Economic Development, Environmental Degradation, and the Persistence of Deprivation in Poor Countries*

by

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November 2002

* This is a revised version of the Inaugural Lecture of a Lecture Series that was organised at the World Bank for the Bank’s Environmentally Sustainable Development Month (April 2002). The original version served as a background paper at the United Nations’ World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, 26 August - 4 September 2002. The text was also used as the basis of a lecture at the symposium marking the award of the Volvo Environment Prize 2002, Gothenburg, October 9, 2002.

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Development as Economic Growth

As a subject of inquiry the economic development of poor countries is only a half-century old. Classical economists were certainly much concerned to identify the social processes that create prosperity;¹ but it was not until the emergence of independent nations in Asia and Africa that economic development became a specialised field. In order to improve upon contemporary development processes economists studied the impact of economic decisions on human well-being not only in the present and near future, but in the distant future too. Unfortunately they also became attached to the idea that an increase in gross national product (GNP) is the key to economic development and to the elimination of poverty.² To be sure, GNP growth was recognised to be a means only, but the means took on such a life of their own in policy discussions, that if someone were to ask, "growth in what?", the response would promptly be, "growth in GNP."

With this background development economics soon acquired a central dogma, that the key to economic progress in poor countries lies in increasing the rate at which capital is manufactured there.³ Admittedly, the United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI) has recently been added to the list of national economic indicators, and is regarded by many to reflect human values more closely than GNP. But HDI, in common with GNP, for the most part reflects current well-being.⁴ This is a major shortcoming. If we are to unearth the character of sustainable development, we should peer not only at the present and near future, but at the distant future too.

¹ Recall the title of that most famous economics treatise of all, Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.

² Of an enormous literature adopting this viewpoint, see the World Bank’s World Development Report 1986 (New York: Oxford University Press).

³ The classic on this line of thinking is W. Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour", Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, 1954, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 139-91.

⁴ HDI is a combined index of GNP per head, life expectancy at birth and literacy. Country estimates of HDI are offered annually in the annual Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme. Since the weaknesses that I identify below in GNP as a measure of social well-being are shared by HDI, I shall not comment on the latter here. For an account of HDI’s particular weaknesses, see my Human Well-Being and the Natural Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
Wealth and Well-Being

In speaking of an economy, I want to cast a wide net here. The economy in question could be that of a household, or it could be that of a village, a district, a state, a nation, or even the whole world. An economy’s prospects are shaped by its institutions and by the size and distribution of its capital assets. Taken together they are its productive base. Note though that institutions are different from capital assets, in that the former comprise a social infrastructure for guiding the allocation of resources, among which are the capital assets themselves.

We have a name for the overall worth of an economy’s capital assets: wealth. Although economic statisticians have customarily interpreted wealth narrowly, the measure is in fact an inclusive one. Wealth is based on a comprehensive list of assets, one that includes not only manufactured capital (roads and buildings; machinery and equipment; cables and ports) and what is nowadays called human capital (knowledge and skills), but also natural capital (oil and minerals; fisheries, forests and, more broadly, ecosystems).

Wealth is an aggregate measure. To say that an economy’s wealth has increased is to say that in terms of their worth, there has been an overall accumulation of capital assets. By the same token, to say that wealth has declined is to say that there has been an overall decumulation. Of course, even if some assets have decumulated, wealth would increase if there has been a compensatory accumulation of other assets in the economy. I shall use the term "genuine investment" to mean any change in wealth, regardless of whether the change is a decline or an increase. Genuine investment is to be contrasted from recorded investment. Since many services obtained from natural capital are missing from standard economic accounts, recorded investment could be positive even if genuine investment were negative. This would happen if the economy accumulated manufactured and human capital, but destroyed or degraded natural capital at a fast rate - a possibility I explore below.

An asset’s worth is measured in terms of the flow of benefits it is able to generate over time. Being the aggregate worth of all capital assets, wealth therefore reflects something like an economy’s capacity to sustain human well-being - today and in the future. In fact one can say more. Subject to certain qualifications, a rise in wealth per person corresponds to an increase in the average well-being of present and future generations. This is the sense in which wealth is a measure of well-being. Concomitantly, it is the sense in which an accumulation of wealth
corresponds to sustained development. Genuine investment is thus a key to economic progress.\(^5\)

Now consider in contrast GNP, which is taken to be the sum of an economy’s rate of consumption and its (gross) investment in manufactured and human capital. GNP misleads not only because changes in the size and composition of much natural capital are ignored by it, but also because, being gross national product, the index does not acknowledge that capital assets depreciate. So it is possible for GNP to increase over a period of time even while the economy’s wealth declines. This would happen if increases in GNP are brought about by mining capital assets - for example, degrading ecosystems and depleting oil and mineral deposits - , without investing appropriate amounts of output in the accumulation of other forms of capital, such as education. There is then little reason to expect movements in GNP to parallel movements in wealth. Of course, a situation where GNP grows and wealth declines cannot last forever. If wealth decumulates sufficiently, GNP will eventually have to decline also. But the moral is telling: GNP (or for that matter HDI) is not a measure of human well-being, meaning that movements in GNP (or for that matter HDI) are a poor basis for judging economic progress.

