Woodrow Wilson’s Administrative Thought and German Political Theory

To what extent were Woodrow Wilson’s ideas about public administration informed by German organic political theory? Drawing on the writings of Wilson, Lorenz von Stein, and Johann K. Bluntschli on public administration, and comparing American and German primary sources, the author offers insights into Wilson’s general concept of public administration, as well as his understanding of the politics-administration dichotomy. With regard to current administrative research, this study underscores how the transfer of ideas profoundly contributes to advancing comparative public administration and helps clarify terminological difficulties and conflicting perspectives among diverse administrative science traditions.

Several authors hold that an ahistorical perspective prevails in American Public Administration (Luton 1999, 210; Raadschelders 2003, 161; Raadschelders et al. 2000; Spicer 2004; Stillman 1997, 335).1 Ahistorical reasoning may be the reason why American scholars have sometimes been reluctant to admit a certain debt to continental European sources (Lowery 1993; Miewald 1994). An analysis of Woodrow Wilson’s writings and lecture notes on administration written at Johns Hopkins University between 1884 and 1897 may serve as a historical case study to exemplify how foreign experience gave direction to trends in American Public Administration.2

This essay concentrates on Wilson’s transfer of German organic political philosophy. On the basis of a comparison of German and American primary sources,3 it illustrates the influence that the German organic state theory—as a set of coherent implications—had as a guiding philosophy for Wilson’s reflections on administration. With regard to the existing literature on Wilson’s German intellectual inheritance, this essay may substantiate and sometimes even slightly modify the picture (e.g., Carrese 2005; Miewald 1984; Pestrutto 2003, 2005, 2007; Spicer 2001, 40–49; Steigerwald 1989).4 Most importantly, it will be argued that Wilson’s complex ideas about the proper relationship between the political and administrative aspects of government can be more readily understood if we interpret passages of Wilson’s writings against the background of his German sources. Wilson’s apparently ambiguous position regarding the politics—administration dichotomy has sparked controversy in the literature and does not seem to have lost its relevance (e.g., Hoffman 2002; Lynn 2001; Ostrom and Ostrom 1971; Overeem 2005; Rosenbloom 2008; Svara 2001; Van Riper 1984; Walker 1989).

The benefits of such a case study for today’s Public Administration are twofold. On the one hand, the close examination of how foreign concepts are adopted to serve domestic needs helps clarify conflicting perspectives among different intellectual traditions and may help clarify terminological difficulties (Rutgers 2001b, 238–39; Stillman 1997, 337). On the other hand, the transfer of ideas approach may contribute to comparative research by furthering our understanding of the historical adequacy of “traditional flavors” in Western administrative thought (Rutgers 2001b). Moreover, whereas comparative scholars have to comprehend ideational change by referring to “critical junctures” or incremental change (Schmidt 2008), the transfer of ideas approach is able to deal analytically with change. It embraces transformations of one intellectual tradition as a consequence of an exchange with another tradition.

This paper is organized into four sections. As it is debatable in the history of ideas as to whether a certain author could have been influenced intellectually by some specific sources, the first section encompasses a discussion of the transfer of ideas approach, the method
American Individualism versus German Organicism

The transfer of ideas is defined as the (intentional) movement of scholarly discourses and concepts between two intellectual traditions (Osterhammel 2003). It is characterized by three processes: mediation, selection, and reception (Lüsebrink 2001, 215–17). First, mediation processes have to do with the actors who transfer and the institutions that allow for the transfer. Contextual factors of the relevant scholarly discourse are important. Accordingly, the intellectual environment in which a scholar works should be discussed. Second, selection processes have to do with the texts and scholarly discourses that are chosen to be transferred from one ideational context to the other. Finally, and most importantly, reception processes have to do with the embedding of the transferred texts and scholarly discourses in the context of the recipient intellectual tradition. With regard to selection and reception processes, the transfer of ideas approach attaches high importance to the individual’s creative power. Here, the explanatory logic of the approach is as follows: When scholars reflecting on their explanations of reality are confronted with inconsistencies, they investigate foreign traditions to solve their intellectual dilemmas (Bevir 2002). Hence, the guiding assumption for conducting research on the transfer of ideas is that authors rely on foreign sources in order to improve their intellectual inheritance.

