wisdom and science is Simon’s separation of facts from values. Factual propositions, Simon argued, can be validated by determining their correspondence to the facts, while value propositions are validated through a process of intersubjective agreement. The values on which this agreement rests arise from the fiat of human will, not from any factual reality (Simon 1957, 56). The earlier proponents of a distinct science of administration (Wilson, Taylor, Goodnow, and White) had argued that the separation between politics and administration turned on the difference between ends and means. Politics was concerned with determining ends, while administration was focused on how to best achieve these predetermined ends. While starting with the means–ends distinction, Simon ultimately abandoned it as an inadequate foundation for a science of administration.

Storing cited two reasons why Simon abandoned his predecessors’ starting point. First, administrators are unable to separate the intermediate values that are imbedded in the subordinate means, which are part of the chain of means–ends causality (Storing 1962, 73–81). For example, the practice of using successive stages of employee discipline as a means of corrective action in human resource management is itself a value that may go beyond the instrumental goal of improving organizational efficiency and effectiveness. Giving employees a fair chance to improve may be a value that stands on a separate ground from the value of achieving results. The second reason for abandoning the means–ends distinction is Simon’s recognition that, in practice, it is impossible for administrators literally to maximize the ends that are set by the political process. There is not enough time and money to calculate all of the possible alternatives to accomplish the policy goals established by that process. For that reason, Storing observed, Simon ultimately abandoned the economic model of “maximizing decisions” in his earlier work and substituted an organizational model of “satisficing” as the measure of administrative success (Storing 1962, 109–23). “Good enough” replaces the objective of maximizing the goals of a predetermined set of policy initiatives.

Storing concluded that Simon’s attempt to replace common sense with a new science of administration is problematic because it rests on a flawed understanding of science. Science necessarily begins with a common sense understanding of the world, and the abandonment of this anchor would leave us without the ability to make rational choices about ends. Storing, therefore, stood Simon’s approach on its head and thereby restored common sense as the necessary starting point for all governance work, making scientific knowledge subservient to knowledge about the ends of administrative activity.

Storing pointed out abundant examples in Simon’s work of his reliance on practical opinions that are not validated by Simon’s science. For example, Simon used phrases such as “correct decision-making,” “rationality,” “pure” values, “effective,” “appropriate,” “more final ends,” “more final goals,” and so on, without giving an account of how their meaning can be determined by and through his science (Storing 1981, 71–72). When Simon retreated to the ground of “satisficing” as the measure of administrative success, Storing pointed out, the term begs the question, What is good enough? and exhibits the subservience of Simon’s notion of rationality “to nonrational preferences” (Storing 1981, 71).

In addition to the incapacity of Simon’s efforts to fashion a science of problem solving to replace prudential judgment, Storing pointed out that the adverse consequence of Simon’s model of rationality is that it leaves us without any way of making rational choices about ends. Without a model of rationality that deals with the ends of human activity, we have no way of deciding what a problem is, and whether it is significant or urgent. “A decision about what is a problem, as distinct from a decision about how to solve a problem, is absolutely dependent on values” (Storing 1981, 147). Storing illustrated the adverse consequences of Simon’s truncated notion of rationality as follows:

One of Simon’s examples is the problem of the blind, which Helen Keller helped to bring to the attention of the public. Why was this a problem? Only because people held or acquired certain non-rational preferences that defined a certain situation as problematic? According to Simon’s assumptions, if no one had held such values there are no “real” problems. And if there are no real problems, the basis of the science of problem solving is destroyed, as Simon himself comes very close to admitting. (1981, 147)
The attempt to draw a bright-line distinction between facts and values, with science serving as the arbiter of facts and common opinion [Herbert] Simon observed that he had not detected “serving as the repository of values, sets up a false dichotomy that is belied by human behavior and experience. Worse, Storing believed, such a view is dangerous. It cuts off rational discussion regarding the ends of government and turns politics into a “might makes right” affair. As Storing observed,

“It is not “common sense” versus “science.” Virtually no one claims that common sense proverbial wisdom is sufficient either as a guide to action or as a means of understanding human behavior. The question is whether the admittedly necessary transcendence of common sense is to be achieved by science as understood by Simon, or by an exploration of human ends, to which common sense points but which it alone is not competent to undertake. (1962, 126)

For Storing, the two critical principles of the regnant understanding of practical reason, or rational decision making—the notion of the “one best method” and the assumption that all practical reason is essentially economic reason—did not make sense (Kirwan 1981, 207). Instead, Storing offered the judicial model of rationality as the appropriate path for transcending common sense. This model necessitates a consideration of ends and requires facts to be connected to values within a larger rational framework.

