FIG. 2-3 The elite model
FIG. 2-2 The group model

Ibid., p. 37.
FIG. 2-4  A rational model of a decision system
FIG. 2-5 A rational resource-allocation model
FIG. 2–7 A game-theoretic matrix for the game of "chicken"

The game theorist himself supplies the numerical values to the payoffs. If Driver A chooses to stay on course and Driver B chooses to stay on course also, the result might be scored as $-10$ for both players. But if Driver A chooses to stay on course and Driver B veers, then Driver A might get $+5$ ("Courage") and Driver B $-5$ ("Dishonor"). If Driver A veers but Driver B stays on course, the results would be reversed. If both veer, each is dishonored slightly ($-1$) but not as much as when one or the other stayed on course.
FIG. 2-8  The systems model