For the sake of analytical clarity, a distinction should be drawn between the “sending” and recipient intellectual traditions because, metaphorically speaking, this permits us to analyze the journey of intellectual concepts from their place of departure to their destination (Werner and Zimmermann 2006, 46). In the sense of heuristic abstractions, it is therefore appropriate to conceive of the American and German intellectual traditions of the nineteenth century as clearly distinct ideational paths, or, to put it in Rutgers’s (2001b) words, as distinct “traditional flavors.” With regard to the transfer of organic concepts from Germany to the United States, it makes sense to contrast the American “stateless” with the German “statelessness” tradition (Rutgers 2001b; Stillman 1990, 1997).

During the early nineteenth century, the social compact theories of Montesquieu and Locke exerted the most significant influence on America’s political thought (Lutz 1984; Pestritto 2007, 19). Government was conceptualized as a rational construct based on premises such as individual liberty, equality, and property. As these premises imply, the political order was understood as irrevocable, and thus could not be subject to historical changes. Americans traditionally regarded the protection of individual freedom as the main reason for political organization. In Spicer’s words, the preferred American form of organization may be labeled as a civil association “in which men and women see themselves as free to pursue their own particular interests and values. What binds them together as a political group is not any common set of substantive ends or objectives, but their common recognition or acknowledgement of certain rules of conduct” (2004, 356). Accordingly, Americans did not conceive of the state as some kind of guardian of the common will (Rutgers 2001b, 230).

The state was identified with government based on and bound to constitutional principles, and it was supposed to intervene only as much as was needed to guarantee the American citizen’s rights. Among the constitutional principles, especially high importance was attached to the separation of powers doctrine. It was believed that the three branches of government would check and balance each other in order to prevent one power from becoming dominant (Pestritto 2007, 18; Rutgers 2000, 291). Because of the limited government tradition and the strict adherence to constitutional principles, Americans did not consider the administration of society an integral part of the state. As bureaucracy was seen as a threat to liberty, the aim was to operate without a public administration.

In nineteenth-century Germany, the preferred form of political organization may be labeled as purposive association “in which individuals recognize themselves as united or bound together for the joint pursuit of some coherent set of substantive purposes or ends”—Spicer’s terminology again (2004, 355). In line with the political philosophy of Hegel, German scholars frequently drew analogies between the state and living organisms in order to portray the state as a purposive association (Böckenforde 1978, 584–86). In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel (1995, §267, §269) pictured the state as an organic, souled being in which all parts formed a system of complete interdependence. The analogy illustrated the development of the state as a dialectical, rational process toward the institution of collective freedom. As members of the rational state, individuals would recognize that they were part of a complete and thus free community. Hegel (1995, §257) explicitly maintained that the “state is the actuality of the ethical idea.” As a vital organ of the whole organism, bureaucracy was considered an integral part and thus a necessary and legitimate consequence of the state’s development. With regard to the promotion of both individual and public welfare, Hegel attached a great deal of importance to public administration (Sager and Rosser 2009).

Bluntschli appreciated Hegel’s treatment of the state’s evolution as well as his emphasis on the ethical significance of the state (Bluntschli 1875, 79). He pictured the state as the actual embodiment of the people when he wrote that “the state is by no means a lifeless instrument, a dead machine but a living and therefore organic entity” (1881, 757). As the organic notion implies, he claimed that the development of the modern state should no longer be based on inadequate, “mechanic” social contract theories. In that context, Bluntschli declared that “as the human being is not merely an amount of blood corpuscles and cells, a nation is not simply a sum of citizens” (1875, 18). Rather, historical explanations should trace the purposive state back to the nation’s intrinsic desire for the commonweal. Like Hegel, Bluntschli saw the establishment of an expansive public administration as a necessary step toward the actualization of the common good.

Stein applied the Hegelian dialectic to systematize his administrative theory (Rutgers 1994, 398). He aimed at a systematic substantiation
of the organic analogy when he interpreted the state as an abstract personality. Whereas he pictured the sovereign as the self-conscious “self” (Ich), he saw the state’s will (Wille) manifested in the constitution/legislation, and its deed (Tat) realized in the administration (Stein 1869, 3–12). He believed, on the one hand, that once the state had developed to its complete form, the administration—determined by the state’s conscience—would implement the public interest. On the other hand, he stressed the importance of self-government, or, in other words, the citizen’s duty to exercise personal responsibility as a means for individual self-fulfillment. For Stein, both the realization of collective and individual freedom were thus to be achieved under the all-embracing umbrella of the organic state.