**The Environment: Luxury or Necessity?**

That Nature is a part of our productive base may appear a commonplace, but scratch an economist and you are likely to find someone who regards the natural environment as a mere luxury. For it is even today commonly thought that, to quote an editorial in the UK’s *The Independent* (4 December 1999), "... (economic) growth is good for the environment because countries need to put poverty behind them in order to care"; or, to quote *The Economist* (4 December, 1999: 17), "... trade improves the environment, because it raises incomes, and the richer people are, the more willing they are to devote resources to cleaning up their living space."

These passages reflect a detached view, observed from Olympian heights. The viewpoint encourages even economic egalitarians to justify the use of GNP as a measure of human well-being in poor countries: since the environment is a luxury, why should one care if it depreciates

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during the early stages of economic development? Closer to home, however, matters look different. For Nature offers us a multitude of ecosystem services, which include maintaining a genetic library, preserving and regenerating soil, fixing nitrogen and carbon, recycling nutrients, controlling floods, filtering pollutants, assimilating waste, pollinating crops, operating the hydrological cycle, and maintaining the gaseous composition of the atmosphere. A number of these services filter into a global context (e.g., the atmosphere as a sink for pollutants), many are spatially localized.

Spatially localized natural assets are of the utmost importance to the world’s poor. When wetlands, inland and coastal fisheries, woodlands, ponds and lakes, and grazing fields are damaged (say, owing to agricultural encroachment or urban extensions or the construction of large dams), traditional dwellers suffer. For them - and they are among the poorest in society - there are frequently no alternative source of livelihood. In contrast, for rich eco-tourists or importers of primary products there is something else, often somewhere else, which means that there are alternatives. The range between a need and a luxury is enormous and context-ridden. Macroeconomic reasoning glosses over the heterogeneity of Earth’s resources and the diverse uses to which they are put - by people residing at the site and by those elsewhere. National income accounts reflect this reasoning by failing to record a wide array of our transactions with Nature.

The reason why changes in the size and composition of natural capital are in large measure missing from national accounts is that Nature’s services most often do not come with a price tag. The reason for that is that property rights to natural capital are often very difficult

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to establish, let alone enforce. And the reason for that is that natural capital is frequently mobile. At the broadest level soil, water, and the atmosphere (which are capital assets themselves) are media that enable capital assets to connect among themselves and flourish, meaning that a disturbance to any one asset can be expected to reverberate on many others at distances away, sometimes at far distances. Under current practice though the consequences of the connectedness of natural capital can easily go unnoted in economic transactions. It can then be that those who destroy mangroves in order to create shrimp farms, or cut down forests in the uplands of watersheds to export timber, are not required to compensate fishermen dependent on the mangroves, or farmers and fishermen in the lowlands whose fields and fisheries are protected by the upland forests. Economic development in the guise of growth in per capita GNP can come in tandem with a decline in the wealth of some of the poorest members of society.

**Nature’s Services and the World’s Poor**

Rural communities in poor countries recognised the local connectedness of Nature’s services long ago and devised institutional mechanisms to cope with the problems created by it. A pond or a woodland is a coupled system of organic and inorganic material, offering multiple services. Some offer current consumption goods, while others are capital goods that can be expected to generate consumption in the future. This feature of the internal structure of ponds and woodlands makes them unsuitable for division into private property. In recent years anthropologists, ecologists, economists, and political scientists have identified a wide variety of non-market institutions that evolved over centuries to mediate economic transactions in Nature’s services. These institutions are frequently communitarian and are based on long term relationships among community members. Moreover, they were designed to respond to the character of the natural capital under their jurisdiction. For example, it is usually not difficult to observe how many animals someone has let into the village grazing field, but it is not always easy to determine the catch someone has made in a fishery. Institutions for managing grazing land and coastal fisheries reflect these differences.

The importance of common property resources for the rural poor was demonstrated in a remarkable paper by the economist Narpat S. Jodha. In a sample of semi-arid Indian villages

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8 Economists refer to unre corded economic interactions as "externalities".

he estimated the proportion of household income from such property to be 15-25 percent. Recent work on village data from Zimbabwe report the proportion to be as high 40 percent. Not surprisingly it is the poorest households that are most dependent on them.