**Constitutional Law and the Judicial Model of Rationality**

As we have already pointed out, part of Storing’s quarrel with some of the early founders of public administration was disagreement with their assumption that the great political questions of the day had been largely resolved in the United States by the Constitutional Convention and the end of slavery, thus leaving means-centered administrative questions as the major problems of the day (Wilson 1887, 12). To the contrary, Storing argued that “age-old political and constitutional problems now present themselves as problems of (or in) public administration,” and that “all interesting administrative questions are political questions” (1964b, 147). This argument reflected Storing’s extensive study of administrative and constitutional law.

Throughout the 1960s, Storing taught doctoral courses on public administration and constitutional law at the University of Chicago. His integration of these subjects was more evident in the classroom than in his writings. His legacy in the subfield of public administration and constitutional law was unusual at the time. For the most part, as late as the 1960s, scholarly analysis of public administration and law was confined to administrative law, with some attention to major constitutional law decisions handed down during the immediate postfounding period and the New Deal. The field’s emphasis on administrative law was narrow, but understandable. It was not until the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in *Goldberg v. Kelly* (387 U.S. 254 [1970]), which applied constitutional due process to welfare benefits, that the rights revolution in U.S. constitutional law moved substantially beyond public personnel administration to broadly affect the administrative treatment of clients, customers, prisoners, public mental health patients, and individuals involved in street-level regulatory encounters. The rights revolution also made it easier for individuals to sue the government and its employees for the imposition of broad-based institutional and administrative reforms, financial compensation, and other relief.

Storing was deeply concerned with constitutional integrity. He closely analyzed the reasoning in relevant case decisions to assess their consistency with the Constitution’s foundational principles. This approach often led him to focus on the allocation of constitutional powers between the executive and legislative branches of government. In many respects, Storing’s attention to the linkage between the Constitution and public administration was unusual at the time. His focus was primarily on (1) constitutional integrity, (2) institutional development, (3) the concept of a civil servant, and (4) the problem of individual liberty versus national security.

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Storing was deeply concerned with constitutional integrity. He closely analyzed the reasoning in relevant case decisions to assess their consistency with the Constitution’s foundational principles. This approach often led him to focus on the allocation of constitutional powers between the executive and legislative branches of government. *Myers v. United States* (272 U.S. 52 [1926]) is a good example. The case involved the constitutionality of President Woodrow Wilson’s dismissal of a first-class postmaster in contravention of an 1876 statute requiring the Senate’s advice and consent for such removals. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, based largely on its interpretation of the “Decision of 1789,” in which the first Congress provided that the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs then being established could be dismissed by the president alone, regardless of the constitutional provision that such department heads be appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. Storing analyzed both the Myers and the 1789 decisions in terms of the criterion of constitutional integrity. He concluded that Congress’s action in 1789 did not fully support the Myers ruling because, although some members argued that the power to dismiss such appointments was part of the executive power vested in the president alone, others thought that Congress had the power to decide where the removal power should be vested. In addition to considering whether Myers or the Decision of 1789 was most in keeping with constitutional integrity, Storing analyzed what the impact on public administration might be if the Court had held in *Myers* that Congress does have the power to require Senate approval of the dismissal of presidential appointees who require its confirmation. By giving the Senate a larger role in federal administration, would such a decision have diluted the executive power and concomitant responsibility and accountability, and promoted something closer to parliamentary government? Would such
outcomes be in keeping with the founders’ constitutional design? Would they be beneficial or detrimental in light of various conceptions and theories of how public administration should function?

Myers was followed by Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (295 U.S. 602 [1935]), which involved the presidential dismissal of a Federal Trade Commission member for policy reasons rather than for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” as prescribed by statute. Storing analyzed this decision in terms of institutional development. The Supreme Court held that the president’s executive power to dismiss appointees did not extend to those officers who were engaged in quasi-legislative and judicial functions. In the course of its decision, the Court stated that commissioners “occupy no place in the executive department” (Humphrey’s Executor 1935, 628). The decision effectively reduced presidential authority over the independent regulatory commissions and fragmented control over public administration. In considering the effects of the decision on public administrative theory and doctrine, Storing made extensive use of the President’s Committee on Administrative Management’s 1937 Report to the President (Brownlow Report), which complained bitterly about the “theadless fourth branch” of government (i.e., the independent regulatory agencies) and sought to put most of it firmly under presidential control (President’s Committee on Administrative Management 1937, 32). Storing’s focus was on the impact of Humphrey’s Executor on the president’s institutional role as administrator in chief.