Around the middle of the nineteenth century, the idea of the state as the actual embodiment of the people had an impact on moderate liberal scholars of political science and public law that can hardly be overstated (Lindenfeld 1997, 176–80). The organism characterized the relationship between the state, the whole society, and every individual’s liberty as a purposive arrangement to which neither revolutions nor overpowering governments could pose a threat (Bückenförde 1978, 601; Stolleis 1992, 264). Public administration was considered the guardian of the common will. Furthermore, the organic notion implied that only historical analyses could offer comprehensive understanding of reality. In preliminary conclusion, it can be stated that in this intellectual tradition, society was “held together not by contract and self-interest, but by a corporate identity and common purpose that far transcended the private satisfaction of individual members” (Harris 1998, 149). While it has been the intention of this section to draw a heuristic distinction between the American and German intellectual traditions, the next section will discuss how these traditions converged in the late nineteenth century.

Organic Political Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University

It hardly seems to be an exaggeration to say that during the closing years of the nineteenth century, the whole of American political science—of which Public Administration cannot be separated at this time—was under great influence of German political theory (e.g., Adcock 2006; Gunnell 1995; Herbst 1965; Hoffman 2002; Pestritto 2005, 84–92). Thousands of students left the United States for a few semesters to enroll in German universities. They probably did so because German academic titles promised a competitive advantage in the academic job market at home. The comparative ease with which a doctorate could be attained in Germany and the international reputation of German philosophers, law professors, and historians may have served as additional incentives.

Moreover, political developments may have convinced them to study abroad (Herbst 1965, 10). In the last three decades of the nineteenth century, social and industrial problems led to a remarkable increase in public spending on both continents (Luton 2003, 171–72; Schieder 1984). More than in Central European countries, however, corruption generated enormous costs to the economy in America (Wallis 2006). New businesses, administrative positions, or, quite simply, money were offered in exchange for political support. Opening hours and regulations of gambling houses and brothels benefitted from arbitrary interpretations of the law (Glaeser and Goldin 2006, 7). In dubious ways, private firms obtained attractive properties, easy access to the harbor, or extortiionsate payments for their services (Putnam 2000, 374). In a nutshell, the corrupt procedures allowed businessmen, politicians, and civil servants to get rich, reelected, or promoted (Menes 2006, 85–86). In order to develop strategies against corruption, reform-oriented scholars traveled across the Atlantic to learn about the German way of dealing with public policies.

Several of Wilson’s teachers were among the students who went to Germany. George Morris, for example, had been brought up within the Hegelian doctrine in Halle and Berlin. He frequently referred to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, which he “regarded as representing the high-water mark . . . in the treatment of the philosophical conception of the state” (Morris 1885, 163). To those students who were not able to read in German, he recommended Elisha Mulford’s Nation (Morris 1885, 164). In Halle and Heidelberg, Mulford had also learned to write “with an obligation . . . to Hegel” (1881, 7–8). The close connection between Mulford’s Nation and Hegelian political philosophy may be exemplified with the following quotation: “The nation . . . is a moral organism, it is formed of persons in the relations in which there is the realization of personality, it is not limited to the necessary sequence of a physical development, but transcends a merely physical condition, and in it there is the realization of freedom and the manifestation of rights” (Mulford 1881, 382). For Mulford, laissez-faire liberalism in the United States posed a dilemma. He was convinced that the common good was more than the sum of individual goods and that the public spirit seeking the common good was represented in the organic state.

Pestritto (2005, 82; cf. Miewald 1984, 27), who has written extensively on Wilson’s German intellectual background, sees a close connection between Hegel’s and Wilson’s political thought. With regard to Wilson’s writings on administration, however, it is difficult to appraise the direct influence that Hegel may have exerted on Wilson. Although the Philosophy of Right appears repeatedly in Wilson’s working bibliographies (Link 1969a, 586–87; 1970a, 129), he quoted Hegel no more than twice, first in a love letter to his wife (Link 1968a, 317), and later in his famous essay “The Study of Administration” (1887). In the latter, he emphasized the need for a new science of administration with a Hegelian statement: “The philosophy of any time is, as Hegel says, ‘nothing but the spirit of that time expressed in abstract thought’; and political philosophy, like philosophy of every other kind, has only held up the mirror to contemporary affairs” (Link 1968b, 361). Even if we doubt whether Wilson studied Hegel’s books, we can assume that the Hegelian notion of the state was presented to Wilson via Morris and Mulford. Between 1884 and 1885, Wilson attended Morris’s course on the philosophy of the state (Link 1968a, 335). When, one year later, he thought about how to “study government,” he acknowledged that Mulford’s Nation was going to furnish him with “with inspiration and philosophy” (Link 1968b, 303). Hence, Pestritto seems safe if he finds more than accidental convergences between Hegel’s and Wilson’s writings.
Another German-trained professor at Johns Hopkins University was Herbert Adams. He had studied in Heidelberg, where he had completed his doctorate under Bluntschli (Fries 1973, 394). It is therefore not surprising that during Adams's courses, the history of the United States was recapitulated with the help of organic metaphors (e.g., Adams 1885, 126). Moreover, in agreement with most of his German colleagues, Adams advocated “the application of the comparative method to the use of historical literature” (1885, 138). Adams's views and methods seem to have appealed to Wilson. Several scholars hold that Adams was an essential source of inspiration for Wilson's early political science (Cunningham 1981, 261; Raadschelders 2002, 581; Stillman 1973, 582–83). Accordingly, he wrote in the introduction to The State that the “only thorough method of study in politics is the comparative and historical” (Wilson 1892, 597; cf. Link 1969b, 116).