Unhappily, in recent years communitarian institutions have eroded in many of the poorest regions of the world. There are a number of reasons for this, among which State interference in the way they function would appear to have been prominent, especially in Sahelian Africa. State usurpation of common property (e.g., for logging or for construction of large dams) without adequately compensating local inhabitants has been another reason. Since improved transportation can make it easier for people to raid the commons without the risk of being observed, the building of roads, otherwise a good thing, have been known to weaken community forest management practices. By creating a fertile ground for battles over resources, large population increases have been yet another reason why communitarian systems have faltered.

Ironically, the growth of markets may have contributed as well, by changing the incentives people have for continuing to remain in long term relationships. The point is that long term relationships are almost always sustained by social norms, such as norms of reciprocity. The growth of markets in one set of goods and services can weaken the incentives people have for remaining in long term relationships involving transactions in other goods and services. When such incentives weaken, social norms decay. But the decline in incentives does not occur equally among all economic actors. When, for example, market opportunities in the neighbouring town expand, it is the young men of the village who are able to take advantage of them, not the women with children, nor the old. But it is often the women and children who bear the responsibility for working the commons (collecting firewood, water, herbs, and fruit). So we should not be surprised that they get hurt when norms decay. When decaying communitarian institutions are neither stayed nor replaced by effective institutions to complement the growth of markets, the economically weakest are the most to suffer. Economic theory predicts such possibilities,\textsuperscript{10} and rural studies in the world’s poorest regions have confirmed them.\textsuperscript{11}


Any system, human or otherwise, responds when perturbed. Public policies lead to all sorts of effects rippling through unnoticed by those who are unaffected, because there may be no obvious public signals (e.g., price changes) to accompany them. Tracing the ripples requires an understanding of non-market interactions and of their interplay with markets. In order to identify policies that would help to sustain development, decision makers need to evaluate the ripples, which means that Nature’s services have to be valued first. But this is rarely done. So it is all too possible for the number of people who are recorded as being poor to decline over time even while a proportion of the poor become poorer still, but remain undetected. Recent findings, that growth in GNP per head in poor countries have been allied to poverty reduction suffer from this weakness: the data for the most part cover market transactions and do not reveal changes in the composition of poverty during the growth process. The weaknesses in present-day national accounts mirror the weaknesses in contemporary policy thinking.

**Genuine Investment in Poor Countries**

Even though there are no markets for many natural assets - and therefore no observable prices that reflect their worth - it is possible to assign notional prices to Nature’s services if we are prepared to put in the effort and apply some low cunning. Economists call them "shadow prices" (or alternatively, "accounting prices"). Shadow prices measure the social worth of goods and services in an economy, and are the ones to use in determining movements in wealth.

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13 The search for methods of estimating notional prices of natural capital is an active field of research today. The hard part of the work lies in determining the connectedness of natural capital from a study of the ecological processes at work.
By estimating shadow prices and then adding net investment in natural capital to recorded investment, the World Bank has recently calculated genuine investment in a large number of countries.\textsuperscript{14} There is a certain awkwardness in the steps the investigators have taken to arrive at their figures. Their accounts are also incomplete. For example, among the resources making up natural capital, only commercial forests, oil and minerals, and the atmosphere as a sink for carbon dioxide were included. Not included were water resources, forests as agents of carbon sequestration, fisheries, air and water pollutants, soil, and biodiversity. So there is an undercount, possibly a serious one. Moreover, some of their methods deployed for estimating shadow prices are dubious. Nevertheless, if we are to read the true macroeconomic character of the recent economic history of poor countries, we have to start somewhere. With this in mind I have used the World Bank figures to estimate changes in wealth per head - over a quarter century starting 1970 - in sub-Saharan Africa, the Indian sub-continent, and China. Taken together, these regions are where the bulk of the world’s 1 billion poorest live. They are also the regions that have experienced the largest growth in population.

The first column of figures in the accompanying table provides the annual rate of growth of population over the period 1965-96. Notice that all but China experienced rates of growth in excess of 2 percent a year, sub-Saharan Africa and Pakistan having grown in numbers at nearly 3 percent a year.