Storing was deeply interested in the historical development of varying conceptions of the civil servant’s role. This was one reason why he focused so intensely on the civil service reform movement of the 1870s and 1880s and the Progressive movement that followed it. Prior to the adoption of a fledgling merit system in 1883, the dominant concept of a civil servant was as a functionary who was, first and foremost, an arm or extension of the political party that appointed him (there were very few “hers” appointed at the time). After reform, a civil servant was considered a politically neutral expert in his or her area of administration. Storing often argued that, post-reform, civil servants could ideally be like judges—neutral, expert, and dedicated to the long-term public interest. He viewed their neutrality as enabling the civil service to act as a shock absorber that smoothed out abrupt policy changes. This role was in keeping with the constitutional design (expounded on in Federalist No. 10 and No. 51, among other places) for moderated responsiveness to shifts in public opinion.

In analyzing various conceptions of civil servants held in different historical periods, Storing looked to judicial decisions among other sources. For example, cases that held that a government job is a privilege to which no rights are attached supported a civil service based on partisanship, whereas those affirming Congress’s and the state legislatures’ power to prohibit civil servants from engaging in partisan activity supported the concept of neutrality.

Finally, Storing was concerned with the contest between individual liberty and national security, a theme that runs through the founding debates over the adoption of the U.S. Constitution. In terms of public administration issues in the 1950s and 1960s, this interest led Storing to focus extensively on the loyalty-security program for federal employees. He painstakingly analyzed the reasoning in key judicial decisions such as Bailey v. Richardson (182 F.2d 46 [1950]), Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath (341 U.S. 123 [1951]), and Keyishian v. Board of Regents (385 U.S. 589 [1967]). Storing’s textual-analytic approach sometimes revealed contradictions in a court’s or an author’s reasoning. When arguments were otherwise well reasoned, Storing viewed such contradictions as revealing the fault lines in broader controversies and pointed to areas where more thought was needed (though some issues inevitably remain intractable). Storing’s interest in loyalty-security cases spun out into consideration of judicial doctrines affecting public administration, such as the doctrine of privilege, which came under heavy pressure in the 1950s and 1960s but did not fully crumble until the 1970s. What does it mean to say that a civil service job is a privilege? What would it mean to say it is a property right or interest? What are the effects of the middle position that there is no constitutional right to a civil service job, but civil servants retain some constitutional rights in the context of their public employment?

Taken together, Storing’s teaching about the convergence and collision of constitutional law and public administration with respect to constitutional integrity, institutional development, the concept of a civil servant, and individual liberty versus national security set a theory-building and research agenda for many of his students. All of us probably pay great attention to the impact of major judicial decisions dealing with constitutional integrity and affecting public administration, such as Bowers v. Sandor (478 U.S. 714 [1986]) and Morrison v. Olson (487 U.S. 654 [1988]). In terms of institutional development, such as the scope of presidential power, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (542 U.S. 507 [2004]) stands out along with theories such as those supporting claims by some presidents over the course of American history that the Constitution establishes a unitary executive branch. The concept of what a civil servant is or should be is also reflected in work on administrative ethics and issues posed by whistle-blowing and internal dissent in administrative organizations, such as those raised in Garcetti v. Ceballos (547 U.S. 410 [2006])). Individual liberty versus national security remains a strong concern in much of public administration theory, while the constitutional rights of public employees have become a major topic within public human resources management. Storing’s effort to ground public administration theory and practice on the Constitution foreshadowed developments that will continue to have an enduring impact on the profession.

One of the important consequences of Storing’s focus on the nexus between constitutional law and public administration was the development of the “judicial model” of administrative decision making. Storing was drawn to the way in which judges in appellate and common law settings have to make judgments that take facts into account while also considering principles that provide a moral standard, without prescribing a specific outcome. Almost every course that Storing taught was enriched with the close study of illuminating judicial decisions. He used these cases in two ways. First, he enjoyed the process of immersing students in the complex interplay between the “facts of the case” and the way each judge used these facts to reach a decision that gave meaning to a broader set of legal principles. This approach to legal analysis treats legal principles as “a basic thought process which is gradually tempered...
by experience, context, and an awareness of the institutional conditions of one’s role as a public official. They [legal principles] can help public administrators cope with the continua of political life in terms of lawful as well as sensible purpose and action. It is one way of making the ideal of rule by law more practicable and adaptable” (Green 2002, 281–82).