Finally, attention should be drawn to Richard Ely, who introduced Wilson to the subject of public administration in 1884. Ely, who had studied philosophy and economy in Halle, Heidelberg, and Berlin, was probably the most important source of inspiration for Wilson's reflections on administration (Link 1968b, 43). As will become clear in the subsequent section, Ely may have paraphrased a statement from Stein when he wrote that the main social problem of the late nineteenth century was not “one of legislation but fundamentally one of administration” (1938, 114). He thought that public ownership managed by responsible civil servants offered a remedy against the corrupt practices prevalent in U.S. politics (Ely 1888, 50). For instance, he stated that the “natural monopolies are those with which we are especially concerned at the present time, and here the general rule is public ownership and management” (1899, 261). Ely was apparently less skeptical of state interventionism than many of his compatriots.

It has been argued thus far that the academic discourse at Johns Hopkins University was influenced by German political theory, sharing its centrality of the state and its organic notion of the state, its use of the comparative-historical approach against methodological individualism, and its critique of laissez-faire economics and political corruption. According to Link, Wilson absorbed his German-trained teachers’ “emphasis upon the origins and organic evolutionary development of institutions” (1968b, 55). For example, Wilson replied to the question about the nature of government: “The answer is hidden in the nature of society itself. Society is in no sense artificial; it is as truly natural and organic as the individual man himself. . . . Society, therefore, is . . . an evolution of experience, an interlaced growth of tenacious relationships, a compact, living, organic whole, structural, not mechanical” (1892, 597). While it may have become clear that the organic outlook was an important aspect of Wilson's idealitarian context, nothing has hitherto been said about how this outlook may have inspired Wilson to respond to the intellectual dilemmas of his time.

The analysis of Wilson's reliance on German sources helps clarify his vision of the proper relationship between the political and administrative aspects of government. At the heart of Wilson's ideas about the subject lies his historical notion of the state (Pestritto 2005, 227). Wilson differentiated between the “era of constitution” and the “era of administration” as two distinct stages in the organic growth of the state. In an early “Essay on Administration” (1885), Wilson noted that the “period of constitution-making is passed now. We have reached new territory in which we need new guides, the vast territory of administration. All the enlightened world has come along with us into these new fields, and much of the enlightened world has realized the fact and is preparing itself to understand administration” (Link 1968b, 52). Here the American quite clearly paraphrased an introductory passage from Stein's Handbuch der Verwaltungslehre (1870, 3), where he had read that if the whole living state and its organic elements were to be understood, one should no longer concentrate on the constitution-making process but rather on the examination of public administration. It was this historical notion of the state that led Wilson to the conclusion, “It is getting to be harder to run a constitution than to frame one” (Link 1968b, 362). Apparently, Wilson envisioned an expansive public administration as the means to run the constitution.

Wilson's distinction between the constitution-making process and administration was not an attempt to declare constitutional questions obsolete for the “era of administration.” As Rohr states, it seems more likely that “throughout his life, Wilson was an enthusiastic constitutionalist” (1986, 60). However, Wilson did not agree with the traditional American idea about the constitution as a static set of principles to ensure strictly limited government. This can be seen in Wilson's rejection of the separation of powers doctrine. He contended that the Americans had followed Montesquieu as “excessively practical people” instead of following him as “philosophers” (Link 1968b, 51). He argued that even if the separation of powers doctrine had been adequate for the period of constitution making, it was no longer consistent with the present situation. He wrote, “The object sought is, not the effectuation of a system of mechanical, or artificial, checks and balances, but only the facilitation and promotion of organic differentiation” (Link 1969b, 142). According to Wilson, “Montesquieu did not hit upon exactly the right devices for practical popular government. When he said that it was essential for the preservation of liberty to differentiate the executive, legislative and judicial functions of government, he was thinking of an undemocratic state in which the executive ruled for life by hereditary right and not be virtue of popular election . . . And he did not say that it was essential to liberty to separate, to isolate, these three functions of government” (Link 1968b, 51). Wilson lamented that government could not intervene according to the contemporary needs of American society because of the strict adherence to constitutional principles. Explicitly, Wilson stated, “Under our own system we have isolation plus irresponsibility,—isolation and therefore irresponsibility. At this point more widely than at any other our government differs from the other governments of the world. Other Executives lead, ours obeys” (1892, 592).