The second column of the table contains my estimates of the annual rate of change in wealth per head during 1970-1993.\textsuperscript{15} The striking message is that in all but China there has been a decumulation in per capita wealth. Moreover, if we compare the figures in the first two columns, we see that during the period in question Bangladesh and Nepal became poorer in the aggregate, not just on a per capita basis. In contrast, the other regions accumulated wealth in the aggregate. But wealth did not keep pace with population in India, Pakistan, and sub-Saharan


\textsuperscript{15} The table was originally prepared for my Presidential Address to the Royal Economic Society at its annual conference in St. Andrews, Scotland, in July 2000, and was published as "Valuing Objects and Evaluating Policies in Imperfect Economies", \textit{Economic Journal}, 2001, vol. 111 (Conference Proceedings), pp. 1-29. The paper explains the steps that were taken to convert the World Bank’s estimates of genuine investment into figures for changes in wealth per head.
Africa. All this may not be a surprise in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, which is widely known to have regressed in terms of most economic indicators. But the figures for Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan should cause surprise. They certainly surprised me when I first estimated them. Even China, so greatly praised for its progressive economic policies, has just about managed to accumulate wealth in excess of population growth. In any event, the estimates of genuine investment do not include soil erosion or urban pollution, both of which are thought by experts to be especially problematic in China.

How do changes in per capita wealth compare with changes in conventional measures? The third column of the table contains figures for the rate at which GNP per head changed during 1965-96; and the fourth column records whether the change in the United Nations’ Human Development Index over the period 1987-1997 was positive or negative.16

Notice how misleading our assessment of long-term economic development in the Indian sub-continent would be if we were to look at growth rates in per capita GNP. Pakistan, for example, would be seen as a country where GNP per head grew at a healthy 2.7 percent a year, implying that the index doubled in value between 1965 and 1993. The corresponding figure in the second column implies though that the average Pakistani became poorer by a factor of about 1.5 during that same period.

Bangladesh is recorded as having grown in terms of per capita GNP at 1 percent a year during 1965-1996. The figure in the second column of the table implies that at the end of the period the average Bangladeshi was only about half as wealthy as she was at the beginning.

The case of sub-Saharan Africa is of course especially depressing. At an annual rate of decline of 2 percent in per capita wealth the average person in the region became poorer by nearly a factor of two. The ills of sub-Saharan Africa are routine reading in today’s newspapers and magazines, but the ills are not depicted in terms of a decline in wealth. The table suggests that sub-Saharan Africa has experienced an enormous decline in its capital assets over the past three decades.

What of the Human Development Index? As the second and fourth columns of the table show, HDI offers a picture that is the precise opposite to the one we should obtain when judging the performance of poor countries. For sub-Saharan Africa the index grew, but for China it

16 The period covered for HDI is short only because the index was first published in 1990 in the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Report 1990.
declined. Moreover, Bangladesh and Nepal have been exemplary in terms of HDI. The Human Development Index misleads even more than GNP.

The figures in the table for per capita wealth changes are rough and ready and we should not regard them with anything like the certitude we have developed over the years for international statistics on GNP and the demographic and morbidity statistics of poor countries. My estimates are a first cut at what is an enormously difficult set of exercises. The theory on the basis of which I have tried to reassess the recent economic history of the poorest regions is firm, it is the applied counterpart that remains very weak. But the figures, such as they are, show how accounting for natural capital can make for substantial differences to our conception of the processes of economic development. We would by now have been far ahead in our understanding of what really has happened in poor countries if development economists had taken Nature’s services seriously in the past.

**Winners and Losers**

There is an understandable temptation on the part of development practitioners, both in academia and international organizations, to focus on contemporary history’s many winners. After all, or so it is pointed out regularly, people everywhere on average live longer today than they did in the past, eat better, are better educated, and (excepting in sub-Saharan Africa) earn more. But village level studies in the poorest regions of the world, being more discriminatory, have frequently revealed something else also, or so I have found. They have uncovered enormous additional hardship that has been experienced during the process of recent economic growth. In this lecture I have offered a framework, based on modern economics, that is able to read not only contemporary history’s winners, but also its many losers. I have also tried to show how a revision of national accounts can enable macro level statistics to better reflect micro level facts. It seems to me such a correspondence is necessary if we are to search for policies that can be expected to lead to economic progress, rather than economic growth.

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17 The reason China is seen to have regressed is that HDI is a relative index: even when a country has improved in terms of each component of HDI, it could still show a deterioration if some other countries have improved even more.
### Table

Economic Change in the Poor World: 1970-93

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>g(L)^b</th>
<th>g(W/L)^c</th>
<th>g(Y/L)^d</th>
<th>∇(HDI)^e</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>-2.40</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>+ve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>+ve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-2.60</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>+ve</td>
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<td>2.9</td>
<td>-1.70</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>+ve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>-2.00</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>+ve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>-ve</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a g(L): average annual percentage rate of growth of population, 1965-96.

b g(W/L): average annual percentage rate of change in wealth per head at constant prices. Adapted from Kirk Hamilton and M. Clemens, op. cit, and from data provided to me in personal communication by Katie Bolt of the World Bank.

c g(Y/L): average annual percentage rate of change in GNP per head, 1965-96.