For Storing’s purposes, dissenting opinions were as important as majority decisions. In keeping with his view of the problematic nature of American democracy, he reminded students that the minority opinion of today may well become the majority opinion tomorrow. What was important to Storing in reviewing each judge’s opinion was whether it was persuasive. Did it make sense? Was the reasoning compelling? Was it consistent with the purposes and intent of the Constitution? All of this was a way of teaching students what “judgment” meant as well as preparing them for the exercise of judgment in the their own teaching and practice. He was far less interested in the “doctrinal impact” of a case or vote than he was in the differing processes used by various judges to distill the ratio decidendi that connected moral principles to concrete facts.

Storing’s call for using the judicial model as a guide to administrative practice foreshadowed a wide-ranging and growing critique of the positivist science decision-making model from critical theorists (Habermas 1985), humanists (Hummel 2007), feminists (Gilligan 1993), and organizational theorists (Lipsky 1980; Schön 1984). As part of their critique, these theorists emphasized at least three forms of practical knowledge that can be acquired only through experience rather than through formal scientific analysis. These forms stand on a separate footing from the knowledge acquired through use of the scientific method (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988; Vickers 1965; Weick 1979). In the world of administrative practice, these practical forms of knowledge often overshadow scientific knowledge as the most common bases for making judgments about policy development, implementation, and all matters related to the design and operation of public organizations.

There is, first, the prudential understanding that is acquired by undertaking an activity over a long period of time. The subtle nuances and complex interactions among materials, people, and settings acquired by master artisans and craftsman through a long period of “hands-on” experience exemplify this kind of tacit knowledge. Police officers, case managers, and city planners rely on it routinely to make decisions under conditions of limited resources, short time frames, significant uncertainty, and political conflicts that often make systematic analysis impossible.

A second kind of practical knowledge can be described as a “feel for the whole,” and it is critically important for successful administrative practice. For public servants, knowledge of the whole tends to develop through experience in a variety of positions, and by moving to higher-level administrative roles that require an increasingly broad or “strategic” sense of their institution. As they do so, they become more aware of how their work forms part of the larger process of democratic governance. They develop a sense of proportion among priorities, and of balancing competing demands. They learn how to weave people and programs together and how to mobilize interests into new missions and institutional arrangements. Viewed in this way, knowledge of the whole is inseparable from managing change for the common good. It is what some call democratic statesmanship (Green 1998).

Third, there is critical knowledge that gives skilled practitioners a sense of when things are not quite right, or do not add up. In these situations, their judgments often run against perceived facts and guiding principles. They also often run against the tide of opinion among colleagues, or in the general public, which invites conflict. The capacity to preserve and protect critical knowledge for the public benefit requires institutional safeguards such as secure tenure for key positions and careful staffing of critical workgroups to avoid problems with “groupthink” and related organizational pathologies. Critical knowledge represents a “sixth sense” for public servants who know that good administrative work cannot always follow prescribed formulas or seemingly convincing data.

These three types of practical knowledge contribute to the vital capacity for making judgments where other types of rational or systematic decision making fail because they are unable to connect facts to moral purposes. Storing’s goal was not to denigrate scientific knowledge. Instead, he sought (1) to make the common knowledge acquired through experience and reflection central to successfully managing public affairs, and (2) to connect it to the larger moral purposes that this knowledge is intended to serve.

Conclusion: Restoring the Nobility of Public Service
Storing’s intellectual agenda was guided by the desire to recover the foundational principles that would enable America’s democratic system of government to thrive. His search for the meaning and implications of the American founding has produced three legacies that, taken together, restore the nobility of public service. First, his efforts to recover the founding principles have permanently reframed the debate about how we measure success in governing. Second, in the process of recovering the founding principles, Storing restored an important role for public administration and its agents in the governing process. Finally, Storing reminded us that the American democratic order can remain healthy only if its leaders and teachers of public service reach out to participate in an ongoing renewal process that connects current political issues to the underlying tensions inherent in American democratic governance.