Wilson may have found inspiration in Bluntschli's writings on administration to argue against the separation of powers doctrine. Bluntschli (1875, 76) considered it to the historical school's credit to have brought the organic character of the state back to the scene.
Historical reasoning had shown that the trias politica was “neither logically correct, nor appropriate to actual conditions” (Bluntschli 1881, 306). Bluntschli (1875, 589) thought Montesquieu’s trichotomy to be analytically helpful, but only if it was not interpreted too mechanically. He did not advocate a limitation of the executive’s power in the sense of the American checks and balances. For him, the executive was related to the other powers in the same way that the head was related to the limbs of the body (Bluntschli 1875, 594). Only an expansive bureaucracy could execute the will of the state and thus promote the welfare of society.

In line with the German intellectual tradition, Wilson wanted the constitutional state to be defined as an organic whole in which the constitution formed “the skeleton frame of a living organism” (Rohr 1986, 63). Accordingly, Wilson interpreted the constitution as a set of general guidelines rather than an irrevocable set of written principles. Cook states that Wilson aimed at an “ambitious reinterpretation of the constitutional order” that included an “expansion of federal government responsibility and action with advances on social policy and political-economic policy, and changes in the executive organization of government and the operation of administrative systems” (2006, 328–29). Wilson was convinced that an expansive public administration could be established without giving up the constitutional values of liberty, property, and equality. He believed that a high-profile public administration had become “the most influential sort of government activity” to achieve the fundamental American ideals (Rohr 1986, 66; cf. Miewald 1984, 24–26).

Building on his historical concept of the state, Wilson distinguished between law-giving and administrative functions of the state. In order to do so, he repeatedly drew on German sources. In “The Study of Administration,” for example, Wilson explicitly referred to page 467 of Bluntschli’s Politik when he wrote, “Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the task for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices. . . . Bluntschli, for instance, bids us separate administration alike from politics and from law. Politics, he says, is state activity ‘in things great and universal,’ while ‘administration, on the other hand,’ is ‘activity of the state in individual and small things.’ ‘Policy does nothing without the aid of administration;’ but administration is not therefore politics. But we do not require German authority for this position; this discrimination between administration and politics is now, happily, too obvious to need further discussion” (Link 1968b, 371). Considering the controversy about the exact meaning of Wilson’s position on the proper relationship between political and administrative aspects of government, which followed in the Public Administration literature, we may have good reason to disagree with Wilson on that point and reevaluate Bluntschli’s discrimination.

In his textbooks, Bluntschli (1876, 465) analyzed the proper role of the state’s functions with the help of dichotomies. He formulated the terminological oppositions “constitution vs. administration,” “legislation vs. administration,” and “politics vs. administration” (1876, 467). We can assume that Wilson had not only read one paragraph of Bluntschli’s textbook but also the subsequent ones. If we follow suit with him, we discover that Bluntschli discussed Stein’s distinction between will and deed and (inaccurately) concluded that it was inappropriate to “parallelize administration and legislation with deed and will as if the administration had no will of its own” (1876, 467). By contradicting Stein, he in the same breath underlined the political function of the administration. Accordingly, Bluntschli wrote that “many administrative acts have—if they bear a meaning for the whole nation—political character. The state-man will leave innumerable affairs to the administration without paying further attention to it” (1876, 467). Against the background of these citations, it becomes clear that Bluntschli formulated his terminological oppositions in order to define the leading part he wanted public administration to play in high politics.

Wilson and Bluntschli’s interpretations of Stein’s distinction between will and deed reveal striking similarities. In “The Study of Administration,” Wilson argued that the “distinction between Will and answering Deed” did not apply to the American context. Rather, a distinction had to be made between “general plans and special means” (Link 1968b, 372). The American administrator was supposed to have “a will of his own in the choice of means for accomplishing his work” (1968b, 372). Of the same tenor, Wilson stated that the public servant “is not and ought not to be a mere passive instrument.” Apparently, Wilson agreed with Bluntschli and disagreed with Stein in order to emphasize the political role of public administration.

While in 1887, Wilson seems to have found an inappropriate “justification for an apolitical administration” in Stein’s textbook, he later revised his opinion (Miewald 1984, 21). In his “Notes on Administration” (1891), he reproduced Stein’s differentiation between will and deed as an analytical distinction (1969b, 115). With regard to the difference between law-giving and administrative functions of the state, he noted that the “theory really predicates a division of organs, based upon a difference of a radical sort in the functions [but] in practice, there has been no sharp differentiation of organs to correspond to the full with these differences of function. The object of actual developments [is] not a system of mechanical checks and balances, but simply organic differentiation . . . no part overworked, but each skilled and instructed by specialization; each part coördinated with and assisted by all others; each part an organ, not to serve a separate interest, but to serve the whole” (1969b, 383). In agreement with Stein’s theory (1870, 9), Wilson pictured the administration as a vital organ of the state that was in no sense subordinate to the legislation, but rather had to compensate for the gradual pace of legislation. Both Stein and Wilson thought that the administration could not wait for the legislature to enforce the state’s will. Accordingly, he maintained that “law is always a summing up of the past. . . . Administration, on the other hand, is always in contact with the present: it is the State’s experienc- ing organ. It is thus that it becomes a source of law” (1969b, 138). For the German as well as the American, both legislative and administrative processes had to do with the “active promotion of the ends of the state” (1969b, 115). It thus becomes apparent that Wilson did not advocate an apolitical public administration. Rather, Wilson’s reading of Stein may have convinced him that the future administration had to be a source of law, or, in other words, a political organ with far-reaching competences.

Wilson referred to Stein in his 1894 lecture on public law in order to provide his students with a state theory he thought appropriate for American circumstances. After his overview of inaccurate state theories, Wilson concluded,
When he talked about the “organs of the state and its means of action,” he relied on Stein to define administration: “The Nature of Administration . . . is the continuous and systematic carrying out in practice of all the tasks which devolve upon the State. . . . It deals directly, indeed, and principally with the structural features and the operative organs of state life; . . . ‘Die Idee des Staates ist das Gewissen der Verwaltung’ (Stein)” (Link 1970b, 28–29; cf. 1968b, 363; 1969b, 124). Clearly, Wilson agreed with Stein in regard to the political significance of public administration.

When Wilson envisaged a science-based, hierarchically organized, formalized, and meritocratic public administration, he pictured concrete organizational aspects that were close to the concepts of Hegel and Bluntschli (1875, 601–27; cf. Sager and Rosser 2009). Wilson thought that the thorough training of the administrative elite would lead to a body of altruistic, dutiful public servants. The remarkable confidence in public administrators may have stoked fears of many Americans who traditionally opposed top-down political organization. Wilson seems to have been aware of that when he stated, “I know that a corps of civil servants prepared by a special schooling and drilled, after appointment, into a perfected organization, with appropriate hierarchy and characteristic discipline, seems to a great many very thoughtful persons to contain elements which might combine to make an offensive official class,—a distinct, semi-corporate body with sympathies divorced from those of progressive, free-spirited people, and with hearts narrowed to the meaness of bigoted officialism” (Link 1968b, 375). However, then he continued by saying that there “is no danger in power, if only it be not irresponsible. . . . if it be centered in heads of the service and in heads of branches of the service, it is easily watched and brought to book.” Wilson apparently believed that a hierarchically organized and professionalized public service would deal altruistically with public life (Link 1968b, 375–76).

Wilson was interested in what Bluntschli and Stein had to say about the organic state in general and public administration in particular, because he was confronted with a dilemma and, as a consequence, interested in change. Wilson believed that an expansive administration would save the people from the destructive influence of egoistic individualism, which he thought was prevalent in U.S. politics. This egoistic individualism had led to the most painful thorn in Wilson’s side: corruption. In fact, “Wilson’s vision of a greatly enlarged role for government in national governance [was] based on his belief that politics had become almost hopelessly corrupt and impure” (Pestritto 2005, 222; cf. Cook 2006, 336). In “The Study of Administration,” for example, he lamented the “crooked state of administration, the confusion, sycophancy, and corruption ever and again discovered in the bureaux at Washington” (Link 1968b, 363).

He believed that thoroughly educated public servants would not be susceptible to corruption. He was convinced that the administration would serve as the guardian of the common will and the promoter of public welfare. In that sense, in order to take “politics out of administration” (Overeem 2005, 317), Wilson formulated a normative politics-administration dichotomy.