The Task of Recovery: The Problematic Nature of American Democracy
As we pointed out earlier in this essay, Storing was singularly focused on the recovery of the problematic nature of the American democratic republic. In undertaking this recovery, Storing concluded that the prevailing views of the founding, whether they be liberal, conservative, elitist, or democratic (e.g., Beard 1913; Brown 1963; Elkins and McKitrick 1962; Hartz 1955; Hofstadter 1948; Jensen 1940; McDonald 1958; Rossiter 1953; Wood 1973), failed to capture the full complexity of the problem that both the Federalists and Anti-Federalists were trying to solve. In revisiting the founding, Storing came to the conclusion that American democracy needed some unity in the executive, adequate opportunities for the expression of existing and emergent interests, wise leaders who had the motivation and discretion to use their judgment to promote the public interest, and vigilant and engaged citizens who cared deeply about democratic governance. Because there was no magic formula
that would successfully and permanently reconcile these competing needs, it was important that each generation be prepared to continuously reengage and rebalance such central political issues. Storing argued that the bureaucracy plays a central role in the success of this ongoing balancing process.

**The Task of Restoration: The Bureaucracy’s Role in Governance**

Storing wanted to put responsibility for continually addressing the problem of American democratic governance on the doorstep of public administration. He rejected the notion that the bureaucracy can or should be limited to a simply subservient role, providing elected political officials with the benefit of narrow technical and neutral expertise. He argued that the bureaucracy was equally responsible for managing the problem of responsiveness, protecting against majority tyranny, and cultivating an engaged and vigilant citizenry. But in sharing responsibility for managing the ongoing problem of democratic governance, administrators needed to be armed with the kind of knowledge necessary to be successful. This knowledge is political in nature and requires the exercise of the kind of judgment found in a statesman.

The cultivation of the kind of judgment needed for a “closet statesmen” was reflected in Storing’s approach as a teacher, as he moved from one set of texts to another, from *The Federalist*, to the writings of the Anti-Federalists, to the political writings of black Americans, to treaties on the U.S. Constitution (i.e., William W. Crosskey’s history and analysis of the U.S. Constitution), to Supreme Court cases, to presidential papers, and always back again to the starting point of his agenda, the American founding. While the goal of reading these texts was to challenge the mind and recover important ideas written by thoughtful authors, it also set an example of what was required to be a good teacher and a good closet statesman. Here was a highly accomplished scholar at a top university who always worked hard—excessively, it sometimes seemed—to do his absolute best in the classroom. He was highly respected by students, and he respected them. For Storing, intellectual development was part of the larger process of character formation.

Storing’s commitment to the nobility of knowledge and thought was reflected in his conception of what a public administrator might ideally be. In earlier days (the Federalists and the Progressive period), civil servants were expected to possess civic virtue, in addition to their other competencies. The old merit exams, which we now look on as neither job related nor productive of a representative bureaucracy, contained questions about the leadership and structure of government, physical public landmarks, and constitutional matters precisely because even the lowest-level civil servant should be a model citizen. Storing shared this idea. For example, he favored the 1955 Hoover Commission recommendation for the establishment of a senior civil service (which finally became law in 1978). He argued that such a senior corps (1,500 at the outset) would provide the bureaucracy with a nonpartisan, experienced, and knowledgeable group of administrators who could give their elected political partners invaluable counsel in managing the affairs of state.

Storing observed in his study of the founding that while the framers believed in the importance of attracting the best individuals to public office, they failed to establish any mechanisms ensuring that this would happen on a consistent basis (Storing 1981, 1:73). Storing believed the establishment of a senior civil service would improve the overall quality of the American polity. (To Dostoevsky’s claim that one could measure the quality of a society by its prisons, Storing might have added, “and its civil service and public administration.”) To fulfill this function, however, civil servants had to be honest, upstanding, and committed to improving the civic culture and public morality.

Such concepts might seem old-fashioned—even archaic—in contemporary public administration writings, which see little that is special about civil service per se. Today, civil servants are largely viewed as interchangeable with private sector employees (including those working for nonprofits). “But for a handful of functions dealing with national security and criminal justice,” remarked Paul Light, “it is not clear that there is a pure and inherently governmental function left today” (1999, 9–10). With the blurring of the boundaries among the public, private, and nonprofit sectors, the role of the civil service has been significantly diminished. When this development is combined with the last three decades of criticism of the bureaucracy by the Reagan-Bush, Clinton-Gore and Bush-Cheney administrations, Storing would have been concerned about the long-term consequences for the quality of American democratic governance.