Rohr (1986) interprets Wilson’s trust in the power of an “enlightened” administration as an expression of his conservative view of democracy and attributes Wilson’s conservatism to the organic political philosophy of Bagehot and Burke (Rohr 1986, 69). Rohr argues that Wilson shared with the framers of the constitution the fear of the “tyranny of the masses,” but he did not envision the same means to remedy this dilemma. Rohr (1986, 74) explains that whereas the founders had seen the means to save “democracy from its own excesses” in the separation of powers, Wilson aimed at a strict separation of politics and “enlightened” administration instead. Pestritto disagrees with Rohr’s interpretation and finds no continuity between the framers’ and Wilson’s ideas about the subject. He argues that “Wilson placed administrative power on an entirely different plane from constitutional power, and it is the sharp distinction between constitutional politics and administrative discretion that separates Wilson from those earlier thinkers . . . who had also placed great importance on national administration” (Pestritto 2005, 237). He concludes that “Wilson’s apparent conservative organicism is not nearly as important as his progressive idealism. Or, to put it another way, his affinity for Burke gives way to his devotion to Hegelian political philosophy” (Pestritto 2005, 223).

Wilson’s reliance on German organicism seems to indicate that he should not be interpreted as a conservative, but rather as a progressive intellectual. What distinguishes him from the intellectual tradition of his forefathers is his definition of society. For Wilson, society was not merely a conglomerate of individuals in the sense of a civil association, but rather a purposive association in which “the individual was really an indistinguishable part of a larger community” (Pestritto 2003, 555). Wilson’s organic account of the state implies that he believed Americans would recognize themselves as bound together for the joint pursuit of the common good. Wilson thought his contemporaries would understand that the realization of the common good was intricately linked with public administration. Like Hegel, Bluntschli, and Stein, he saw no contradiction in advocating a highly influential administration in the same breath as an administration subordinate to the people. In this vein, he noted several times that
"[a]dministration . . . sees government in contact with the people. It rests its whole front along the line which is drawn in each State between Interference and Laissez faire. It thus touches, directly or indirectly, the whole practical side of social endeavour" (Link 1969b, 116; cf. 1968b, 373; 1970a, 411; 1970b, 29). Hence, it seems appropriate to concur with Pestritto's conclusion about Wilson's optimistic progressivism. However, as has been argued before, it does not follow from this that Wilson drew a sharp distinction between constitutional and administrative aspects of government. On the contrary, he did not intend to draw a dividing line between "constitution" and "administration," because he interpreted the American constitution as a set of general guidelines that were subject to historical change.

Miewald argues that during Wilson's academic career, Wilson could only arrive at a coherent theory on public administration "by resorting to the highest levels of abstraction," or, to put it differently, by increasingly relying "upon the organic theory of the state" (1984, 23; cf. 26). Considering the essential role that organic political theory played in both Wilson's intellectual context at Johns Hopkins University and his writings on administration, it is debatable whether Wilson resorted to the organic accounts of Bluntschli and Stein, or whether their theories provided Wilson with a starting point. On the whole, however, this case study substantiates Miewald's interpretation of Wilson's reliance on German organicism. Arguably, it was German organic political theory that provided Wilson with a coherent set of implications from which he could deduce concrete aspects of administration. The "concept of the organic state was not a mere academic conceit" for Wilson (Miewald 1984, 22). Instead, he understood the state quite literally as a living organism.

Conclusion and Outlook
To claim that Wilson was determined by German sources would be an unsustainable exaggeration. However, as this comparison of Wilson's work on administration with passages from Stein's and Bluntschli's writings has shown, he was eagerly interested in what the Germans had to say about public administration. Most importantly, it has been argued that the organic theories of Bluntschli and Stein informed Wilson's ideas about the proper relationship between the political and administrative aspects of government.

With regard to high politics, reading German organic political theories may have inspired Wilson to contrast "constitution" with "administration" as well as "legislation" with "administration." By distinguishing between the constitutional and administrative aspects of government, Wilson aimed to demonstrate that the state was subject to historical change. He believed that constitutional principles such as the trias politica should no longer be interpreted as an irreducible set of premises, but as general guidelines for government activity. According to Wilson, the time had come for public administration to translate these guidelines into concrete actions. Similarly, in order to distinguish between general plans and special means, he contrasted legislation and administration. Wilson saw in public administration the means to compensate for the gradual pace of legislation. He thought that a body of altruistic, dutiful public servants would promote the common good of society, which he believed had primacy over the good of the individual. Public administration had to be protected from the influence of egoistic individualism and corrupt politics. In that sense, in order to take politics out of administration, Wilson formulated a prescriptive politics–administration dichotomy.

With regard to current research, Rutgers (2001a) shows how important and nevertheless problematic dichotomies are for Public Administration. This case study has provided evidence of the several dimensions contained within the politics–administration dichotomy. For the sake of analytical clarity, we should distinguish between the analytical, the substantial, and the normative meanings of the concept. With regard to the last, it should be considered whether scholars have separated the two spheres to protect administration from political influence or to insulate democracy from an overwhelming bureaucracy (Overeem 2005). In terms of an outlook, this case study may exemplify how primary source–based examinations of reciprocal receptions of American and European scholars may further our search for common terminological ground on both sides of the Atlantic. The transfer of ideas approach may contribute to the clarification of polysemous meanings of and terminological difficulties within administrative concepts and may put them into perspective.

In addition, comparative Public Administration may benefit from the transfer of ideas approach. Comparative scholars usually concentrate on differences between bureaucratic paths rather than on similarities and reciprocal inspirations. As a consequence, they suggest that continental European and American administrative developments have proceeded separately and continue to do so. According to Werner and Zimmermann, "in the case of the comparative method, where the deductive aspect is often significant, national issues, pre-existing and crystallized in a language and in specific categories of analysis, pose a risk of partly prefiguring the results" (2006, 46). Rutgers's (2001b) article on the different sentiments in European and American administrative thought, which has provoked reactions from high-profile administrative scholars such as Stillman (2001) and Rohr (2001), shows that it makes sense to contrast the Anglo-American stateless tradition with the continental European tradition, where the state has always figured as the center for administrative research. Rutgers concludes, however, that the two traditions are largely ideal-typical constructions. The transfer of ideas approach takes such elaborated, clear-cut units of investigation—diametrically opposed administrative traditions—as a starting point. Hence, the transfer approach does not claim to "escape the weight of such pre-established national formatting, but its inductive orientation aims to limit effects through an investigative mechanism in which the objects, categories, and analytical schemes are adjusted in the course of research" (Werner and Zimmermann 2006, 46). By analyzing how contact between two administrative paths results in their deviation, the inductive orientation of the transfer of ideas approach may clarify in what respect intellectual traditions are historically adequate descriptions and in what respect they prove to be ideal-typical constructions.
Finally, if comparative scholars conceptualize administrative paths as isolated and autonomous, they must comprehend ideational change by referring to “critical junctures” as periods of significant change, or, alternatively, they will have to continue merely describing incremental change. The transfer of ideas approach also takes “critical junctures” into account. However, it additionally conceptualizes “change” as a result of mutual inspiration and fertilization. Metaphorically speaking, it may help set rather static national traditions in motion. On the whole, the transfer of ideas approach should not be regarded as an alternative to comparative Public Administration, but as a complementary tool to assess the findings of comparative research.

Acknowledgments

The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Hubert Treiber of the University of Hannover and Joachim Eibach, Fritz Sager, Pascal Hurni, and Christine Trampusch of the University of Bern on an earlier version of this paper.

Notes

1. With regard to terminology, “Public Administration” is used to refer to the study and “public administration” to the practice.

2. In 1884, Wilson was introduced to the academic subject of “public administration.” Thirteen years later, he stopped lecturing on the subject at Johns Hopkins University.

3. I would like to point out that all translations of German texts, and consequently all potential mistranslations, are my own.

4. Several authors have discussed Wilson's British (e.g., Karl 1976; Rohr 1986, 69–75; Stillman 1973) and French (Martin 1987) intellectual background.

5. In nineteenth-century Germany, various versions of organic political theory existed. I focus the discussion of the analogy's implications on Hegel, Stein, and Bluntschli, because it was Stein who brought Hegel's notion of bureaucracy to the United States, and because Bluntschli's private library, containing more than 3,000 books and manuscripts, was donated to Johns Hopkins University in the early 1880s (Adams 1885, 122; Rutgers 1994; Miewald 1984). In addition, contemporary scholars may object that Hegel's organicism has little to do with understanding the state as a “natural” body. His organicism should rather be linked with individual and collective self-determination and rationality (e.g., Neuhouser 2000). However, as it is the aim of this paragraph to illustrate how scholars of the late nineteenth century interpreted Hegel, a traditional reading of Hegel seems appropriate.

6. It should be noted that Stein favored a constitutional monarchy in which the head of state would participate in both the legislative process as well as in government (Böckenförde 1978, 608; Miewald 1984, 20).

7. Mulford (1881, 8) used the terms “nation” and “state” synonymously.

References


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