**The Task of Renewal**

Storing did not believe that recovering the founding principles by themselves and lodging shared responsibility for their stewardship in the bureaucracy was sufficient. These principles had to be connected to the realities of current political life. Principles held only as abstractions could not provide the energy and excitement for a renewal of public administration. Public administration is a clinical practice. As mentioned earlier in this essay, one of the proposed reforms that especially intrigued Storing was the creation of a senior civil service. But Storing was also mindful of the important role of education in this recovery and renewal process. “Unquestionably,” Storing argued, “if our nation requires leadership, including administrative leadership, we had better give more and deeper consideration to the education of our leaders than we have done” (1963, 84).

While Storing did not set forth a curriculum for bureaucrats, the direction that such a curriculum might take is clear from his views on the role of administrators in governing and from his critique of the two accepted criteria of successful administrative work: technical competence and subservience to the popular will. Storing observed that “it is where these standards are unavailable, or contradictory, or insufficient that [an administrator] meets his most difficult and highest test” (1964a, 46). So what is the best way to educate administrators for the exercise of discretion, especially for the kind of political discretion characteristic of the closet statesmen? The answer for Storing might take a variety of forms. For example, Storing observed that the study of Supreme Court decisions “will sharpen and deepen the [bureaucrat’s] practical grasp on the complex and sometimes ambiguous political principles that provide most of the ethical ground and substance of their work as American public administrators” (Rohr 1978, vi.). Because Storing was not a legal positivist, he believed that law constitutes “the normative horizon, or context, from which public administration must take its bearings.” For Storing, the interpretation of law required reflection on the purposes.
of the law, and hence on questions of justice and right (Clor 1980, 2). But the opportunity to reflect on justice and right were also provided for Storing by the writings of the Anti-Federalists and black Americans, a major reason he gave for assembling collections of their readings. One consequence of Storing's approach would be a greater focus in American schools of public administration on the thoughtful and critical study of constitutional law, political history, political theory, and political biography, at the expense of reducing the curricular role of generic courses that ignore the difference between public and private administration and the “systems science” approach, whether it be policy analysis, decision making, budgeting, personnel management, information management, or any number of other subjects.

An important opportunity for Storing to regenerate interest in public administration was provided by the civil rights movement of his day. The movement posed the question of how we can construct an enduring devotion to the principle of e pluribus unum without losing the identity of the parts. This was a central theme of his study of the founding, of constitutional law, and public administration. In the introduction to his collection of political writings by black Americans, Storing argued that social and political thought ought “to aim to help men find their way into broader and higher levels of significance.” The aim should be, however, “not to abandon the narrower particular associations but rather by sustaining their integrity and exploring their implications, to enrich and elevate the whole community.” Storing observed that W. E. B. Du Bois’s writings raise basic questions about the foundations of American government and politics, and even about the accepted foundations of politics in the modern world (1970, 11–12). In his preface to What Country Have I?, Storing turns to Du Bois for guidance in identifying what is ultimately important in our work as teachers and scholars (1970, vi–vii).

Du Bois described the African American as “a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world. . . . One ever feels his two-ness—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.” Storing observes that “Du Bois knew that all men live within their veils of prejudice, convention and particularity, just as, at the same time, all thoughtful men reach out for a world beyond”:

I sit with Shakespeare and he winces not. Across the color line I move arm in arm with Balzac and Dumas, where smiling men and welcoming women glide in gilded halls. From the caves of evening that swing between the strong-limbed earth and the tracery of the stars, I summon Aristotle and Aurelius and what soul I will, and they come all graciously with no scorn nor condescension. So, wed with Truth, I dwell above the Veil. (Du Bois 1903, 109; emphasis added)

Storing cited Du Bois, first, because he stood “among the noteworthy makers and critics of the American regime,” thus shedding light on our efforts to reconcile the political parts with the whole. But he praised Du Bois also because he stood among “those who seek to understand men and their relations with one another . . . a teacher of all who aspire to wed Truth and dwell above the Veil” (Storing 1970, 11–12). Du Bois was an exemplar for Storing, both for what he taught us about living together as members of a common political community and for what he taught about being human. No less can be said of Storing’s contributions as a teacher and as a scholar of public administration. The nobility of public service ultimately finds expression in the lives of men and women of noble character who devote their lives of service and teaching to balancing the tensions inherent in the foundations of America’s system of democratic governance.

Notes
1. In preparing this article, we have drawn heavily from Kent Kirwan’s (1981) earlier summary of Herbert Storing’s contributions to public administration.
3. For an excellent extended discussion of the importance of the judicial model of reasoning to administrative practice, see Green (2002).

References
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